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 INTRODUCTION: 
CLIMATE DISRUPTION AND GOVERNMENTAL ACTION:  
APPROACHES, OBSTACLES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 
JOEL A. MINTZ* 
 
On February 6th and 7th, 2014, Nova Southeastern University and 
the Center for Progressive Reform co-sponsored a symposium on New 
Directions in Energy Law and Policy, Climate Disruption and Sea Level 
Rise.  The gathering—which was held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida—featured 
presentations by an outstanding interdisciplinary group of scientists, legal 
scholars, federal, state and local government officials, representatives of non-
governmental organizations and others, along with thoughtful questions and 
comments from the audience.  Preparation of a written law review article was 
not made a prerequisite to speaking at the symposium, and—primarily due to 
other professional commitments—most of those who spoke on symposium 
panels chose not to summarize or expand their oral comments in a written 
piece.  Nonetheless, three distinguished, nationally prominent legal 
scholars—Professors David Driesen, Joseph Tomain, and Thomas 
McGarity—followed up by submitting the articles that comprise this 
important issue of the Nova Law Review.  In this brief symposium 
introduction, I will summarize some of the key points advanced by each of 
the article authors, note two themes that are common to their pieces, and 
discuss a few of the implications of their perceptive work. 
In Phasing Out Fossil Fuels, David Driesen advances a powerful 
case for a planned and reasonably rapid phase out of fossil fuels.  Noting that 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions account for fully eighty percent of all 
greenhouse gas emissions—both in the United States and globally—that 
once emitted CO2 remains in the atmosphere for centuries, and that fossil 
fuels cause immense problems wholly apart from their impacts on climate, 
Driesen argues that the predicted and possible consequences of climate 
disruption are simply too serious to permit a very gradual shift to a carbon 
free economy. 
Professor Driesen soundly rejects the theory that any phase out of 
fossil fuels should set emission targets or prices designed to equalize costs 
and benefits at the margins.  He perceptively observes that cost-benefit 
analysis does not provide a useful guide to policy since the costs and benefits 
of particular mitigation measures cannot be quantified with precision; and it 
is morally unacceptable to refuse to prevent deaths in developing—and some 
developed—countries because prevention would be too costly.  Instead, 
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Driesen calls for a focus on distribution of the costs of phasing out fossil 
fuels, including particularly the hardships this needed policy might create for 
individuals who are employed in the fossil fuels industry, and for energy 
consumers.  He advocates the use of emission trading to phase out fossil 
fuels.  He also suggests the enactment of an environmental competition 
statute—legislation that would allow facilities reducing their carbon 
emissions to collect the cost of their emission reductions from competitors 
with higher carbon emissions—as a spur to technological innovation in the 
control of CO2. 
With regard to the politics of phasing out fossil fuels, Professor 
Driesen advises environmental leaders to make the phasing out of fossil fuels 
part of a rhetorical strategy that prepares the American public for much more 
significant changes than are now politically feasible.  However, he concedes 
that it is not possible for anybody to prove a view about what political 
strategy is best, and he views his own strategic recommendation as simply a 
starting point for further discussion. 
In contrast with David Driesen’s article, Professor Thomas 
McGarity’s illuminating piece, The Disruptive Politics of Climate 
Disruption, focuses less on the normative question of what the energy policy 
approach of the United States should be, and far more on the sobering 
realities of national climate disruption politics.  In a remarkably 
comprehensive, detailed, and well-documented way he describes five failed 
attempts by supporters of a federal program to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to move legislation through Congress.  These include the Clinton 
administration’s proposed BTU tax, Senator Jim Jeffords’ four pollutant bill, 
the Lieberman-Warner proposal, and the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Lieberman-Graham bills.  In each instance, Professor McGarity demonstrates 
coordinated, well-funded, ideologically-driven campaigns—conducted by the 
business community, a small coterie of conservative funders, and various 
foundations and institutions that they created—that successfully forestalled 
the passage of climate disruption legislation. 
McGarity carefully analyzes the lessons to be learned by 
environmental advocates from these successive legislative defeats.  He 
observes that the political infrastructures that the business community has 
erected over the past thirty-five years have had a powerful influence on both 
public opinion and the sentiments of federal elected officials.  Due to those 
efforts, America is now deeply divided on numerous issues—certainly 
including climate disruption; and many Americans are now persuaded that 
climate disruption is neither caused by humans nor a genuine threat, and that 
the government should not interfere in private economic arrangements.  The 
business community has adeptly taken advantage of regional differences and 
made effective use of ginned up grassroots organizations.  Moreover, 
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although they have experienced internal difficulties, business interests have 
generally remained unified in their political positions regarding climate 
disruption legislation. 
McGarity notes that—like the general public—the two major 
national political parties are now substantially divided along ideological 
lines.  While Democratic leaders in Congress have experienced great 
difficulty corralling enough votes to get mandatory climate disruption bills 
through committees and past floor votes, Republican congressional leaders 
have been able to persuade nearly all of their party’s members to vote against 
all such proposals as a bloc.  Additionally, major environmental 
organizations supporting anti-climate disruption bills have been repeatedly 
outgunned and outclassed by the sophisticated, well-resourced efforts of 
lobbyists and public relations experts working to further the positions of 
industry.  Furthermore, notwithstanding its profoundly harmful impacts, 
climate disruption is too gradual a process to create the sort of crisis 
atmosphere among the public that is likely to generate Congressional action. 
Given these various considerations, Professor McGarity concludes 
that Congress is not likely to enact national anti-climate disruption 
legislation for some time to come.  And even if such legislation somehow 
does emerge, it will probably contain a jumble of conflicting provisions that 
may not actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effective way. 
Unlike the Driesen and McGarity articles, Professor Joseph 
Tomain’s well-reasoned article concentrates on investor owned electric 
utility companies and state public utility commissions.  He argues that the 
utilities must recognize the realities of enormous shifts in the electricity 
market, create new business models, and join with state regulators to create a 
new regulatory compact. 
As Professor Tomain’s piece lucidly describes, the demand for 
centrally generated electricity has fallen very considerably since the early 
1990s, and it is projected to decline much further in coming years.  This 
trend is the result of a combination of factors, including competition from 
new technologies, increases in energy efficiency, lifestyle changes among 
energy consumers, and certain shifts in federal and state regulatory 
requirements.  At the same time, electric utilities are now called upon to 
make significant new investments in order to upgrade the current grid, to 
develop and use new technologies, and to promote interconnections with 
renewable resources.  To meet these new challenges, Tomain contends, a 
new set of regulatory principles is now urgently needed. 
More specifically, Joseph Tomain proposes five new precepts as a 
general guide to state regulation of utilities.  First, he writes, utilities should 
not be required to incur “stranded costs,” i.e. excess costs due to regulatory 
or policy changes that force utilities to lose customers.  Simultaneously, 
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however, universal electric service must be maintained by the utilities.  
Third, traditional cost-of-service rulemaking should not be used to allow 
utilities to build coal-fired plants or projects based on nuclear power.  Fourth, 
competition and the development of innovative energy technologies—
including technologies friendly to distributed generation of energy and the 
development of solar, wind, and other renewable energy projects—must be 
encouraged.  Finally, public utility commissions should encourage electric 
utilities to adopt new business models that are more in sync with a rapidly 
shifting electricity marketplace. 
Professor Tomain argues for some significant departures from 
traditional ratemaking practices.  He favors rate designs that base utility rates 
on factors other than the volume of electricity sales, such as the number of 
customers that a utility serves, and the sums that the utility has invested in 
smart grids, energy audits, smart meters, and the like.  He also favors regular, 
mandatory reviews of the prudence of utility capital investments, and state 
regulatory assessments of the need for power, before investments are made 
in new large-scale utility construction projects. 
Finally, Tomain urges investor-owned utilities to place their 
emphasis on distribution and customer service instead of on generating 
electricity.  In his view, utilities should evolve into the managers of a modern 
infrastructure system.  In the future, their focus should be on providing 
financial products for firms that wish to install distributed energy technology, 
develop and provide energy storage, and promote distributed generation and 
energy efficiency retrofits. 
Although the three articles that form this symposium issue concern 
quite disparate aspects of the policy and politics of climate disruption, upon 
close examination two common themes are evident.  First, each of the article 
authors either identifies or presumes a very clear need for a change in the 
status quo.  Professor Driesen identifies a need for a reasonably rapid 
phasing out of fossil fuels at the national level and assays its implications.  
Professor Tomain urges a new regulatory regime and a new business model 
for electric utilities that responds to the realities of climate disruption.  And, 
although his article is primarily historical and empirical, Professor McGarity 
also identifies a need for new legislation to curb climate disruption, writing 
that the impact of human greenhouse gas emissions “may well be the most 
profound environmental problem that the civilized world has ever 
encountered.” 
Secondly, all three authors note the need for a meaningful 
governmental role in curbing climate disruption.  Driesen takes the view that 
climate disruption poses problems of coordination that make it unsolvable 
without a significant government role; and he proposes profound changes in 
our national approach to energy policy.  McGarity assesses the prospects for 
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national legislative change through the enactment of a federal statute to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions; and Tomain argues for new directions in state 
administrative regulation of electric utilities. 
Beyond these similarities, the three fine articles in this symposium 
issue also imply some less obvious conclusions.  Given the dismal prospects 
for the enactment of federal legislation to curb climate disruption 
demonstrated in Professor McGarity’s piece, it may well be that those 
concerned with this grave and burgeoning threat should focus, to an 
increased extent, on pressing for policy changes among the states, rather than 
at the national level.  Professor Tomain’s recommendations, of course, 
already emphasize a need for regulatory reforms by state electric utility 
regulators and state legislatures.  Although Professor Driesen’s provocative 
energy policy recommendations would clearly be most effective on a 
national—if not an international—level, their adoption by state legislators 
and regulators, and environmental non-governmental organizations, would 
nonetheless count as a forward step toward a carbon free economy. 
In addition, given the ongoing political obstacles to reforming 
governmental energy policies among some U.S. states and in the federal 
government, these symposium articles seem to imply a need for climate 
disruption opponents to concentrate more on persuading non-governmental 
actors to make helpful changes.  Thus, for example, environmental advocates 
may wish to improve their relationship with the news media generally and 
with television weather reporters in particular.  Much of what the public 
learns about disastrous climate disruption-related events is gleaned from the 
reports of television meteorologists.  If weathercasters noted that particular 
severe droughts, floods, and cyclonic storms are consistent with well-
supported scientific studies that predict an increase in human caused 
weather-related disasters—even though no individual weather event may be 
directly linked to climate disruption—public awareness of the perils of 
climate disruption may be significantly increased.  Patient relationship-
building with television weather reporters, and their editors and producers, 
might persuade some of them to adopt that progressive approach. 
Anti-climate disruption advocates will also do well to friend raise 
among business enterprises that already recognize the acute dangers posed 
by global climate disruption.  Even though few such companies have thus far 
been willing to break openly with the anti-regulation/anti-government 
positions espoused by the business community, over time some anti-climate 
disruption business leaders may find the courage to do so.  Their political 
support would certainly be of benefit.  Along the same lines, quiet 
discussions with leaders of electric utility companies might persuade a 
number of them to modernize their business models along the sensible lines 
recommended by Professor Tomain. 
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
392 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
All in all, the outstanding articles contained in this symposium issue 
provide a rich sampling of the sorts of careful research, thorough analysis, 
and creative thought that is much needed in discussions of climate disruption 
and public energy policy.  Each one is a valuable contribution to the field.  I 
hope these top-notch symposium articles will provoke your thought, stir your 
conscience, and benefit your work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The impact of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases (“GHG”s) on the Earth’s climate may well be the most 
profound environmental problem that the civilized world has ever 
encountered.  Since the United States has until quite recently been the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases, its efforts to ameliorate climate disruption by 
reducing those emissions have been of considerable interest to its citizens 
                                            
* Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law, 
University of Texas School of Law; board member, Center for Progressive Reform. 
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and the rest of the world’s inhabitants.1  Yet, it has done very little to reduce 
GHG emissions until very recently, and even those initial steps have been 
tiny in comparison to what reputable scientists say is needed to mitigate 
climate change.  In the years since climate disruption became a serious 
political issue in the late 1980s, supporters of a federal program to reduce 
GHG emissions have made five serious attempts to move legislation through 
Congress—the Clinton Administration’s British Thermal Unit (“BTU”) tax 
in the 103rd Congress, Senator Jim Jeffords’ four-pollutant Bill in the 107th 
Congress, the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the 110th Congress, and the 
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bills in the 111th 
Congress.2  All five of these efforts failed.3 
This article will examine these five major legislative initiatives with 
an eye toward extracting lessons for future efforts to enact major 
environmental legislation.  While there are many reasons for Congress’ 
failure to enact climate disruption legislation, including concerns about the 
underlying science and the efficacy of proceeding ahead in the absence of 
commitments from other massive GHG emitters like China and India,4 I will 
argue that one powerful explanation lies in a thirty-five-year war against 
government regulation waged by the business community, several prominent 
conservative foundations, and the institutions that they created and 
nourished.  I will show how these institutions played a prominent role in 
defeating climate disruption legislation, even when the business 
community’s solid opposition to climate disruption appeared to be dissolving 
as some companies accepted the reality of climate disruption and amended 
                                            
1. Anup Shah, Climate Change and Global Warming Introduction, GLOBAL 
ISSUES (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/233/climate-change-and-global-
warming-introduction. 
2. See infra Part III. 
3. Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap Emissions—Democrats Forgo 
Centerpiece of President Obama’s Energy Plan, As Cap-and-Trade Fails to Lure Broad 
Poiltical Support, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A3 [hereinafter Power, Senate Halts Effort to 
Cap Emissions]; Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less 
Likely, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Aug. 6, 1993, at 12, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Eric 
Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME (June 9, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1812836,00.html; S. 556 (107th):  Clean Power Act of 2002:  Overview, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s556 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); 
111th Congress Climate Change Legislation, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
4. See James Parker-Flynn, The Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Climate 
Science, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 11098, 11118 (2013); Juliet Eilperin & David A. Fahrenthold, 
Missteps Weigh on Agenda for Climate; Academic Breaches, Flaws in Seminal Report Feed 
Doubts on Warming, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A1; David Bennett, Cap and Trade—
Tough Questions, DELTA FARM PRESS (July 30, 2009), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/
management/cap-and-trade-tough-questions. 
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their business models accordingly, while others saw opportunities to profit or 
gain competitive advantage from such legislation.5 
My thesis is that the institutions that trade associations and 
conservative funders created and continue to create have by-and-large 
remained true to a laissez faire minimalist prescription for the nation’s 
economy, and they are therefore unalterably opposed to legislation that 
would subject greenhouse gas emitters to government-imposed controls, 
even when such controls might serve the economic interests of a substantial 
number of businesses.  This adamant opposition, which has in turn 
influenced members of Congress from both political parties, has effectively 
forestalled climate disruption legislation.  I will further argue that the 
presence of these powerful negative voices in the legislative debates proved 
to be of great strategic value to companies that preferred that Congress not 
enact any legislation, but wanted a place at the table when Congress was 
shaping the bills that would greatly affect their interests if they became law.  
Hence, the fractures in the business community are not likely to affect the 
vitality of these institutions in the foreseeable future. 
Part II of this article will briefly describe the Laissez-Faire Revival 
that I document in my book—Freedom to Harm—by highlighting the 
institutions that the business community and conservative funders created to 
resist progressive governmental initiatives like climate disruption 
legislation.6  Part III will describe the five attempts to enact climate 
disruption legislation and detail the role those institutions played in defeating 
each of those initiatives.  Part IV will explore some of the lessons that we 
can learn from these failed attempts.  The article reaches the rather 
discouraging conclusion that strong climate disruption legislation is not 
likely to emerge from a deeply divided Congress that reflects the deep 
divisions in the current political culture over the proper role of government 
in today’s economy. 
II. THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 
The Laissez Faire Revival began in the late 1970s as a reaction 
against the progressive legislation that Congress enacted during the late 
1960s and early 1970s to protect consumers, workers, and the environment 
                                            
5. See Reena Jana, The Business Benefits of Going Green, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-22/the-
business-benefits-of-going-greenbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-
advice. 
6. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE 
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 6 (2013). 
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from risky products and business practices.7  Several wealthy conservative 
benefactors spent millions of dollars to create an idea infrastructure 
consisting of think tanks and free enterprise centers in universities and law 
schools.8  Financed largely through conservative foundations and corporate 
contributions, this idea infrastructure conducted an air war against federal 
regulation in books, scholarly journals, magazines, white papers, internet 
blogs, op-ed columns, media interviews, and talk shows.9  Three think tanks 
that played prominent roles in the climate disruption battles were the 
Heritage Foundation, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (“CEI”), and the 
George C. Marshall Institute.10 
The business community also created an influence infrastructure to 
conduct the ground war against regulation in the regulatory agencies and 
Congress.11  The most visible of the ground troops during the climate wars 
were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“CoC”) and the National Association 
of Manufacturers (“NAM”).12  Less visible, but still highly influential were 
the so-called astroturf grassroots organizations that trade associations and 
conservative funders created to run advertising campaigns in the districts of 
swing members of Congress, sponsor local rallies, and generate phone calls, 
letters, and emails to members of Congress.13  Some of these organizations, 
like the American Energy Alliance (“AEA”), Citizens for a Sound Economy 
(“CSE”), and Americans for Prosperity, were permanent institutions that 
fought in many wars.14  Others were created on an ad hoc basis by public 
relations firms working for companies and trade associations to conduct 
focused campaigns against particular legislative initiatives.15  Another 
critical component of the influence infrastructure was an extremely effective 
media echo chamber for influencing the content of news and political 
commentary at both the national and local levels.16  Two highly influential 
                                            
7. Id. at 5. 
8. Id. at 40. 
9. See id. at 41–56. 
10. Id. at 247; Parker-Flynn, supra note 4, at 11100. 
11. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 57. 
12. Id. at 60. 
13. Id. at 58–59. 
14. See id. at 59; Robert Parry, What Wouldn’t Bob Do for Koch Oil?, 
NATION, Aug. 26–Sept. 2, 1996, at 11, 13–14; Peter H. Stone, Grass-Roots Goliath, NAT’L J., 
July 13, 1996, at 1529, 1530.  “Established in 1984 by George Mason University economics 
professor Richard Fink with funding from the David H. Koch Foundation,” CSE was a 
sophisticated Astroturf grassroots operation committed to “‘lower taxes, less spending, less 
regulation, and free trade.’”  MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 58; Stone, supra note 14, at 1530. 
15. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33. 
16. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER: 
RUSH LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 20 (2008); JOHN 
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN 
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pro-business media outlets were Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation and 
David Smith’s Sinclair Broadcast Group, both of which hosted 
commentators, like Rush Limbaugh and Steve Milloy, who preached a 
populist-flavored laissez faire minimalist message to millions of viewers and 
listeners and provided ready access to conservative think tank scholars.17 
With strong idea and influence infrastructures in place, the business 
community launched three powerful assaults on the protective governmental 
infrastructure that Congress established during the Progressive Era, New 
Deal Era, and Public Interest Eras.18  Those assaults have thus far failed to 
achieve their fundamental goal of repealing the landmark environmental and 
consumer protection statutes of the 1970s, but the business community’s idea 
infrastructure has been remarkably successful in shaping public attitudes 
toward government regulation in society.19  After a 35-year barrage of anti-
regulation rhetoric, many Americans have lost faith in the capacity of 
government to protect it from the vicissitudes of the marketplace. 
The business community has never been monolithic in its opposition 
to federal regulation.20  Pollution control technology vendors, for example, 
have not always been strong supporters of the CoC’s fierce attacks on 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulations.21  Indeed, the fact 
that the bedrock regulatory statutes have survived may, in part, be 
attributable to an understanding on the part of influential members of the 
business community that the appearance of a protective governmental 
infrastructure is necessary to maintain the public’s perception that it is not 
wholly at the mercy of unconstrained economic forces, and that perception, 
in turn, is necessary to maintain a stable economic structure within which 
businesses can thrive.22  During the past few years, there has been a highly 
visible split in the business community on the issue of global warming that 
                                                                                                       
AMERICA 162 (2004); Patricia J. Williams, The Disquieted American, NATION, May 26, 2003, 
at 9.  Compare Distorting Climate Change Findings on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s 
“Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in the ‘20s and ‘30s,” MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 24, 2007, 5:02 PM), http://www.mediamatters.org/research/2007/10/
24/distorting-climate-change-findings-on-kcol-jame/141487, with Company Profile, SINCLAIR 
BROADCAST GROUP, http://www.sbgi.net/about/profile.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
17. DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE: RIGHT-WING MEDIA 
AND HOW IT CORRUPTS DEMOCRACY 171 (2004); JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 16, at 46; 
MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 16, at 162; Distorting Climate Change Findings 
on KCOL, James Guest Said Gore’s “Global Warming Crusade Is a Lot Like Eugenics Was in 
the ‘20s and ‘30s,” supra note 16. 
18. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 6, 60–61. 
19. See id. at 61. 
20. See id. at 39–40, 61. 
21. See Elizabeth Williamson, Climate Issues Divide U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Big Members, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at A6. 
22. See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
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goes deeper than the fraying at the edges that might be expected in any large 
organization putatively devoted to a single cause.23  The following 
description of the battles over climate change legislation will highlight these 
divisions and evaluate their significance. 
III. THE ASSAULTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION 
Climate disruption became a salient public policy issue in the mid-
1980s as scientists verified the reality of human activity-induced global 
warming and called for increased energy efficiency to reduce GHG 
emissions.24  During his 1988 campaign to be the nation’s first environmental 
president, candidate George H.W. Bush promised to take action to address 
global warming.25  Soon after his inauguration, the EPA delivered a report to 
Congress proposing bold action, including fees on coal, oil, and natural gas 
to discourage future use of those fossil fuels in producing electricity.26  A 
panel of experts assembled by the National Academies of Sciences urged the 
federal government to take concrete steps to reduce GHG emissions, 
including raising energy taxes and enacting mandatory efficiency 
standards.27 
The business community responded to these developments with a 
coordinated campaign to sew doubt in the minds of policymakers and the 
public about the scientific basis of global warming predictions.28  Relying 
heavily on think-tanks and a small group of mostly industry-funded scientists 
in academia, the electric utility and manufacturing industries sponsored an 
effective public relations campaign to persuade Congress not to enact 
legislation requiring mandatory GHG reductions.29  The Global Climate 
                                            
23. Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, ELECTRICITY J., Dec. 2009, at 1, 1, 
5–6. 
24. See Erik Eckholm, New Predictions See Rise in CO2 Transforming Earth, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1984, at C1; Philip Shabecoff, Major ‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is 
Unavoidable, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1988, at C1 [hereinafter Shabecoff, Major 
‘Greenhouse’ Impact Is Unavoidable, Experts Say]. 
25. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 108. 
26. Philip Shabecoff, E.P.A. Proposes Rules to Curb Warming, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 1989, at C7. 
27. Rudy Abramson, Prompt Action to Curb Global Warming Urged 
Environment:  Science Panel Says U.S. Could Cut ‘Greenhouse’ Pollution 40% with Little 
Economic Cost, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at 1. 
28. ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS; THE COVER-UP; 
THE PRESCRIPTION 9, 19, 31 (1998); SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE 
EXPERTS!  HOW INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 272 
(2001). 
29. GELBSPAN, supra note 28, at 9, 19, 31; RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 
28, at 270. 
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Coalition (“GCC”) was created in 1989, comprising of the CoC, the NAM, 
and the auto and energy industries to lobby against climate change 
legislation.30  In 1991, the National Coal Association (“NCA”), the Western 
Fuels Association, the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”), and trade 
associations for the coal, oil and gas, and electric utility industries, created a 
group called the Information Council on the Environment (“ICE”) which 
“launched a[n] . . . advertising and public relations [effort] to . . . ‘reposition 
global warming as theory—not fact.’”31  The public relations firm it hired 
arranged for the sympathetic scientists on its advisory board to appear in 
broadcast appearances, op-ed pages, and newspaper interviews.32  Faced with 
this strong opposition from the business community, the Bush 
Administration did not seriously attempt to fulfill the president’s campaign 
promise.33 
Toward the end of the Bush Administration, however, a thin fracture 
line began to develop in the business community’s opposition to climate 
disruption regulation as the American Gas Association (“AGA”)—a trade 
association of natural gas producers and distributors—joined the Solar 
Energy Industries Association in sponsoring a study concluding that the 
United States could reduce GHG emissions and increase employment by 
moving rapidly to natural gas-fired power plants, renewable energy, and 
high-efficiency technologies.34 
A. The BTU Tax in the 103rd Congress 
The Clinton Administration hit the ground running with a proposal 
for a tax on energy consumption as part of the Administration’s broader 
legislative effort to balance the federal budget and stimulate the economy.35  
During the first two weeks of January 1993, transition officials debated 
whether the tax should be on the carbon content of all fuels—a carbon tax— 
or the heating value of all fuels—a BTU tax.36  The BTU tax offered a 
weaker incentive to move toward renewable energy than a carbon tax, which 
would not have affected dams, solar energy generators, or nuclear power 
                                            
30. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 270; Margaret E. Kriz, Warm-
Button Issue, NAT’L J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 319, 322 (1992) [hereinafter Kriz, Warm-Button 
Issue]. 
31. RAMPTON & STAUBER, supra note 28, at 272. 
32. Id. at 272–73. 
33. Kriz, Warm-Button Issue, supra note 30, at 319, 320. 
34. Margaret E. Kriz, The New Eco-nomics, NAT’L J., May 30, 1992. 
35. Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, PLATTS INT’L GAS REP., Feb. 5, 1993, 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
36. David Hage & Sara Collins, Pointing to Tax Increases, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 46; Gas a Winner in Tax Debate, supra note 35. 
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plants.37  Environmental groups therefore favored the carbon tax.38  The coal 
industry and coal-burning utility companies, however, strongly opposed the 
carbon tax, arguing that it would result in substantial price increases for coal 
compared to natural gas and sources of energy that did not burn fossil fuels.39  
Both energy taxes were more attractive to the incoming administration than 
an addition to the federal gasoline tax, which would have been immediately 
noticeable to consumers.40  Since the Democratic Party controlled the White 
House and both houses during the 103rd Congress, supporters of an energy 
tax were optimistic.41 
Both the energy industry and industries that were large consumers of 
energy were united in their opposition to any new energy taxes.42  The EEI, 
the primary trade association for the electric utility industry, prepared a set of 
economic analyses of several variations of energy taxes and presented them 
to members of the transition team and incoming Energy Secretary Hazel 
O’Leary.43  The industry argued that any tax capable of reducing GHG 
emissions would have to be so high that it would have an undesirable impact 
on the economy and a disproportionate impact on the poor.44  The CoC also 
took an uncompromising stand against any energy tax.45  Long before the 
Clinton Administration drafted proposed legislation, industry lobbyists and 
Astroturf grassroots groups were meeting with—and phoning and sending 
emails to—White House officials and members of Congress, urging them to 
stop the energy tax in its tracks.46  The President publicly complained that 
                                            
37. Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Matthew L. Wald, Pondering an Energy 
Tax That Can’t Please All the People: Experts See Three Practical Ways to Levy a ‘Broad-
Based’ Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at F10. 
38. Hage & Collins, supra note 36; Wald, supra note 37. 
39. Hage & Collins, supra note 36 (referencing coal-producing state 
opposition); Wald, supra note 37. 
40. Eric Pianin & Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Suggestions Propel 
Opponents to the Barricades; Coalitions of Interests Make Enactment Difficult, Analysts Say, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at A10; David Wessel & Rick Wartzman, Energy Interests 
Mobilize Against a New Tax, But Real Fight May Focus on What Form It Takes, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 26, 1993, at A16. 
41. Michael Weisskopf & Steven Mufson, Lobbyists in Full Swing on Tax 
Plan; Some Groups Already Have Shaped Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1993, at A1. 
42. Viveca Novak, An Energy Tax? Ok, If It’s Not on Us, NAT’L J., Feb. 13, 
1993; Wessel & Wartzman, supra note 40. 
43. Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial 
Balloon, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Feb. 5, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1739616. 
44. Id.; Utilities, Automakers Note Comments by O’Leary That Energy Tax 
May Be Delayed, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Jan. 25, 1993 (quoting Alan Richardson, 
American Public Power Association). 
45. Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
46. Weisskopf & Mufson, supra note 41; Michael Wines, Clinton Makes 
Lobbyists a Target in Opening Battle over Tax Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A15. 
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opponents of the carbon tax “ha[d] already lined the corridors of power with 
high-priced lobbyists.”47 
In late January, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen announced that 
the incoming Administration was considering an energy tax, and the major 
players in the business community’s influence infrastructure sprang into 
action to shoot down the trial balloon.48  The American Petroleum Institute 
(“API”) hosted a well-attended gathering for all interested companies and 
trade associations at which the message was “[l]et’s not fight each other.”49  
The GCC circulated reports concluding that an energy tax would increase 
unemployment and precipitate an economic downturn.50  A brand new 
association of public utility companies calling itself the Alliance Against a 
Carbon Tax conducted grassroots organizing and lobbying against the tax.51  
A Denver-based think tank called the Center for a New West contracted for 
studies concluding that a carbon tax would cause regional imbalances and 
put more than 600,000 jobs at risk.52  Nearly all electric utility companies 
opposed any tax on electrical energy,53 but Southern California Edison—a 
large utility company that had already invested heavily in natural gas 
facilities—supported a BTU tax.54 
On February 17, 1993, President Clinton announced a four-year 
blueprint for stimulating the American economy that included, among its 
many revenue-enhancing provisions, a BTU tax on nearly all fuels.55  The 
decision to go with a BTU tax, rather than a carbon tax, reflected the 
Administration’s determination to make the proposal as palatable as possible 
to Democrats from coal-producing states by spreading the burden to other 
                                            
47. Wines, supra note 46. 
48. Industry Repeats Opposition to Taxes as White House Floats Trial 
Balloon, supra note 43; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
49. Novak, supra note 42. 
50. Id.; Pianin & Lippman, supra note 40. 
51. Novak, supra note 42. 
52. Carbon Tax Could Harm Economy, Environment, Think Tank Studies 
Claim, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 16, 1993. 
53. See Death of Energy Tax Makes Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes 
Less Likely, supra note 3. 
54. AES’ Sant Backs Energy Tax, Citing Environmental, Efficiency Benefits, 
UTIL. ENV’T REP., Apr. 2, 1993, at 13, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
55. Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All; Yearly Cost 
Estimated at Up to $150 Per Household, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A1 [hereinafter 
Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All]; Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to 
‘Face Facts,’ Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, 
at A1. 
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fuels, including nuclear and hydroelectric power.56  Yet, in a victory for 
environmental groups, the proposal exempted wind and solar power from the 
tax.57  The Bill also included additional funding for the federal low-income 
energy assistance program to offset some of the adverse effect on low-
income Americans.58  Since the tax would be hidden in gas, electric, and fuel 
bills, most Americans would probably not notice that they were paying it.59  
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) predicted that the tax would result in the 
reduction of GHG emissions by about 25 million tons per year.60 
Environmental groups supported the proposal.61  Although they 
favored a carbon tax, they were persuaded by Treasury Secretary Bentsen 
that it was politically infeasible.62  They worried that the tax rate was too low 
to result in a reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, but they 
decided that any increase in the cost of fossil fuels would encourage power 
plants to consider moving to renewable sources of energy.63  And they were 
pleased that President Clinton had chosen the BTU tax over a gasoline tax.64  
Consumer groups were dubious about the tax because of its regressive effects 
on low-income consumers.65  But they applauded the provisions in the 
proposal ensuring that low-income consumers did not bear a disproportionate 
burden of the tax.66  They warned regulated utility companies that if they 
tried to persuade state public utility commissions to allow them to pass the 
tax through to consumers, the groups would argue that the companies already 
                                            
56. Margaret Kriz, A Green Tax?, NAT’L J., Apr. 17, 1997; Energy Tax 
Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Feb. 22, 
1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1748628. 
57. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55. 
58. Id.; Clinton Plan:  BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, 
Feb. 18, 1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
59. Lippman, Energy Tax Would Touch All, supra note 55. 
60. Clinton Plan:  BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, supra note 58. 
61. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, NAT’L 
ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 22, 1993 (quoting Dan Lashof, National Resources Defense 
Council (“NRDC”)); Thomas W. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint; 
Environmentalists Back Plan They Helped Draft, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1993, at D1 
[hereinafter Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint]. 
62. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61. 
63. See Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, 
supra note 61; Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 917–18 (quoting Dan Lashof, NRDC). 
64. Lippman, Energy Tax Proposal Has ‘Green’ Tint, supra note 61. 
65. Novak, supra note 42; Economist:  Energy Tax Would Penalize Western 
Coal, Could Hurt Environment, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Mar. 5, 1993, at 3, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
66. Environmental Groups Flex For Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
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owed consumers hundreds of millions of dollars in rebates because of 
unexpected declines in interest costs on capital projects.67 
The energy industry was unified in its opposition to the tax.68  The 
API predicted that the tax would cost seven hundred thousand jobs and 
reduce the gross national product by about $5 billion.69  The coal industry 
estimated that coal prices would increase by more than 25%.70  
Manufacturing trade associations argued that it would bring a nascent 
economic recovery to a rapid end.71  Even the natural gas industry was 
unhappy.72  Its primary concern was the decision to collect the tax from 
natural gas producers at the wellhead, rather than from consumers at the 
consumption end of the pipeline.73  At the same time, the major natural gas 
players did not join the chorus of energy interests in the hope that a less 
categorical stand would be more likely to get it a seat at the negotiating table 
when the proposal began to work its way through Congress.74  The Electric 
Generation Association, a trade association representing independent power 
producers, offered qualified support for “a properly structured broad-based 
energy tax.”75  Not surprisingly, the American Wind Energy Association and 
the Geothermal Resources Association strongly supported the proposal, so 
long as wind and geothermal energy remained exempt from the tax.76 
                                            
67. Craig S. Cano, Gas Groups Gain Some Ground in BTU-Tax Debate; 
Discussions Continue, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 
1756589 (quoting Edwin Rothschild, Citizen Action). 
68. Republican, Democratic Senators Voice Concern on BTU Proposal, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 26, 1993 (quoting Jerry Jasinowski, National Association of 
Manufacturers). 
69. Administration Figure on Consumer Costs “Grossly Underestimated,” 
Industry Says, NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), Feb. 24, 1993. 
70. Congress Checks Impact of BTU Tax; NCA Registers Protest, PLATTS 
COAL OUTLOOK, Mar. 1, 1993, at 8, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (discussing a 
perverse effect); Economist:  Energy Tax Would Penalize Western Coal, Could Hurt 
Environment, supra note 65. 
71. Kriz, A Green Tax?, supra note 56 at 919. 
72. Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, 
supra note 56 (undermining competitiveness; devastating impact). 
73. Sonali Paul, ‘Where?’ Is Gas Worry over Clinton BTU Tax, PLATTS 
OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 1993, at 3, available at 1993 WLNR 1726354; President Clinton’s 
Proposal to Tax Energy Sources Including Natural Gas Is Part of Broad Economic Reform 
Program That Also Emphasizes Natural Gas R&D and Use, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Feb. 18, 
1993, at 1, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
74. See Craig S. Cano, Gas Industry Distancing Itself from Harsh Criticism of 
Energy Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1709083. 
75. Energy Tax Focuses on Raising Money, Ignores Costs, Officials Growl, 
supra note 56 (quoting Thomas Dodd, Electric Generation Association). 
76. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
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Stung by the industry criticism, the Clinton Administration adopted 
“a strategy of placate and conquer.”77  As they worked out the details of a 
proposed bill, high-level officials engaged in a series of meetings with 
industry lobbyists over a two-week period in an attempt to address their 
objections.78  They hoped to convince the industries that an energy tax was 
inevitable and they were better served by working with the Administration 
than by standing on the outside denouncing any energy tax.79  Trade 
associations for the natural gas industry quickly agreed to meet with 
Administration officials to argue that the tax should not be collected at the 
wellhead.80  The manufacturing, petroleum, and electric utility industries 
continued to take a hard line against any energy tax, even though that meant 
that they were not invited to participate in the negotiations.81  The NAM 
assembled an ad hoc 1300-member umbrella group containing a broad array 
of energy, manufacturing, and transportation companies called the 
Affordable Energy Alliance—later renamed the American Energy Alliance—
the exclusive goal of which was to kill the BTU tax.82  It hired two public 
relations firms to conduct a $2 million advertising campaign to generate 
pressure on members of Congress from energy-producing states to oppose 
the tax.83  The Sierra Club responded with a far less resource-intensive 
appeal to its members to urge their representatives to support the tax.84 
President Clinton’s BTU tax proposal got off to a bad start in 
Congress.85  At a hearing conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy and 
the Environment in late February 1993, Committee Chairman Bennett 
                                            
77. Thomas W. Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at D1 [hereinafter Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes]. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id.; see White House Firm on BTU Tax, Appears Flexible on Collection 
Point, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1718127. 
81. Lippman, Administration Courts Energy Tax Foes, supra note 77; 
Environmentalists Question Utility Efforts to Move BTU Tax Downstream, UTIL. ENV’T REP., 
Mar. 19, 1993, available at 1993 WLNR 1727921 (reporting the position of the EEI). 
82. Compare New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint 
Effort, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 6, 1993, at 3, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com, 
with Lobbyists Boast BTU Tax Beaten in the House, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, May 24, 1993, at 
1, available at 1993 WLNR 1726814. 
83. David S. Hilzenrath, Miscalculations, Lobby Effort Doomed BTU Tax 
Plan, WASH. POST, June 11, 1993, at D1; Timothy Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a 
Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1993, 
at A18 [hereinafter, Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem 
Able to Write Own Exemptions]. 
84. Environmental Groups Flex for Industry Opposition to BTU Tax, supra 
note 61. 
85. See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 
25, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1731982. 
29
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 405 
Johnston (D-Louisiana) expressed his strong opposition to the proposal.86  
The Republican committee members all opposed the BTU tax.87  The Clinton 
Administration failed to provide a witness to defend the tax, and no other 
members of the committee came to its defense.88  In late March, Senator 
Johnston expressed a willingness to support a BTU tax, so long as it was 
collected by electric utility companies directly from consumers—something 
that Administration officials opposed because they feared it would 
precipitate a consumer revolt.89 
In early April, the Treasury Department circulated a draft of a 
modified BTU tax that changed the point of collection for natural gas from 
the wellhead to the local distribution companies and for coal from the coal 
producer to the utility companies that burned the coal.90  The natural gas 
industry remained unhappy with the change because it still did not place the 
burden of payment on the ultimate consumer of the gas.91  The petroleum and 
electric utility industries remained adamantly opposed to the tax.92  The coal 
industry was pleased with the changes, but it continued to oppose the Bill 
because of the disproportionate negative economic impact it would have on 
the industry as a whole.93  The National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners and consumer and environmental groups strongly opposed 
the shift in the collection point.94 
Capitulating to industry pressure once again, President Clinton 
agreed to allow the tax to be collected by utility companies without the 
                                            
86. Craig S. Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to 
Implementing BTU Tax, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, Mar. 29, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Cano, While 
Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU Tax], available at 1993 WLNR 
1716991; Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85. 
87. See Skeptical Senators Reveal BTU Doubts, supra note 85. 
88. Id. 
89. Cano, While Not Sold on Idea, Johnston Cites Keys to Implementing BTU 
Tax, supra note 86. 
90. Treasury Unveils Modified BTU Tax Proposal, CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 1, 
1993. 
91. Bill Loveless, AGA’s Baly Says Details of BTU Tax Are ‘Major Blow’ to 
Gas Industry, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 5, available at 1993 WLNR 1726625; 
James Risen, Lobbyists Win Changes in Energy Tax Proposal Revenue:  Administration Says 
Some Industries Would Get Exemptions.  Burden Would Shift Closer to Consumers, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at 1. 
92. Patrick Crow, U.S. BTU Tax Plan Revised; Industry Wary of Results, OIL 
& GAS J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 21, 21; Loveless, supra note 91. 
93. See Industry Reacts to BTU Tax Modifications, COAL & SYNFUELS TECH., 
Apr. 19, 1993, at 1. 
94. Jackie Calmes & David Wessel, Clinton Changes Course on Part of 
Energy Tax: Agreement Would Ease Restrictions on Utilities to Pass Along the Levy, WALL 
ST. J., May 11, 1993, at A2; States Try to Blunt BTU Tax Impact, PLATTS OILGRAM PRICE 
REP., Apr. 23, 1993, at 4, available at 1993 WLNR 1727380. 
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approval of state public utility commissions.95  The House Ways and Means 
Committee in mid-May approved a bill that contained this compromise, 
along with a number of exemptions for the aluminum and chlor-alkyl 
industries and farming interests.96  The House, in late May, narrowly 
approved (219-213) the stimulus bill with the BTU provision intact.97  It was 
the first time that either house of Congress had passed legislation aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions.98 
The battle then shifted to the Senate Finance Committee, where the 
CoC and the energy industry hoped to kill it.99  Because Senator David Boren 
(D-Oklahoma) was one of the senators who made up the eleven to nine 
Democratic majority on the committee, he became the target of an intensive 
campaign to influence his vote.100  The Affordable Energy Alliance and CSE, 
a grassroots organization devoted to less government regulation created in 
1984 by the David H. Koch Foundation,101 convened taxpayer rallies in 
Oklahoma, commissioned polls demonstrating strong opposition to the tax in 
Oklahoma, and generated letters and phone calls from his constituents urging 
him to oppose the tax.102  Newspaper ads proclaiming that Senator Boren 
could stop a BTU bill that stood for Big Time Unemployment were part of 
CSE’s $100,000 advertising campaign.103  A direct-mail blitz to more than 
nine thousand Oklahoma community leaders and a corresponding 
telemarketing campaign generated a huge number of pre-written letters and 
calls to Boren’s offices.104  In addition, a study commissioned by several 
                                            
95. Calmes & Wessel, supra note 94. 
96. House Ways and Means Approves Tax Plan With Modified Energy Tax, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), May 17, 1993; Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways 
and Means Reports Bill, PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 17, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 
1746071. 
97. In Close Vote, House Sends Energy Tax and Budget Plan on to Senate, 
PLATTS INSIDE FERC, May 31, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1711901. 
98. John M. Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, House Leaders Gained 
a Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20 [hereinafter Broder, Adding Something for 
Everyone]. 
99. Patrick Crow, BTU Tax Battle Hits Capitol Hill, OIL & GAS J., May 10, 
1993, at 25, 25; Patrick Crow, Clinton’s BTU Tax Starting to Fall Apart, OIL & GAS J., May 
17, 1993, at 24, 24; New Group Formed to Fight BTU Levy; API Part of New Joint Effort, 
supra note 82. 
100. Michael Weisskopf, Fanning a Prairie Fire; Capital Lobbies Stirred 
Oklahomans’ Tax Revolt, WASH. POST, May 21, 1993, at A1; Richard S. Dunham, With 
Friends Like David Boren…, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (June 6, 1993), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/1993-06-06/with-friends-like-david-boren-dot-dot-dot. 
101. Parry, supra note 14, at 13; Stone, supra note 14, at 1529–30; Weisskopf, 
supra note 100. 
102. Weisskopf, supra note 100. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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energy companies from economists at the University of Oklahoma predicted 
that the tax would destroy eleven thousand Oklahoma jobs, devalue farmland 
by $1 billion, and add $180 per year to household energy bills.105  The effort 
paid off when Senator Boren appeared at a rally on Capitol Hill sponsored by 
the Independent Petroleum Association of America to urge the attendees to 
help him kill the tax.106  Senator Boren then assembled a bipartisan group of 
senators to offer an alternative stimulus bill that did not include an energy 
tax.107 
Once it became clear that well placed political pressure could turn 
the President around, it was katy-bar-the-door as lobbyists insisted that their 
clients should not have to pay the tax.108  The NAM maintained that it 
contained so many loopholes that it was unfair to the industries that did not 
have one.109  Then, in late June, Clinton agreed to a giant exemption for the 
entire manufacturing and agricultural sectors of the economy.110  Still, 
Senator Boren refused to vote for any change that included any form of tax 
based on the heat content of fuel.111  The Finance Committee ultimately 
approved a bill with a 4.3¢ per gallon gasoline tax and a number of 
additional spending cuts, but no BTU tax.112  The Senate barely approved a 
deficit reduction bill that contained the modest gasoline tax in late June after 
Vice President Gore broke a fourty-nine to fourty-nine tie vote in which all 
of the Republicans voted against the Bill.113 
Worried that the conference committee might restore the BTU tax, 
both the AEA and CSE launched new advertising campaigns in the districts 
                                            
105. Id. 
106. Gas Lobby Wins BTU-Tax Concessions as Ways and Means Reports Bill, 
supra note 96. 
107. Sonali Paul, Boren Offers BTU Tax Alternative, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, 
May 21, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 1753024. 
108. See Jackie Calmes, President’s Call for ‘Shared Sacrifice’ Turns Into 
Scramble Among Lobbyists, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1993, at A3; Noah, BTU Tax Is Dying 
Death of a Thousand Cuts as Lobbyists Seem Able to Write Own Exemptions, supra note 83; 
William Neikirk, Dealing with Reality, CHI. TRIB. (June 20, 1993), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1993-06-20/news/9306200083_1_special-interests-bill-clinton-mining. 
109. Hilzenrath, supra note 83. 
110. Clinton Expects Senate to Pass Budget Reconciliation Bill This Week, 
NAT’L ENV’T DAILY (BNA), June 22, 1993. 
111. Id. 
112. Patrick Crow, U.S. Senate Deficit Bill Shifts Focus to Transport Fuels 
Taxes, Spending Cuts, OIL & GAS J., June 21, 1993, at 19, 19; EEI Concerned That Energy 
Tax May Be Resurrected in Final Budget Package, UTIL. ENV’T REP., June 25, 1993, available 
at 1993 WLNR 1760031. 
113. Eric Pianin & David S. Hilzenrath, Senate Approves Budget Plan, 50-49; 
Vice President Gore Casts Deciding Vote, WASH. POST, June 25, 1993, at A1. 
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of members of committee they deemed to be swing votes.114  The conference 
committee voted out a Bill with the Senate’s gasoline tax, and it passed both 
houses of Congress.115  The trade associations for the energy industry were, 
to say the least, pleasantly surprised by the outcome.116  In a thoughtful 
postmortem gesture, the AEA spent some of its remaining cash on 
newspaper ads thanking the Democratic Senators who had come to the 
industry’s aid.117 
Congress’ failure to pass a BTU tax left President Clinton’s April 
1993 promise to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000 in tatters.118  
And the ease with which the business community’s influence infrastructure 
forced the President to abandon the tax did not bode well for legislative 
efforts to address climate change during the remainder of his 
administration.119  Having prevailed in a face-to-face confrontation with the 
new President on his signature climate change initiative, energy industry 
lobbyists correctly predicted that climate change legislation would be a non-
starter for the remainder of the Clinton Administration.120 
B. The Jeffords Cap-and-Trade Bill in the 107th Congress 
Any hope that Congress would enact legislation requiring GHG 
reduction measures appeared dead with the Supreme Court of the United 
States’s declaration that George W. Bush had won the 2000 presidential 
election.121  The Bush Administration was far more concerned with 
increasing domestic energy production than in protecting the environment 
from global warming.122  Indeed, the Administration was not convinced that 
                                            
114. Timothy Noah, Energy Tax Compromise Presents Major Challenge for 
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WLNR 1754024 (quoting an unnamed lobbyist for the oil industry). 
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Carbon Levy, Other Environmental Taxes Less Likely, supra note 3. 
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121. See Tim Dickinson, Six Years of Deceit, ROLLING STONE, June 28, 2007, 
at 54. 
122. See Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Bush Plans on Global Warming Alter 
Little; Voluntary Programs Attract Few Firms, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A1. 
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anthropogenic emissions of GHGs did in fact increase global temperatures.123  
Instead of legislation, the Bush Administration preferred voluntary programs 
with vague and unenforceable targets.124  Nevertheless, President Bush 
recognized the need to place additional controls on grandfathered power 
plants to protect downwind states from long-range transport of nitrogen 
oxides (“NOx”), sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), and mercury emissions; it looked 
for some time like newly appointed EPA Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman would persuade the President to include GHGs in the Clear Skies 
Bill that the Administration was drafting to address the continuing problem 
of interstate transport.125 
Reports of a possible four-pollutant Clear Skies Bill sent energy 
industry lobbyists and conservative think tanks back into battle mode.126  A 
spokesperson for the CEI called the four-pollutant Bill a colossal mistake.127  
The coal industry and most of the electric utility industry undertook a 
massive lobbying campaign to convince the Administration to take GHG 
emissions out of the Bill.128  One focal point of the lobbying efforts was the 
Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group, a task force 
made up of high level governmental officials charged with recommending a 
national energy policy.129  The Cheney Task Force went out of its way to 
meet with lobbyists from the coal, petroleum, and utilities industries to solicit 
their views on what should be included in its report.130  The EEI put together 
                                            
123. Dickinson, supra note 121; Amy Goldstein & Eric Pianin, Hill Pressure 
Fueled Bush’s Emissions Shift, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at A1. 
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a group of around twenty utility executives to meet personally with Vice 
President Cheney.131  Representing several electric utility companies, former 
Republican National Committee chairman, Haley Barbour, sent a 
memorandum to Vice President Cheney urging the Administration to 
abandon the president’s campaign promise to regulate GHG emissions from 
power plants.132 
Presidential Economic Advisor, Lawrence Lindsey, “then 
convene[d] a series of meetings” at which officials from the EPA, the DOE, 
and the White House debated whether the administration’s Clear Skies Bill 
should include GHGs.133  At the same time, industry lobbyists focused a last-
minute barrage on the White House and sympathetic members of Congress in 
the hope that they would in turn put pressure on the President.134  Participants 
in the lobbying effort were later singled out for special praise for the efforts 
that Thomas Kuhn, the president of the EEI and a former Yale classmate of 
President Bush, had played in pleading the energy industry’s case.135  
Pressure also came from conservative think tanks and advocacy 
organizations.136  Grover Norquist, the head of Americans for Tax Reform, 
and Fred Smith, head of the CEI, complained directly to Bush’s political 
advisor Karl Rove.137 
In mid-March, the President announced that he would not support 
legislation mandating reductions in GHG emissions.138  The announcement 
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came as a surprise to EPA Administrator Whitman, who was busily assuring 
both the American public and European allies, that the United States would 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.139  Environmental 
activists accused the Bush Administration of yielding to industry pressure 
and criticized Whitman for failing to resign after her public humiliation.140  
Whitman gamely defended the President’s decision.141  Denying “that the 
president had ‘pulled the rug out’ from under her,”142 she promised to pursue 
alternative approaches to greenhouse gas reduction that would emphasize 
technology development, nuclear power, and voluntary approaches to 
reducing GHG emissions.143  The CoC and most of the energy industry 
praised the administration for adopting a more balanced approach to climate 
change.144  The greatest benefactors of the decision were coal producers and 
utilities that burned mostly coal in their plants.145 
Prospects for climate change legislation brightened somewhat in 
May 2001 when Senator James Jeffords of Vermont abandoned the 
Republican Party to become an independent who caucused with the 
Democrats.146  A primary reason for the move was Jeffords’ growing 
discomfort with the position of the Bush White House on environmental 
issues.147  In gratitude for returning the Senate to Democratic control, the 
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leadership appointed Jeffords to chair the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works.148  Jeffords had already introduced a four-pollutant bill 
that was modeled on the Clean Air Act’s acid rain program.149  The Bill 
would have required every covered source of carbon dioxide (“CO2”)—a 
greenhouse gas—to acquire an allowance for every ton of CO2 that it 
emitted.150  The allowances could come from many sources, including 
purchases at annual government auctions, gifts from the government to ease 
transitions, and purchases from other companies that held extra 
allowances.151  The total number of allowances available in any given year 
would be limited—or capped—by statute, and the caps would gradually 
decrease in accordance with specified statutory benchmarks.152  For example, 
the bill provided for reducing CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2012.153 
At this point, however, noticeable fracture lines were beginning to 
appear in the energy industry’s approach to climate change.154  The natural 
gas industry was disappointed with the Bush Administration’s disavowal of 
the president’s campaign promise, as were a few companies in the electric 
utility industry that had already invested heavily in nuclear power and natural 
gas-fired power plants and had begun to implement energy conservation 
measures, sometimes in response to state GHG reduction initiatives.155  
Concluding that GHG controls were inevitable, they valued the certainty of 
knowing what the rules would be as they planned future projects.156  In June, 
“a coalition of seven electric [power] companies” calling itself the Clean 
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Energy Group drafted a four-pollutant bill that would have cut CO2 
emissions to 2000 levels by 2008 and to 1990 levels by 2012.157  Utility 
companies more heavily invested in coal generating capacity and nearly all 
coal companies, however, remained steadfastly against any form of 
mandatory restrictions on GHG emissions.158  Eight coal-dependent utility 
companies created a new group called the National Electric Reliability 
Coordinating Council to lobby against climate change legislation.159 
To no one’s surprise, the proposed limitations on power plant 
emissions in the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Bill did not reach 
GHGs.160  Despite strong support from the energy industry, however, the 
proposal got a lukewarm reception in Congress.161  Instead, the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee marked up the Jeffords Bill.162  
No electric utility companies supported the Bill.163  An umbrella group 
purporting to represent “‘more than 75,000 businesses and millions of 
workers and energy consumers’” called the Coalition for Affordable and 
Reliable Energy (“CARE”) predicted that the Bill would cause “escalating 
energy prices and significant risk of electricity shortages for American 
consumers and businesses.”164  Despite President Bush’s threat to veto any 
bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG emissions,165 the Committee, 
after a bitter debate, voted largely along party lines to approve the Jeffords 
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Bill in late June.166  Jeffords offered to work with the Bush Administration to 
come up with a consensus bill, but EPA Administrator Whitman replied that 
“‘the door [was] closed’” on any negotiations that included a cap on CO2 
emissions.167  With a presidential veto assured, the Senate leadership decided 
not to take the Jeffords Bill to the floor.168  That turned out to be the death 
knell for climate change legislation for the next four years because the 
Republicans regained control of the Senate in the 2002 elections.169 
C. The McCain-Warner-Boxer Bill in the 110th Congress 
With both the House and the Senate controlled by the Democrats 
after the 2006 elections, the prospects for climate change seemed as bright as 
they had been in years.170  The new chairperson of the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works was Barbara Boxer (D-California), an 
outspoken proponent of climate change legislation, who characterized the 
Bush Administration’s record on climate change as worse than dismal.171  
Sensing a groundswell of public opinion in support of legislation,172 she 
hoped to make climate disruption a bipartisan issue.173  Boxer was joined in 
her enthusiasm by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico), the incoming 
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chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee.174  And some 
former skeptics in Congress––like Senators Ted Stevens and Lisa 
Murkowski of Alaska––were persuaded by the growing evidence of 
shrinking glaciers and disappearing permafrost that global warming was 
real.175 
The picture was not entirely rosy for proponents of climate change 
legislation, however, because a large number of Democratic members 
represented rust belt and energy-producing states that could be adversely 
affected by climate disruption legislation.176  Moreover, the election had 
taken a huge toll on moderate Republicans from the Northeast, thereby 
dimming the prospects for truly bipartisan legislation.177  In the House, 
Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan) replaced climate change denier 
Joe Barton (R-Texas) as chairperson of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, but Dingell was wary of any environmental legislation that 
affected the automobile manufacturers in his district.178  Finally, President 
Bush retained his veto power,179 and the Administration remained deeply 
opposed to any legislation providing for mandatory GHG emissions 
reductions.180 
Most of the climate disruption bills introduced at the outset of the 
110th Congress employed some variation of a cap-and-trade regime, but they 
presented a bewildering array of options on many critical issues.181  One 
issue was whether to apply the cap-and-trade regime to all sectors of the 
economy or just to power plants.182  Another was whether to allocate 
allowances to sources free of charge during the early years or auction them 
off to the highest bidders.183  Of those allowances given away to power 
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plants, another issue was whether to do so on the basis of the amount of 
electricity the plant produced—an option that would favor companies that 
relied on renewable energy and natural gas because they would have excess 
allowances to sell to coal-burning plants that produced much more CO2 per 
unit of electricity produced—or on the heat input of the fuels burned in the 
plant—an option that would favor coal-burning plants because it would 
prevent renewable energy and natural gas-burning plants from getting credit 
for the fact that they produced fewer CO2 emissions per unit of heat input.184  
Still another issue was whether or not the cap-and-trade program should 
contain a safety valve guaranteeing an upper price for allowances by 
requiring the EPA to sell all allowances demanded above the safety valve 
price, even though that would have the effect of raising the cap.185  A final 
issue was whether or not to preempt state GHG emissions reduction 
programs.186 
Sensing that the political winds were changing, some electric utilities 
began to shift their position from adamant opposition to any mandatory 
climate change legislation to grudging acceptance of the need for limits on 
GHG emissions.187  They were not opposed to a cap-and-trade program for 
GHG emissions so long as it did not single out the electric utility industry, 
allocated a substantial proportion for allowances free of charge in the early 
years, began auctioning allowances only after carbon control and 
sequestration (“CCS”) technologies were commercially available—most 
likely ten to twenty years in the future—, required little upfront expenditure, 
pushed the deadlines far into the future, and provided generous safety valves 
that ensured stable prices at some level.188  Beset by internal division, the 
EEI maintained a position of studied neutrality on the desirability of a cap-
and-trade regime for GHG emissions.189  The oil and gas industry continued 
to oppose mandatory climate change legislation, but indicated its willingness 
to support a properly designed cap-and-trade regime that also preempted all 
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state climate change laws.190  The coal industry maintained its strong 
opposition to any climate change legislation whatsoever.191 
Senator Boxer kicked off congressional consideration of climate 
change legislation with an ambitious series of nine hearings on climate 
change over three months.192  As the hearings progressed, it became apparent 
that some Republicans could support a cap-and-trade bill, if it would meet 
the electric utility industry’s demands and would eliminate the EPA’s highly 
successful new source review program under which the Justice Department 
was seeking very large penalties from most of the nation’s prominent electric 
utility companies.193  Others, like Senator James Inhofe and Representative 
Joe Barton remained skeptical of both the scientific basis for global warming 
claims and cap-and-trade as a tool for reducing GHG emissions.194 
As the hearings were wrapping up in April 2007, the Supreme Court 
of the United States delivered a landmark opinion that dramatically changed 
the political calculus.195  The Court held GHGs were pollutants and EPA 
therefore had authority to regulate GHG emissions from autos and—by 
implication—from other sources such as power plants and refineries.196  This 
meant that if EPA found that GHGs endangered public health or the 
environment, it could begin regulating GHG emissions from new sources and 
modifications of existing sources.197  If Congress did not enact legislation 
saying otherwise, EPA could proceed ahead with stringent technology-based 
standards that would have no trading opportunities and no blow-softening 
provisions like free allocations of allowances and safety valves.198  The fact 
                                            
190. Brian Hansen, Dingell Releases Climate Bill Advice Solicited from 
Industry, Green Groups, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 23, 2007, at 9, available at 2007 
WLNR 8625530. 
191. Cathy Cash, House Panel Examines Climate Bills, but No Movement 
Expected This Year, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, June 23, 2008, at 4, available at 
http://www.Lexisnexis.com. 
192. Dawn Reeves & Jenny Johnson, Activists Rally Around Boxer After Early 
Breach on Climate Change, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., May 18, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
9292612; see also Jessica Brady, Hearing on Global Warming Attracts Like-Minded Senators, 
CONGRESS DAILY, Jan. 30, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1871899. 
193. See Cash, Building a Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More from 
Utilities About Challenges, supra note 187, at 2–3. 
194. Anthony Lacey, Bipartisan Senate Plan May Sidestep Deadlock over 
Carbon Price Limits, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., July 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
14296375; House Committee Members Study Merits of Setting Up CO2 Cap-and-Trade 
Program, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 2, 2007, at 8, available at 2007 WLNR 7208828. 
195. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007); Daniel Whitten, Court 
Ruling Seen Feeding Movement for Carbon Controls in Congress, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, 
Apr. 9, 2007, at 3, available at 2007 WLNR 7651996. 
196. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 500; Whitten, supra note 195. 
197. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
198. See id. 
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
418 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
that the Bush Administration remained strongly opposed to mandatory 
measures, however, ensured that EPA was not likely to act in the immediate 
future.199 
Sensing no movement on any of the pending Democratic bills, 
several senators began to work on bipartisan alternatives.200  Senators Joe 
Lieberman (I-Connecticut) and John Warner (R-Virginia) unveiled a 
proposal for a more stringent bill that called for a cap-and-trade regime 
applicable to all sectors of the economy that would have capped GHG 
emissions at the 2005 level by 2012, 15% below the 2005 level by 2020, and 
70% below the 2005 level by 2050.201  Of the initial allowances, 24% would 
have been auctioned, 20% would have been given to the power sector, 20% 
would have been given to the industrial sector, and 2.5% to the transportation 
sector.202  The proportion of allowances auctioned would gradually increase 
to 52% in 2035.203  Revenues from the auctions would be channeled to low- 
and moderate-income consumers and technology development projects.204  
The proposal included a novel cost containment provision that would have 
created an administrative board that could authorize cost relief measures to 
companies presented with unexpected economic hardship.205  The electric 
utility industry presented a nearly united front in opposition to the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill.206  Only Exelon and Pacific Gas & Electric, 
companies that relied heavily on nuclear power and natural gas respectively, 
supported the Bill.207 
As it became clear that a climate change bill containing mandatory 
caps was likely to reach the Senate floor, utility company executives huddled 
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“behind closed doors with White House [aides] and administration officials” 
to come up with a legislative approach to a cap-and-trade program that more 
closely reflected what the industry had in mind.208  The favored approach 
would have preempted state climate change laws and replaced EPA’s new 
source review program.209  The authority to regulate GHG emissions would 
have been delegated to the DOE, rather than EPA.210  And, GHG reductions 
would have been required only when proven technologies were available.211 
The Environment and Public Works Committee passed the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill with only a few minor amendments by a vote of 
eleven to eight.212  Only one Republican—Senator Warner—voted yes.213  
The Bill now had to clear the sixty vote hurdle necessary to halt the 
Republicans’ promised filibuster.214  The Bill’s sponsors began a lengthy 
process of negotiating the concessions that would be necessary to persuade 
ten to tweleve Republicans and nearly all coal-state Democrats to vote to cut 
off debate.215  By the time that the negotiations were nearing completion in 
January 2008, a persistently sluggish economy had dimmed enthusiasm for 
comprehensive climate change legislation.216  Nevertheless, the Democratic 
leadership assured the Bill’s supporters that it would go to the floor in early 
2008.217 
In the meantime, climate change legislation was moving at a snail’s 
pace in the House.218  At the outset of the 110th Congress, Majority Leader 
Pelosi created a special committee to address climate change issues and 
appointed long-time climate change activist Representative Edward Markey 
(D-Massachusetts) to head it, but the committee lacked the jurisdiction over 
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any actual legislation.219  The Energy and Commerce Committee, which had 
jurisdiction over climate disruption legislation, was preoccupied with the 
Bush Administration’s energy bill.220  In sharp contrast to Senator Boxer’s 
committee, it failed to hold a single hearing on climate change legislation 
during 2007.221  The chairperson of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over 
the climate disruption legislation was Rick Boucher (D-Virginia), a moderate 
Democrat who represented a coal-producing district in Virginia.222  Although 
Boucher had been a global warming skeptic, he now believed that legislation 
was necessary to forestall EPA action.223  Convinced that coal should play a 
major role in electricity generation for the foreseeable future, he insisted that 
the rate at which GHG reduction technologies became available to coal-fired 
power plants should determine how rapidly the government required GHG 
emissions reductions.224 
In mid-January 2008, representatives of a new group, called the 
Climate Action Partnership—consisting of environmental groups and more 
than thirty companies concerned about global warming—urged Congress to 
enact mandatory climate change legislation “on a fast-track basis.”225  They 
called for a 60% to 80% reduction in GHG emissions from 2005 levels by 
2050 and for a 10% to 30% reduction during the first fifteen years.226 
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Before drafting a bill, Boucher took the unusual step of having the 
subcommittee staff draft a series of public position papers on issues that were 
likely to arise when the committee considered a bill.227  As the position 
papers trickled out through the spring of 2008,228 it became clear that the bill 
that Representative Boucher had in mind was considerably less stringent than 
the Lieberman-Warner Bill in the Senate.229 
When the Lieberman-Warner Bill came to the floor of the Senate 
during the first week of June 2008, the lobbyists for the affected interests 
were out in force.230  The CoC joined with oil and gas and mining interests to 
create the Alliance for Energy and Economic Growth to send Congress the 
message that the Lieberman-Warner Bill would harm the economy with little 
resulting impact on global warming so long as China and India failed to 
reduce GHG emissions.231  The NAM opposed the Bill on many grounds.232  
Another advocacy organization for the business community, the Club for 
Growth, launched “a radio and [television] ad[vertising] campaign against 
the bill in states [with] senators [who were] potential[ly] swing votes.”233  
Even the natural gas industry opposed the legislation because it required 
natural gas processors to purchase allowances instead of end users.234  
Environmental groups had reservations about the Bill and favored more 
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stringent requirements in several regards, but they united behind the Bill 
after the sponsors made several changes designed to meet their objections.235 
On the day before the scheduled cloture vote, President Bush 
threatened to veto any bill that contained mandatory limits on GHG 
emissions.236  With such formidable opposition lined up against the Bill, it 
was clear to the Bill’s sponsors that it would be impossible to line up the 
sixty votes necessary to prevent a filibuster without making major 
concessions that would be opposed by environmental groups and could cause 
progressive Democrats to abandon the effort.237  Despite its poor prospects, 
Democratic strategists believed that the party would benefit in the upcoming 
elections by forcing Republicans to vote against climate change 
legislation.238  Recognizing the political risks involved, the Republican 
leadership shifted its strategy away from outright refusal to acknowledge the 
reality of global warming to an insistence that the Lieberman-Warner Bill 
intruded too deeply into the American economy.239  Reflecting the laissez 
faire minimalist view espoused by the conservative think tanks, they argued 
that the Bill amounted to little more than a stealth tax on American 
consumers.240 
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As expected, the 48-36 vote in favor of cloture did not reach the 
sixty-vote majority necessary to end the filibuster.241  The full Senate never 
debated the merits of the Bill.242  After the vote, Senate Majority Leader Reid 
pulled the Bill and announced that it would not be taken up again during the 
110th Congress.243 
D. The Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th Congress 
The 2008 elections appeared to mark a major shift in the politics of 
climate disruption.244  Both houses of Congress remained under the control 
of the Democratic Party, and the Democratic majority in the Senate had 
reached the magic number of sixty.245  The voters also sent to the White 
House a charismatic young Democrat who had promised during the 
campaign to make climate change legislation one of his top priorities.246  
President Obama featured climate disruption in his inaugural address, and he 
promised to “‘work tirelessly to . . . roll back the specter of a warming 
planet.’”247  To demonstrate his commitment to climate change legislation, 
he hired former EPA Administrator Carol Browner as a White House 
Advisor and charged her with directing the Administration’s legislative 
efforts on matters relating to energy and the environment.248  At the same 
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time, many states were already putting climate change regulatory programs 
into effect, and the EPA was rapidly proceeding ahead with an endangerment 
finding and associated regulatory programs.249 
In the House, Speaker Pelosi re-authorized the Select Committee on 
Energy Independence and Global Warming and re-appointed Representative 
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) to head it.250  In an audacious move, 
Representative Henry Waxman (D-California) challenged Representative 
John Dingell (D-Michigan) for the chairmanship of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce,251 and he prevailed by a vote of 137–122 in the 
Democratic caucus.252  The CEI proclaimed that the Waxman election 
provided “a loud wake-up call to American business leaders that the 111th 
Congress is not going to play nicely with them on energy rationing 
policies.”253 
Having wrested control of the committee from Representative 
Dingell, Chairman Waxman announced that the 111th Congress had “‘an 
opportunity that comes only once in a generation’” to enact landmark climate 
change legislation.254  He and Speaker Nancy Pelosi hoped to move a bill out 
of his committee by Memorial Day with an eye toward enactment by the end 
of the year.255  But Waxman first had to patch up the wounded feelings of 
Dingell’s supporters and reach an accommodation with Democrats from 
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coal-dependent states who were already banding together to defend their 
states’ economic interests.256 
If anyone was capable of steering the climate change bill through the 
treacherous waters of the House of Representatives, it was the energetic 
Henry Waxman.257  He was in an excellent position to work with the White 
House because his former aide of more than twenty years, Philip Schiliro, 
was President Obama’s liaison to Congress.258  But Waxman’s committee 
had a full plate of important bills, including the president’s health care 
reform bill, which taxed even his formidable capacity for hard work.259  He 
therefore delegated to Representative Markey, who replaced Representative 
Boucher as chairperson of the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, the 
responsibility for drafting the initial bill.260 
As Waxman’s committee began a series of hearings on climate 
disruption, the Reality Coalition, an umbrella organization composed of 
several of the nation’s largest environmental groups, sponsored an 
advertising campaign featuring a yeti and a mermaid holding lumps of coal 
to make their point that coal could not play a major role in America’s energy 
future.261  At the committee’s first hearing in mid-January, it received 
testimony on the Blueprint for Legislative Action that the Climate Action 
Partnership had drafted.262  The blueprint’s goal was to achieve a 42% 
reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 and an 80% reduction by 
2050.263  It allocated a substantial portion of the allowances on the basis of 
historical emissions and contained cost containment measures to act as a 
safety valve.264  The blueprint allowed companies to purchase offsets from 
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companies that agreed to improve the efficiency of their operations or 
farmers who agreed to plant more carbon absorbing vegetation.265  Despite 
the substantial industry support for the blueprint, the Republican members of 
the committee rejected the cap-and-trade proposal and argued that Congress 
should consider a carbon tax instead.266 
President Obama signaled his support for a cap-and-trade regime 
with auctioned allowances in February 2009 when he included in his fiscal 
year 2010 budget request a surprisingly detailed description of what the 
President wanted to see in a climate change bill, including a GHG emissions 
cap of 14% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% below 2005 levels by 
2050,267 with 100% of the allowances to be auctioned to prevent the dirtiest 
emitters from reaping windfall profits.268  The coal industry and coal-
dependent electric utility companies strongly objected to the President’s 
suggestion that 100% of allowances should be auctioned.269  If that 
happened, executives from American Electric Power and Duke Energy 
predicted electricity rates in some states—like Indiana—would go up by as 
much as 40%.270 
In mid-March, Senator Boxer and Representatives Waxman and 
Markey met with the White House staff to come up with a strategy for 
passing climate change legislation.271  They agreed on the broad contours of 
a comprehensive energy and climate change bill that would create an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade regime.272  Since Boxer had the votes in her 
committee to report out a bill at any time, they decided that the House Bill 
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should move forward first to give the Senate sponsors some idea of what was 
possible.273 
In late March 2009, Representatives Waxman and Markey 
introduced a 648-page discussion draft to serve as a starting point for the 
Energy and Commerce Committee’s consideration of climate change 
legislation.274  Based on the Climate Action Partnership blueprint,275 the Bill 
would have established an economy-wide cap-and-trade regime that capped 
GHG emissions at 20% below 2005 levels by 2020, at 42% below 2005 
emissions in 2030, and at 83% below 2005 levels by 2050.276  The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) would have managed the primary 
allowance market.277  The draft did not specify the percentages of allowances 
that would have been given away and auctioned; nor did it specify how the 
revenues from the auctions would have been spent.278  The draft would have 
allowed emitters to increase emissions over their allowances if every four 
tons of emissions were offset by five tons of emissions reductions from other 
domestic or international sources.279  It would have “create[d] a ‘strategic 
reserve’ of . . . 2.5 billion allowances” for EPA to auction to emitters in times 
of price volatility to stabilize allowance prices.280  To further increase 
flexibility, it would have allowed a source to borrow allowances from next 
year for this year’s emissions.281  The draft also contained a renewable 
energy portfolio standard that would have required electrical generators to 
derive at least 25% of their production from renewable energy by 2025.282 
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The Waxman-Markey draft also contained a number of provisions to 
reduce predictable opposition; to make the coal industry happy, the Bill 
created a $10 billion pool to finance carbon capture and storage and related 
technologies.283  To mollify the electric utility industry, the Bill prohibited 
the EPA from regulating GHGs under its existing Clean Air Act authorities 
and suspended state climate change programs for five years until the federal 
program got underway.284  To please environmental groups, a citizen suit 
provision would have empowered private citizens to sue the federal 
government for failing to enforce the Bill’s requirements.285 
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and the Secretaries of Energy and 
Transportation praised many aspects of the draft without giving it the 
Administration’s formal endorsement.286  In response to anticipated 
complaints from the “no we can’t” crowd that the proposal would cause huge 
increases in electric bills, Jackson cited an EPA analysis of the draft 
concluding that it would have only a modest effect on consumers—27¢ to 
38¢ per day—if it retained its generous offset program and if most of the 
revenues from the auctions of allowances went to regulated local distribution 
companies.287  The Climate Action Partnership applauded the Bill as a strong 
starting point for a bill, but said it would insist that a substantial number of 
allowances be awarded for free to emitters.288  Environmental groups and 
clean energy companies also supported the draft, but they were somewhat 
taken aback by Waxman’s decision to limit EPA’s Clean Air Act authority to 
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available at 2009 WLNR 8452639; Doug Obey, Draft House Climate Bill Includes New 
Concessions to Industry, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 3, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
6162435. 
285. Jean Chemnick & Brian Hansen, Bill Allows People to Sue the 
Government over Alleged Harms from Climate Change, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 20, 
2009, at 9, available at 2009 WLNR 8452640. 
286. The American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 
102 (2009) (Statement of Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection 
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No.17, at 912 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
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of Offsets Would Cut Cost of Program, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 914 (Apr. 24, 2009); 
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regulate GHG emissions and to preempt state climate change laws for five 
years without demanding any concessions from industry in return.289  
Democratic committee members from coal-producing states did not support 
the draft as written.290  Among other things, they believed the 20% by 2020 
goal was highly unrealistic.291  Republicans were unified in opposition 
against the draft bill.292 
Coal-dependent electric utility companies and the EEI supported the 
cap-and-trade concept, but they refused to support a bill that did not 
distribute free allowances to emitters.293  They strongly opposed the 
renewable portfolio requirement, arguing that states were in a better position 
to impose such measures.294  The CoC and several conservative think tanks 
objected to all of the measures in the draft.295  The Heritage Foundation 
predicted that the Bill would impose a cost of $1600 a year on the average 
household and kill as many as three million manufacturing jobs.296  The head 
of the CEI promised that his organization would “‘work to see that it dies as 
quickly as possible.’”297 
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[hereinafter Eilperin, House Panel Begins Debate on Climate Bill] (clean energy companies). 
290. Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact, supra note 287; 
Waxman/Markey Climate Draft Draws GOP Alternative, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, Apr. 27, 
2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 8941484. 
291. Power, EPA Previews Carbon Caps’ Impact, supra note 287. 
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(quoting Jim Rogers, Duke Energy). 
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supra note 23, at 1, 5–6; Ben Lieberman, Proposed Global Warming Bills and Regulations 
Will Do More Harm Than Good, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/
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The CoC’s adamant opposition to any climate change legislation 
caused three electric companies, PG&E, PNM Resources, and Exelon, to 
terminate their memberships in protest.298  The companies preferred to live 
with the limited restrictions of a cap-and-trade program than with the 
uncertainties of no legislation or the strictures of EPA regulation under the 
Clean Air Act.299  The American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity 
(“ACCCE”)—which included mining companies and electric utility 
companies—also lost members over its opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.300  Duke Energy, Alstom Power, and Alcoa no longer wanted to 
be associated with a group that did not acknowledge the reality of climate 
disruption and the need for legislation to deal with it.301 
President Obama dealt climate disruption legislation a minor setback 
when he decided to make health care reform his top legislative priority, after 
which the White House became absorbed in lengthy—but ultimately 
unproductive—negotiations with House and Senate Republican leaders over 
the content of the health care bill.302  Pressed by the need to take up President 
Obama’s health care legislation, Chairman Waxman decided to skip the 
subcommittee markup of the Waxman-Markey Bill and move directly to 
markup by the full committee.303  But that required him to reach an accord 
with the committee’s coal-state, oil-patch, and rust-belt Democrats and the 
lobbyists for the coal, oil refining, and manufacturing industries that were 
pressuring them.304  Hoping to move the issue along, President Obama met 
with all of the Democratic committee members at the White House, at which 
time he indicated that he was willing to compromise on key issues.305  As an 
                                            
298. Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 5–6; see also 
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305. See Scott, Legislation:  Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key 
Issues, supra note 304. 
55
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 431 
example, he dropped his opposition to giving free allowances to emitters 
during the first years of the program.306 
Soon thereafter, on May 12, 2009, Waxman announced that the 
Democratic committee members had reached an agreement on a 932-page 
bill that they all could support.307  Waxman agreed to lower the 2020 target 
for GHG emissions reductions from 20% below 2005 emissions to 17%.308  
He also agreed to give away more than half of the allowances to emitters and 
local distribution companies during the early years.309  The largest portion—
35%—would go to local distribution companies and would cover 90% of the 
current emissions of the electric utilities that provided their electricity.310  
The formula for dividing up allowances within the electric utility industry 
was derived from a consensus agreement arrived at by the EEI after two 
years of internal negotiations and was based on a fifty-fifty formula under 
which half of a plant’s allowances would be based on emissions and half on 
energy output.311  The agreement, however, left coal-dependent rural 
electrical cooperatives out in the cold.312  In order to win the support of oil-
patch and rust-belt Democrats, billions of dollars worth of free allowances 
would go to energy-intensive manufacturing industries (15%), gas utility 
companies (9%), refineries (2%), and automobile manufacturers (3%).313  
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307. Scott, Legislation:  Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key 
Issues, supra note 304; Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, supra note 304 
(referencing a 932-page bill); Stephen Power & Siobhan Hughes, House Democrats Reach 
Accord on a Climate Bill, WALL ST. J., (May 13, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
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And the renewable energy mandate would drop from 25% by 2025 to 20%, 
with up to 8% coming from state efforts to enhance efficiency.314 
Republican members of the committee prepared more than four 
hundred proposed amendments to the Bill in an effort to slow it down and 
hone their message that the Bill would kill jobs, harm consumers, and have 
little beneficial effect on the environment.315  As the Republican members 
rallied against the astronomical costs of the Bill and the threat of 
environmental socialism, Democratic members chastised them for failing to 
negotiate in good faith over possible bipartisan amendments.316  After a week 
of late-night markup sessions, the full committee voted out a bill that did not 
differ in any important way from the Democrat’s compromise bill.317  Four 
Democrats from Utah and the South voted against the Bill, and only one 
Republican from California voted for it.318 
As the Energy and Commerce Committee was completing its work, 
trouble loomed on the horizon in the form of a request by Representative 
Collin Peterson (D-Minnesota) to have the Bill referred to the Agriculture 
Committee that he chaired.319  Frequently at odds with environmental groups, 
Peterson had made light of global warming by stating that it would allow 
Minnesota farmers to grow more corn.320  Peterson had a long list of issues 
that would have to be addressed to his satisfaction before he would be 
                                            
314. Scott, Legislation:  Energy Committee Democrats Reach Deal on Key 
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amendments); Kathleen Hart, Waxman Opens Weeklong Debate of Landmark House Cap-
and-Trade Bill, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., May 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric 
Utility Report”; search “Waxman Opens Weeklong Debate”); see also Power & Hughes, 
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316. Hart, supra note 315 (environmental socialism); see Darren Goode, EPA:  
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Emissions, WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, at A2 [hereinafter Fahrenthold, House Panel Passes 
Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions]; see Mufson, Climate Bill Seeks a Broad Coalition, 
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(AM ED.), May 22, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Panel Completes Climate Marathon]. 
319. Fahrenthold, House Panel Passes Limit on Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, 
supra note 317; Jerry Hagstrom, Peterson Raises Concerns About House Climate Measure, 
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June 22, 2009, at A4 [hereinafter Power, In the House, It’s Peterson vs. Climate Bill]. 
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willing to support the Bill.321  Among other things, he wanted to protect 
United States farmers from international competition in the market for 
offsets, increase the allowances given to rural electrical coops and municipal 
power plants, and prohibit Wall Street banks from trading in the allowance 
markets.322  He reported that forty-five additional Democrats shared his 
concerns.323 
Lobbyists for farming and forestry interests stepped up their efforts 
to influence members of the House Agriculture Committee.324  Constituents 
in the districts of all of the Democratic members of the House Agriculture 
Committee received emails and robocalls from the National Republican 
Congressional Committee and other opponents of the Bill characterizing it as 
a “job-killing climate bill.”325  Six organizations representing farmers and 
ranchers demanded that the Bill be amended to allow unlimited offsets from 
domestic, but not foreign, agriculture and forestry; notwithstanding the fact 
that GHG emissions from cattle—approximately one-quarter of United 
States methane emissions—and tilling soil on farms had been excluded from 
the Bill.326  Another farmer alliance called for amending the Bill to provide 
for a list of pre-approved farming practices, such as planting trees, preserving 
forests, and no-till farming practices that would offset GHG emissions.327  
Both groups agreed with Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack’s 
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recommendation that Congress give the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) the authority to manage the offsets program.328 
Waxman hoped to work out a deal with Peterson to avoid a nasty 
fight over amendments to the Bill in the Agriculture Committee.329  Peterson 
was especially miffed by the fact that rural electric cooperatives received so 
few allowances in comparison to those awarded to utilities on the East and 
West Coasts.330  Peterson also insisted on the transfer to USDA as a 
condition to going forward with the bill.331  Waxman then met with the heads 
of the EEI and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
(“NRECA”) to iron out a compromise on the allocation issue that would be 
acceptable to the rural cooperatives.332  Two days before the June 26th floor 
debates, Waxman and Peterson struck a deal in which Waxman effectively 
capitulated to the demands of farm-state Democrats.333  USDA would 
oversee the offsets markets.334  The Bill required non-coal-dependent 
companies to surrender some of their allowances to coal-dependent rural 
cooperatives, allocating 0.5% of allowances specifically to small utility 
companies that generated “less than [four] million megawatt hours.”335  The 
net effect of the changes was to channel billions of dollars worth of 
allowances to the agricultural sector and to lodge a critical piece of the 
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regulatory program in a department that had historically placed agricultural 
interests over environmental concerns.336 
As the Bill neared consideration by the full House at the end of June, 
however, President Obama began to vigorously lobby Democratic members 
to vote for it.337  EPA released an analysis of the most recent version that 
concluded that the average annual household cost of compliance with its 
provisions would be somewhere between $80 and $111, or 22¢ and 30¢ per 
day.338  In other words, the Bill was quite affordable.  Despite EPA’s 
assessment, the National Republican Congressional Committee aired 
advertisements featuring its claim that the Bill would add $1800 to the 
average annual electric bills of middle-class families.339 
The bill that the House took up on June 26 had expanded to more 
than 1200 pages, reflecting dozens of deals that Waxman and Markey had 
made with wavering Democrats.340  Nevertheless, the major environmental 
and consumer groups held their collective noses and supported the 
compromise bill with all of its warts.341  Several groups, including EEI,342 the 
AGA,343 and the NRECA,344 supported the Bill, but planned to demand 
changes in the Senate.345  The trade associations for farming interests and 
rural electric cooperatives were pleased with the changes, but divided on 
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whether to support the overall Bill.346  The CoC, the NAM, the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America, and the ACCCE all opposed the Bill.347 
The Bill passed by a narrow 219–212 margin.348  Forty-four House 
Democrats—nearly 20%—voted against the Bill, and eight Republicans 
voted for it.349  The fact that the Climate Action Partnership supported the 
Bill made it easier for some Democrats to vote favorably.350  The final Bill 
established a multi-sector cap-and-trade regime that capped GHG emissions 
at 17% below 2005 emissions by 2020, 42% by 2040, and 83% by 2050.351  
The allowance markets were overseen by the FERC and the allowance 
derivatives markets by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”).352  The Bill set aside allowances for the EPA to distribute to 
various public and private beneficiaries in accordance with formulas 
provided for in the statute.353  Beginning in 2026, the allowance gifts would 
be gradually phased out until they ended in 2035, at which point all 
allowances would be allocated by auction.354  The allowances set aside for 
the electric utility industry would be allocated to local distribution companies 
so that state public utility commissions would have the power to ensure that 
retail consumers received their economic benefit.355 
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Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339; Waxman-Markey, Characterized 
As ‘A Pile of (Bleep)’ by One Lawmaker, supra note 347. 
350. Darren Goode, House Democrats Near Impasse as Climate Talks 
Intensify, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 11, 2009. 
351. Hitt & Bendavid, supra note 342. 
352. Cathy Cash et al., Tackling Climate Change, Senate Immediately Delays 
Action, Identifies Tough Issues for Debate, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 13, 2009, at 1, available 
at 2009 WLNR 14401949. 
353. Tom Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, No Clear Path 
for Impact on Utility Customers, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., July 6, 2009, at 3 [hereinafter Tiernan, 
Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations], available at 2009 WLNR 13824309. 
354. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th 
Cong. § 764(a)(1)(B) (2009); Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra 
note 353. 
355. Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra note 353. 
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Instead of reducing emissions, emitters could purchase offset credits 
on a one-to-one basis—not the five-to-four basis of the original Bill.356  Each 
offset credit would represent one ton of CO2 emissions removed from the 
atmosphere by declining to engage in activities that would otherwise result in 
CO2 emissions; planting vegetation to take CO2 out of the atmosphere, 
capturing methane emissions from cow manure, or other forms of permanent 
carbon sequestration.357  The USDA would oversee the offset markets.358  
The Bill established an overall limit of two billion tons of offset credits per 
year, only half of which could come from international sources.359  The Bill 
also contained a renewable energy portfolio mandate under which utilities 
would be required to generate 15% of their electricity from renewable 
sources and save 5% from energy efficiency by 2020.360  This was far less 
ambitious than many existing state renewable energy standards.361  To 
provide a safety valve, the bill established a $25 per megawatt–hour 
alternative compliance payment that a utility company could pay in lieu of a 
renewable energy credit.362  Finally, the Bill retained a technology-based 
requirement—new power plants would have to emit 50% fewer GHGs and 
plants built after 2020 would have to emit 65% fewer GHGs than existing 
plants.363 
                                            
356. Stephen Power, Impact of ‘Offsets’ to Limit Emissions Is Uncertain—Tool 
for Firms to Avoid Cutting Output Through ‘Green’ Investments Elsewhere Involves Political, 
Practical Hurdles, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2009, at A2; How Offset Credits Will Work Under 
Waxman-Markey Climate Bill, OIL DAILY, July 22, 2009.  International offsets purchased after 
2017 would have remained subject to the five-to-four restriction.  Moving America Toward a 
Clean Energy Economy and Reducing Global Warming Pollution:  Legislative Tools:  
Hearing Before the Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm., 111th Cong. 29–30 (2009) 
(testimony of David G. Hawkins, Director of Climate Programs, Natural Resources Defense 
Counsel) [hereinafter Hawkins Testimony]. 
357. How Offset Credits Will Work Under Waxman-Markey Climate Bill, supra 
note 356. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. 
360. House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create 
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas 
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339. 
361. See Jennifer Zajac, Federal RECs in Waxman-Markey Bill Raise 
Questions on Fate of State RECs, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., July 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric 
Utility Report”; search “Federal RECs”). 
362. Id. 
363. Wayne Barber, Waxman-Markey Targets New Coal Plant Performance, 
SNL ENERGY COAL REP., July 13, 2009; David A. Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, 
Deconstructing the Climate Bill; Q&A on the Mammoth House Measure, WASH. POST, July 6, 
2009, at A6. 
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In anticipation of Senate consideration of the House-passed bill, a 
number of governmental and private sector entities produced analyses of the 
House bill.364  In late July, the USDA released a study concluding that the 
Waxman-Markey Bill would impose very little short-run cost in the form of 
increased prices for fuel and fertilizer on farms, and in the long run, farmers 
would come out ahead because of the ability to sell offsets to GHG emitting 
companies.365  An analysis prepared by the DOE’s Energy Information 
Administration concluded that the Bill would probably increase average 
household energy costs by $114 in 2020 and $288 in 2030.366  A study 
prepared for NAM by Science Applications International Corporation, by 
contrast, concluded that the Bill would reduce the gross domestic product by 
a minimum of 1.8% by 2030, reduce household income by at least $730, and 
bring about the loss of at least 1.7 million jobs.367  The Heritage Foundation 
warned that the Bill could cause gasoline prices to go up 74% by 2035.368 
E. The Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bill in the 111th Congress 
The lobbyists for the various interest groups now turned their 
attention to the Senate, where things were moving with far less dispatch than 
in the House.369  As in the House, the CoC and many coal and oil companies 
joined the CEI and the Heritage Foundation in opposing all climate change 
legislation.370  Many groups that had supported the final House Bill now 
hoped to persuade the Senate to include provisions that had been deleted 
from the House Bill or remove provisions from the House Bill that they had 
failed to defeat.371  The electric utility industry came together to lobby for 
lower targets for the caps, less ambitious deadlines, more allowances for 
electric utilities, and a price collar that would set a minimum and a 
                                            
364. See, e.g., Dean Scott, Legislation:  USDA Study Estimates Little Cost to 
Farms from House Bill, but Senators Are Skeptical, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1755 
(July 24, 2009). 
365. Id. 
366. Ari Natter, Legislation:  Report Says House Climate Bill Increases 
Household Energy Costs by $114 in 2020, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 32, at 1882 (Aug. 7, 
2009). 
367. Leora Falk, Legislation:  Waxman-Markey Bill Would Lead to Job Loss, 
Slower Growth, Manufacturing Group Says, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1939 (Aug. 14, 
2009). 
368. House-Passed Climate Bill Will Promote Renewable Energy and Create 
Jobs, Says Majority; Republicans Decry “National Energy Tax,” While Oil and Gas 
Producers Hope for Better Deal in Senate, supra note 339. 
369. Id. 
370. See Lieberman, supra note 295; Mulkern, Coal Industry Sees Life or 
Death in Senate Climate Debate, supra note 295. 
371. Tiernan, Deep in the Weeds of Allowance Allocations, supra note 353. 
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maximum price on allowances.372  The high end of the price collar would act 
as a safety valve to ensure against disruptive price spikes, and the low end 
would provide assurance to a company and its bankers that the price of 
allowances would not drop below the statutory price, as it was comparing the 
purchase of allowances to investing in GHG emissions reductions 
technologies.373  The NRECA wanted the Senate to distribute all allowances 
based on the carbon content of the fuel used, rather than using the EEI 
formula that distributed half on the basis of electrical output.374  A new group 
of coal-dependent power companies called Generators for Affordable Power 
was formed specifically with the goal of ensuring that unregulated merchant 
generators received their fair share of allowances in any cap-and-trade 
legislation.375 
Environmental groups wanted the Senate to set the 2020 cap at 20% 
below 2005 emissions and to require all allowance trading to be conducted on 
regulated public exchanges.376  They strongly objected to giving the USDA 
authority over offsets and allowance trading.377  In addition, they urged the 
Senate to prohibit any source that was out of compliance with the Clean Air 
Act’s requirements for conventional pollutants from receiving free allowances 
and from purchasing offsets in the climate change program.378  They also 
                                            
372. See Cathy Cash, Allowance Game Continues; PG&E’s Darbee Tries to 
Persuade Against Utility ‘Balkanization,’ ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Sept. 28, 2009, at 1 
[hereinafter Cash, Allowance Game Continues], available at 2009 WLNR 20114210; Cathy 
Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as Utilities Target Carbon Allowances, PLATTS 
INSIDE FERC, July 6, 2009 [hereinafter Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as 
Utilities Target Carbon Allowances], available at 2009 WLNR 13823963; Cathy Cash et al., 
Senators Mull Provision to Block EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions, PLATTS 
INSIDE ENERGY, Mar. 22, 2010, at 3 [hereinafter Cash et al., Senators Mull Provision to Block 
EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions], available at 2010 WLNR 7051518. 
373. See Cathy Cash, Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators 
Contemplate GHG Bill, PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, May 24, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Cash, 
Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators Contemplate GHG Bill], available at 
2010 WLNR 11605741. 
374. Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat up as Utilities Target Carbon 
Allowances, supra note 372; Kathleen Hart, Rural Cooperatives Push Boxer to Make Senate 
Cap-and-Trade Bill Affordable, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Aug. 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (select “Secondary Materials”; search and select “SNL Electric 
Utility Report”; search “Rural Cooperatives Push Boxer”); Tom Tiernan, Allocations to 
Merchants Reveal Fault Lines in Industry Support for Climate Change Bill, ELECTRIC UTIL. 
WK., July 20, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Tiernan, Allocations to Merchants Reveal Fault Lines], 
available at 2009 WLNR 14961067. 
375. Tiernan, Allocations to Merchants Reveal Fault Lines, supra note 374. 
376. Hawkins Testimony, supra note 356, at 4–6. 
377. Id. at 31–32. 
378. Id. at 6–7. 
64
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
440 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
urged the senators to refrain from preempting EPA and state regulation of 
GHG emissions under their existing authorities.379 
Senator Barbara Boxer, who remained chairperson of the 
Environment and Public Works Committee, decided to proceed cautiously 
until she was confident that she had sixty votes lined up to end the 
guaranteed Republican filibuster.380  To accomplish this, she had to seek an 
accommodation with a group of sixteen Democratic senators from coal-
dependent states that had coalesced during the defeat of climate change 
legislation in the 110th Congress.381  The committee kicked off its work on 
the climate disruption Bill with a hearing on July 7th featuring EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Secretary 
of Energy Steven Chu, and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar;382 all four of 
whom urged the committee to report out a bill similar to the House Bill.383  
At the same time, Senator Boxer and Senator John Kerry (D-
Massachusetts)—a strong supporter of stringent climate change legislation—
met with coal-state, farm-belt, and rust-belt Democrats to address their 
concerns and to negotiate over potential changes to the Bill.384 
Agricultural interests dominated the hearing that the Senate 
Agriculture Committee held in late July 2009.385  They argued that up to 5% 
of the allowances should go directly to farmers to offset the higher prices 
they would probably have to pay for fuel and fertilizer after cap-and-trade 
provisions went into effect.386  The American Farm Bureau Federation 
(“AFBF”) continued to oppose the Bill in its entirety.387  The Democrats on 
the Committee were sympathetic to the pleas for more allowances, while the 
Republicans tended to take the AFBF position that no bill was necessary.388  
                                            
379. Id. at 23–24. 
380. Darren Goode & Peter Cohn with Billy House, Rangel, Pelosi Get Wires 
Crossed a Bit on Climate Change, Health Care Order, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), June 3, 
2009. 
381. Broder, Geography Is Dividing Democrats over Energy, supra note 256. 
382. Cash, Senate Climate Bill Debate to Heat Up as Utilities Target Carbon 
Allowances, supra note 372; Jean Chemnick, Panel Set to Kick off US Senate Climate Bill 
Action, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, July 3, 2009, at 8, available at 2009 WLNR 13671023; 
Senate Gets to Grips with Climate Change Bill, OIL DAILY, July 8, 2009. 
383. Darren Goode, Top Officials Pitch Climate Bill to Senators, CONGRESS 
DAILY (PM ED.), July 7, 2009; Senate Gets to Grips with Climate Change Bill, supra note 382. 
384. Doug Obey & Nick Juliano, Senate Democrats Take Steps to Build Support 
for Climate Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., July 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 13563377. 
385. See Dean Scott, Legislation:  Farm Group Wants Free Allowances in Bill 
to Offset Expected Higher Cost of Materials, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1756 (July 24, 
2009). 
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388. Id. 
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Committee Chairman Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) expressed support for an off 
ramp that would allow the United States to abandon the cap-and-trade 
program if China and India declined to implement equivalent programs in the 
near future.389 
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Montana) also 
claimed jurisdiction over both the allowance allocation and the international 
trade aspects of any cap-and-trade bill.390  Baucus represented Montana, a 
major coal-producing state with a large number of rural cooperatives, and he 
was determined to protect the interests of both industries.391  He sided with 
the coal-dependent utility companies who believed that free allocations to 
electric companies should be based on historical emissions alone and not on 
the EEI’s 50–50 formula that also relied on energy output.392  The Finance 
Committee heard from economists from across the political spectrum who 
urged the Senate to abandon the idea of allocating allowances for free and to 
distribute allowances through a more efficient auction.393  An economist for 
the Environmental Defense Fund testified in support of the House Bill, 
which, in his view, channeled 43% of the value of the allowances to 
consumers.394  But Baucus made it clear that he was not sold on the 
allocation arrangements in the House Bill.395 
While Congress took its August recess, a river of money flowed into 
grassroots efforts to build support for and against climate disruption 
legislation.396  The NAM and the National Federation of Independent 
                                            
389. David Bennett, Cap and Trade—Tough Questions, DELTA FARM PRESS 
(July 30, 2009), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/management/cap-and-trade-tough-questions. 
390. See Cathy Cash, Baucus Claims Key Aspect of Senate Climate Bill, 
PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, July 27, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 15448965. 
391. Id. 
392. See id. 
393. Climate Change Legislation:  Allowance and Revenue Distribution: 
Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of Dallas 
Burtraw, Senior Fellow, Resource for the Future, Washington, District of Columbia) 
[hereinafter Burtraw Testimony]; Climate Change Legislation:  Allowance and Revenue 
Distribution: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) 
(testimony of Alan D. Viard, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) [hereinafter 
Viard Testimony]. 
394. Climate Change Legislation:  Allowance and Revenue Distribution: 
Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of Nathaniel 
O. Keohane, Director of Economic Policy and Analysis Environmental Defense Fund) 
[hereinafter Keohane Testimony]. 
395. Cathy Cash, Price ‘Collar’ on Carbon Gains Traction in Senate as 
Lawmakers Strive for Vote-getting Measure, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Aug. 10, 2009, at 1, 
available at 2009 WLNR 16499886. 
396. Darren Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28 
States, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Sept. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Goode, Climate Bill Backers 
Unveil Large-Scale Effort for 28 States]. 
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Businesses spent several million dollars on television ads in thirteen swing 
states characterizing such legislation as anti-jobs and anti-energy.397  
Americans for Prosperity, an offshoot of Citizens for a Sound Economy that 
was likewise funded by the Koch brothers—whose petroleum interests were 
directly affected by the proposals—hosted eighty grassroots events at which 
speakers asserted—erroneously—that backyard barbeques would be taxed if 
Congress enacted the House Bill.398 
The AEA arranged a bus tour through coal-producing and 
manufacturing states to stir up public opposition to any climate change 
bill.399  The CoC staged its own road show demanding that EPA hold a 
modern “Scopes Monkey Trial” to debunk the evidence that GHG emissions 
caused global warming.400  Another industry-funded grassroots group called 
Energy Citizens sponsored rallies featuring ready-made signs for members of 
the crowds to display to local media and a video of a country western star 
bemoaning the higher energy costs that would follow the enactment of a 
climate change bill.401  Still another industry-funded group called CO2 is 
Green, which was created in 2009 for the purpose of influencing the climate 
disruption debate, began running advertisements in Montana and New 
Mexico aimed at Senators Max Baucus and Jeff Bingaman, arguing that 
increasing GHG emissions would help the planet’s ecosystems and that 
reducing them would kill jobs.402  Several thousands of oil industry 
employees were bussed to a rally against climate disruption legislation in 
                                            
397. Cathy Cash, EPA’s ‘Endangerment Finding’ Could Spur Senate to Act on 
Climate Legislation, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Aug. 31, 2009, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Cash, EPA’s 
‘Endangerment Finding’ Could Spur Senate to Act on Climate Legislation]; David A. 
Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate; Opponents Seize Initiative 
as Senate Bill Nears, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Fahrenthold, 
Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate]; Goode, Climate Bill Backers Unveil 
Large-Scale Effort for 28 States, supra note 396. 
398. Jane Mayer, The Billionare Brothers Who Are Waging War Against 
Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/30/
100830fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=all. 
399. Cathy Cash, Unions, Enviros Pressure Congress on Climate Bill, PLATTS 
COAL OUTLOOK, Aug. 24, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 17597644; see also Juliet 
Eilperin, Climate Bill Faces Hurdles in Senate; Democrats Deeply Split Deal on Nuclear 
Plants Offered to Court Republicans, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Eilperin, 
Climate Bill Faces Hurdles in Senate] (industry funding). 
400. Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra 
note 397. 
401. See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, 
supra note 397; Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change, 
supra note 300. 
402. Mufson, New Groups Revive the Debate over Causes of Climate Change, 
supra note 300.  One of the group’s founders was Corbin J. Robertson, Jr.—perhaps the 
largest private owner of coal resources in the country.  See id. 
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downtown Houston, where they enjoyed hamburgers and hot dogs, heard a 
local high school band, and received free t-shirts saying, “I’ll pass on $4 
gas.”403 
To rally support for climate change legislation, environmental 
groups purchased television ads, operated phone banks, and sponsored public 
events.404  The Alliance for Climate Protection, a group assembled by former 
Vice President Al Gore, and the Blue-Green Alliance, an umbrella 
organization of environmental groups and labor unions, undertook a twenty-
two-state, Made in America Jobs Tour to demonstrate how such legislation 
would create good jobs.405  In September, a coalition of sixty-eight 
environmental, labor, civil rights, and consumer groups calling itself the 
Clean Energy Works Campaign, launched a $20 million advertising 
campaign, run by a former top media advisor to the Obama presidential 
campaign to support the enactment of climate change legislation.406  A major 
grassroots effort to generate calls, letters, and emails to key members of 
Congress accompanied the ad campaign.407 
Flanked by military veterans, clean energy entrepreneurs, and state 
and local lawmakers, Senators Boxer and Kerry, in late September, unveiled 
an eight hundred-page draft climate disruption bill.408  The Bill established a 
cap-and-trade regime for all facilities emitting more than 25,000 tons of 
GHGs per year that reduced GHG emissions by 20% below 2005 levels—
higher than the House bill’s 17%—by 2020, 41% by 2030, and 83% percent 
by 2050.409  Although the draft resembled the House Bill on many critical 
                                            
403. Paul Burka, Cap and Tirade, TEX. MONTHLY, Nov. 2009, at 14, 14. 
404. Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra 
note 397. 
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supra note 396. 
407. See id. 
408. Christine Cordner, Draft Legislation Punts on Oversight, Collar, PLATTS 
MEGAWATT DAILY, Sept. 30, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 20275098; Juliet Eilperin, 
EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases; Biggest Polluters Are in Cross Hairs, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 1, 2009, at A3 [hereinafter Eilperin, EPA, Senate Take Aim at Greenhouse Gases]. 
409. Dean Scott, Legislation:  Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts, EPA Authority, 
Leaves Negotiating Room for Senate Debate, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 2282 (Oct. 2, 
2009) [hereineafter Scott, Legislation:  Bill Maintains Emissions Cuts]; Eilperin, House Panel 
Begins Debate on Climate Bill, supra note 289; Jay Hodgkins, Analyst:  Senate Climate Bill 
Slightly Tougher than House’s; EPA Option Likely Toughest, SNL RENEWABLE ENERGY 
WKLY., Oct. 9, 2009 [hereinafter Hodgkins, Analyst:  Senate Climate Bill Slightly Tougher 
than House’s]; Gerald Karey & Cathy Cash, EPA Unveils First-Time GHG Regulation Plan, 
PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 20343953. 
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issues, it contained some important differences.410  For example, it 
established a soft price collar that set a minimum price for auctioned 
allowances of $10 per ton and created a strategic reserve of allocations to be 
sold at a minimum price of $28 per ton at first and increasing 5% plus 
inflation per year for five years and by 7% plus inflation per year 
thereafter.411  Unlike the House bill, the Bill would have preserved EPA’s 
authority to apply the new source review and new source performance 
standards of the Clean Air Act to GHG emissions.412  The draft left some 
critical questions unanswered because they came under the jurisdiction of 
other committees.413  Although 25% of the allowances would be auctioned in 
the early years—more than the 15% in the House bill—the Bill did not 
address how the remaining allowances would be allocated among the 
targeted recipients.414  The Finance Committee would have to resolve those 
issues.415  It also failed to specify which agency would oversee the allowance 
and allowance derivatives markets.416 
The draft was an immediate flop with the audience that mattered 
most—Democratic senators from coal-producing, oil-patch, and rust-belt 
states.417  Senators Ben Nelson (D-Nebraska) and Mary Landrieu (D-
Louisiana) said they would not vote for the Bill because it adopted a cap-
and-trade approach.418  Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) called the 
Bill a “‘disappointing step in the wrong direction’” because it did not give 
electric utilities sufficient time to develop and deploy CCS technology.419  
Senators Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) and Kent Conrad (D-North 
Dakota) thought the 20% by 2020 emissions reduction target was too 
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Oversight, Would Set Carbon Emissions Cap, PLATT’S INSIDE FERC, Oct. 5, 2009, at 7, 
available at 2009 WLNR 20647813. 
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than House, CONGRESS DAILY (AM ED.), Sept. 30, 2009. 
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ambitious.420  Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) was also concerned 
about the Bill’s aggressive deadlines.421  When not a single Republican 
senator ventured out of the fold to support the Bill, it became clear that 
supporters did not have nearly enough votes to overcome a promised 
Republican filibuster.422 
Unwilling to concede failure, Senator Kerry made an overture to 
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) to come up with a bill that 
could attract bipartisan support.423  In a New York Times editorial, on October 
11th, Senators Kerry and Graham announced that they had come up with a 
framework for climate disruption legislation that would attract the necessary 
sixty votes.424  In support of their framework, they argued that sending “$800 
million a day to sometimes-hostile oil-producing countries threaten[ed] 
[national] security.”425  They warned opponents of the legislation that failure 
to act would leave climate change regulation to EPA and the clumsy tools 
available to it under the Clean Air Act.426  President Obama immediately 
jumped on the bandwagon.427  In a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the President praised Kerry for reaching out to Republicans, and 
he attacked “the naysayers” who pretended that global warming was not an 
issue.428 
While Senators Kerry and Graham drafted their Bill, Kerry and 
Senator Boxer filled in some missing details of the Kerry-Boxer Bill, made 
some minor adjustments, and added some allowance giveaways to make it 
more palatable to affected industries.429  At that point, the Bill had blossomed 
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to 923 pages.430  EPA predicted that the Bill would cost consumers $79 to 
$80 each year per household in increased prices for energy and consumer 
products, about the same as the House Bill.431  The Environment and Public 
Works Committee held a quick series of three hearings on the Kerry-Boxer 
Bill,432 and it went straight to committee markup over the strenuous 
objections of Republican committee members who boycotted the markup 
sessions.433  In the absence of the Republican members, the committee 
quickly voted out the Bill.434  Although it was highly unlikely that the Bill 
would attract sixty votes, the Senate leadership now had a vehicle to take to 
the floor where it could be amended or even replaced with a completely 
different bill at the appropriate time.435 
As hopes for the Kerry-Boxer Bill faded, the efforts of Senators 
Kerry and Graham to craft a bipartisan bill assumed greater importance.436  
Soon after their editorial appeared, Senator Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut) 
joined the effort.437  They met with Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Interior 
Secretary Ken Salazar, and Energy Czar Carol Browner at the White House 
to ascertain the Administration’s position on the elements—like expediting 
nuclear power plant licensing and opening offshore areas to oil and gas 
drilling—that some Republicans deemed critical to supporting a cap-and-
trade bill.438  In early November, the CoC suggested that it might support a 
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bill reflecting the approach outlined in the Kerry-Graham editorial.439  
Lieberman called the letter a game changer because it signaled that the three 
sponsors might be able to bring a large segment of the business community 
to the negotiating table.440  An industry lobbyist acknowledged that “‘Kerry-
Graham-Lieberman is where the game will be decided.’”441 
Senator Graham’s attempts to forge a bipartisan bill, however, 
attracted the wrath of the AEA, which spent almost $300 thousand on a 
series of radio, television, and online advertisements just before Halloween, 
warning that one of the “‘scary stories coming out of Washington’” was that 
Senator Graham “‘support[ed] . . . a national energy tax called cap-and-
trade.’”442  Environmental groups responded with a more modest ad 
campaign asking why “‘[o]ut-of-state interests [were] attacking’” Senator 
Graham for “‘backing an energy plan that produces more power [for] 
America.’”443 
In the meantime, the electric utility industry’s compromise over the 
allocation of allowances among regulated electric utility companies, as 
reflected in the EEI’s 50-50 formula, was unraveling.444  Coal-burning 
Midwest utility companies and rural electric cooperativeswhich had not 
been involved in the EEI negotiationscomplained that they would have to 
purchase offsets or install GHG reduction technologies to meet the steadily 
decreasing caps of the House and Senate bills, while non-coal-dependent 
utility companies would receive a substantial share of the allowances they 
needed without having to do much in the way of reducing emissions or 
purchasing credits.445  Representatives of the non-coal-dependent companies 
argued that their computer modeling showed that the costs of the Bill were 
evenly divided among all utility companies.446 
The split was also widening between regulated utility companies and 
unregulated merchant companies.447  The regulated companies joined the 
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rural electric cooperatives and two associations of public utility commissions 
in a letter to senators, arguing that the only way to ensure that the benefits of 
the free allowances award to the industry flowed through to consumers was 
to limit them to companies subject to state utility commission 
requirements.448  Unregulated utility companies, they argued, would just 
channel the savings to their shareholders.449  EEI attempted to smooth over 
both contentious issues by asking the Senate to allocate more allowances to 
all utility companies and to set a price ceiling for allowances as a safety 
valve, a solution that was sure to anger environmental groups.450 
The efforts to move climate disruption legislation through the Senate 
received a bolt from the blue in November 2009, when more than three 
thousand purloined emails and documents to and from scientists involved in 
preparing a report for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were 
leaked to the press.451  The emails, which were taken from East Anglia 
University’s Climate Research Unit, revealed that some of the hundreds of 
scientists involved in preparing the report had attempted to prevent papers 
from climate change skeptics from being published in scientific journals.452  
Critics also saw evidence in the emails of attempts to hide scientific data and 
to manipulate the data to fit particular theories of global warming.453  As 
Senator James Inhofe demanded that the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee conduct a full-scale investigation into the scandal, a 
spokesperson for the CEI boasted that “[w]e may be close to having [the 
legislation] permanently stymied.”454 
The revelations did not undermine the integrity of the science 
underlying the report.455  Several re-examinations of the scientific 
underpinnings of the report chastised the scientists for belittling fellow 
scientists and for poor choices of words in their emails, but otherwise 
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supported the conclusions reached in the report.456  The scandal did, 
however, arrest the forward momentum of climate disruption legislation.457  
If nothing else, the need to investigate the incident gave wavering Democrats 
a reason to urge the leadership to slow down the process until after the 2010 
elections.458 
As the prospect for climate change legislation faded and it began to 
look like the Republican Party might regain control of the House in the 
upcoming elections, British Petroleum, ConocoPhillips, and Caterpillar, Inc. 
announced that they would not be renewing their memberships in the 
Climate Action Partnership.459  A spokesperson for ConocoPhillips said that 
passing a bill had become such a high priority for the group that it was no 
longer attempting to ensure that the substance of the bill was workable for all 
companies in the coalition.460  Since it did not appear that Congress would be 
enacting climate change legislation, the companies decided to pursue what 
was in the best interest of their shareholders and consumers.461  More than 
twenty other large companies, however, remained in the coalition.462 
As the Senate was wrapping up its work on the President’s health 
care legislation in early March, Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham held 
a series of meetings with senators from both parties to attract their support 
for the Bill that they were still in the process of drafting.463  They made it 
clear that they would consider alternatives that were less stringent than the 
House Bill to bring more senators into the fold.464  At the same time, 
President Obama and high-level administration environmental officials met 
with thirteen senators to try to hammer out a compromise that could be 
featured in the Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Bill.465  At the meeting, the 
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President seemed open to the possibility of implementing a cap-and-trade 
regime quickly for the electric utility industry, but taking a more deliberate 
approach to reducing emissions from the manufacturing sector.466  Although 
a consensus position did not emerge from the meeting,467 it did clarify that a 
multi-sector cap-and-trade bill like the House and Kerry-Boxer Bills was not 
a serious option.468  At Kerry’s request, former President Bill Clinton began 
lobbying wavering senators, explaining to them that climate disruption 
legislation would create thousands of jobs and make the nation more 
competitive.469  The constant refrains of climategate, war on coal, and cap 
and tax at Tea Party rallies and in the conservative media echo chamber had 
found their way into the mainstream media, and the public was souring on 
the idea of climate disruption legislation.470 
Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham concluded that they could win the 
votes of oil-patch, rust-belt, and coal-state Democrats, as well as a few 
persuadable Republicans if they could soften the resistance of the CoC, the 
API, and coal-dependent electric utilities.471  Over the course of two weeks in 
late March, they met the CoC, more than a dozen trade associations, and 
various other industry groups to solicit their input on the measures the 
senators were considering to make their bill more attractive to industry.472  
The Bill “would regulate power plants beginning in 2012,” but would not 
extend to other industrial sectors until 2016.473  The Bill would establish a 
cap-and-trade regime with a hard price collar limiting the amount paid 
allowance to between $10 and $30 per ton, as adjusted for inflation.474  The 
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targets for the caps would be 17% of 2005 emissions by 2020 and 80% by 
2050—lower than the House bill.475  The cap-and-trade regime would 
preempt EPA and state regulation of GHGs.476  For the transportation sector, 
the Bill would levy a tax on fuel at the pump—not at the refinery where the 
oil companies would most likely bear some of the cost.477  The Bill would 
also encourage faster permitting of nuclear power plants and open up more 
offshore areas for oil and gas development.478  The industry groups were 
delighted that the senators had gone to such lengths to allow them to 
participate in the drafting process.479 
The direction in which the three senators were moving deeply 
concerned their progressive colleagues.480  Senator Bernie Sanders objected 
to the provisions preempting EPA and the states, the support for nuclear 
power, and the decision to open up more offshore areas to oil and gas 
development.481  A group of senators led by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida 
urged the trio not to include offshore oil and gas drilling in the Bill.482  
Several state attorney generals joined the National Association of Clean Air 
Agencies in complaining about the trio’s position on preempting EPA 
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regulation and state law.483  Environmental groups were also deeply 
concerned about the concessions.484  With the 2010 off-year election 
campaigns not going well for the Democrats, the groups realized that if 
Congress did not enact a bill, however compromised, by the end of the year, 
the prospects for climate change legislation in the next Congress were quite 
grim.485  Most were willing to hold their noses and acquiesce in the changes 
contemplated by the three senators, but others were less inclined to 
compromise.486 
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham scheduled a press 
conference for Monday, April 26, 2010 to roll out their long-awaited Bill.487  
Six days before the rollout, however, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid told 
the Democratic leadership that he was moving immigration reform ahead of 
climate disruption legislation on the legislative agenda.488  The move 
infuriated Senator Graham, who viewed the move as “‘nothing more than a 
cynical political ploy’” to attract Hispanic votes in the upcoming election.489  
He announced that he was no longer willing to support the Bill if 
                                            
483. Dean Scott, Legislation:  Senators Urged to Resist State Preemption in 
Crafting Compromise Climate, Energy Bill, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 781 (Apr. 9, 
2010); Kathleen Hart, Air Agencies Want Senate Climate Bill to Let States Enact Tougher 
Emissions Standards, SNL ELECTRIC UTIL. REP., Apr. 19, 2010 [hereinafter Hart, Air Agencies 
Want Senate Climate Bill to Let States Enact Tougher Emissions Standards], available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (Select “Secondary Materials”; Search and Select “SNL Electric 
Report”; Search “Air Agencies Want Senate”); Coastal States Oppose EPA Pre-Emption, 
CONGRESS DAILY, Apr. 7, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7210291. 
484. Cash, Senators Shop CO2 Cap on Utilities in 2012, supra note 474 
(quoting Timothy Wirth, United Nations Foundation); Cash et al., Senators Mull Provision to 
Block EPA, States from Regulating Carbon Emissions, supra note 372 (quoting Center for 
Biological Diversity). 
485. Darren Goode et al., Outlines of Climate Bill Emerging, NAT’L J., Apr. 14, 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 26395437. 
486. Margaret Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction, NAT’L J., Apr. 14, 
2010 [hereinafter Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction], available at 2010 WLNR 
26395432; Doug Obey, EPA Seeks to Quell Fears over Likely Loss of Climate Powers in 
Senate Bill, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 23, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 8290617. 
487. Kriz Hobson, The Wages of Climate Inaction, supra note 486; see Juliet 
Eilperin, EEI, Three Oil Companies to Back Climate Bill; Top 10 Highlights of Kerry 
Proposal, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://views.washingtonpost.com/climate-
change/post-carbon/2010/04/by_juliet_eilpern_the_nations.html. 
488. Laura Meckler, Democrats Revive Immigration Push—Pelosi, Reid Agree 
to Put Issue Ahead of Energy Bill as Hispanics, a Key Voting Bloc, Grow Frustrated About 
Inaction, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, at A5. 
489. Jim Tankersley, Dispute Leaves Climate Bill Stuck on Hold; a Republican 
Senator Pulls His Support in Anger over a Separate Immigration Measure, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 2010, at A12. 
77
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] THE DISRUPTIVE POLITICS OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 453 
immigration reform remained on the Senate’s agenda.490  Senator Reid 
quickly backtracked,491 but Senator Graham was not mollified.492  Under 
attack in his home state from Tea Party activists, he may have welcomed the 
opportunity to separate himself from climate disruption legislation.493 
If Graham’s departure was not enough to sink the Bill, the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout, which began on April 20, 2010 and continued 
throughout the summer, ensured that the Bill’s provisions for opening up 
more offshore areas to deepwater drilling was no longer viable.494  In 
addition, Senator Bill Nelson (D-Florida) promised to filibuster any bill that 
contained such a provision.495  Taking that provision out of the Bill, 
however, would cause the oil and gas industry to oppose it with the 
consequent loss of support from oil-patch senators.496 
Senators Kerry and Lieberman introduced their 987-page Bill 
without Senator Graham on May 12, 2010 to little fanfare, because the 
Senate was absorbed in the Deepwater Horizon spill.497  Not a single 
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Republican supported the Bill.498  The Bill resembled the outline that the 
three senators had described earlier in the year, but with some important 
details filled in and many additional giveaways.499  It would have established 
a cap-and-trade regime with a 2020 cap 17% reduction from 2005 emissions 
and a 2050 cap of 83% reduction.500  The program would take effect in 2013 
for power plants, but would not kick in for the manufacturing and natural gas 
distributing companies until 2016.501  The Bill provided such generous 
allowances that many sources would not have to purchase allowances—or 
reduce GHG emissions—for several years.502  Allowances would be 
allocated to unregulated merchant generators in an amount equal to half of 
their emissions, but the percentage would diminish to zero by 2029.503  The 
formula for allowances for the electric power industry allocated 75% on the 
basis of emissions and 25% on the basis of retail sales, rather than the 50–50 
split of the House Bill.504  Two-thirds of the proceeds from the auctions 
would go immediately back to consumers through their local electricity 
distributors.505 
The Bill allowed emitters to purchase offsets, but at least 75% of all 
offsets had to be produced domestically, unless sufficient domestic offsets 
were unavailable.506  Trading of allowances, derivatives, and offsets would 
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be overseen by the CFTC.507  The Bill contained a hard price collar with a 
floor of $12 and a ceiling of $25.508  It required the EPA to write technology-
based standards requiring new coal-fired power plants to reduce GHG 
emissions by 50% and by 65% after 2020, and it preserved the EPA’s 
authority to require states to write technology-based standards for existing 
power plants for non-criteria pollutants.509  To please coal-fired power plant 
owners and the coal industry, the Bill contained a line charge on sales of 
electricity to finance research on CCS technology.510  To make natural gas 
producers happy, it included tax incentives and faster environmental 
permitting for existing plants that converted from coal to cleaner fuels.511  
For the nuclear power industry, the Bill contained $2 billion to $6 billion in 
direct support and an increase from $18.5 billion to $54 billion in loan 
guarantees.512  The Bill contained a provision giving states a veto over 
offshore oil and gas drilling in adjacent waters, but it preempted state and 
regional GHG emissions programs.513 
The EEI and most investor owned electric companies and 
representatives of environmental groups were present at the unveiling to 
express their support for the Bill.514  The CoC and the API remained 
neutral.515  The Midwestern Climate Coalition and the NRECA said that it 
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would withhold judgment until they saw EPA’s cost analysis of the Bill.516  
The American Public Power Association complained that the price cap was 
too high and that it provided too many allowances to unregulated merchant 
generators.517  Although some major oil and gas producers supported the 
Bill, the natural gas industry’s umbrella group, America’s Natural Gas 
Alliance, was not high on the Bill, because it did not provide sufficient direct 
incentives to use natural gas over coal.518 
Environmental groups were concerned about the provisions 
preempting the states’ power to regulate GHG emissions, providing 
incentives for nuclear power plants, and allowing offshore drilling, even with 
the state veto power.519  Despite those concerns, a group of environmental, 
labor, and military veterans groups spent $11 million on a series of television 
advertisements and an associated online campaign in states of wavering 
senators, suggesting that viewers urge their senators to support broad climate 
disruption and energy legislation.520  Other environmental groups opposed 
the Bill; Frank O’Donnell of Clean Air Watch criticized Kerry and 
Lieberman for following an inside-the-beltway strategy that ultimately failed 
to attract a single Republican supporter.521  The National Association of 
Clean Air Agencies also opposed the Bill because it preempted state 
regulation of GHG emissions.522 
Supporters of cap-and-trade legislation got a minor boost in mid-
June when EPA’s analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman Bill concluded that it 
would have a relatively modest impact on consumers.523  The average annual 
cost per household would be between $79 and $146, compared with the $80–
                                            
516. Cash, Electricity Rates on List of Considerations as Senators Contemplate 
GHG Bill, supra note 373; Goode & Harder, Kerry, Lieberman Work to Keep Together 
Fragile Coalition, supra note 497. 
517. Cash, Finally Revealed, Senate Climate Bill Proposal Wins Utility 
Backing, but Big Hurdles Remain, supra note 500. 
518. See Bill Holland, Industry Says Climate Bill Falls Short in Promoting Gas 
as Clean-Burning Fuel, PLATTS GAS MARKET REP., May 14, 2010, at 17, available at 2010 
WLNR 11014089; Whieldon, supra note 507. 
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$111 cost that EPA attributed to the House bill.524  In early July, the 
Congressional Budget Office released a report concluding that complying 
with the Kerry-Lieberman Bill would be slightly less expensive than 
complying with the House bill.525  In addition, public opinion polls taken 
during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill showed that two-thirds of the public 
supported mandatory limits on GHG emissions.526 
As the oil continued to spew from the Deepwater Horizon well, 
President Obama met with a group of Democratic and Republican senators to 
discuss the possibility of linking a legislative response to the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill with a cap-and-trade bill that would be limited to the 
electric utility industry.527  Most of the Republican senators were unwilling 
to consider any form of cap-and-trade bill and they urged the President 
instead to pour federal dollars into research on GHG emission reduction 
technologies.528  The meeting ended with no agreement on a framework for 
moving forward.529 
In late July, Senator Reid announced that neither the Democratic 
leadership nor the President had been able to cobble together sixty votes for a 
climate disruption bill of any size or shape.530  They had therefore called a 
halt to their efforts.531  Climate disruption was now in the hands of the EPA, 
which was exercising its limited power under the Clean Air Act, and states 
that were willing to take on that controversial topic.532  The conservative 
think tanks turned their attention to enacting legislation calling a halt to those 
climate change initiatives.533 
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. Introduction 
What can we learn from these four attempts to enact climate 
disruption legislation over the past twenty years?  Some lessons are obvious 
and bear little analysis.  Thus, one lesson to take away from the fate of 
climate change legislation during the 107th Congress is that it is very 
difficult to enact legislation that the president strongly opposes when your 
party controls only one House of Congress.534  This section of the article will 
probe some less obvious lessons that the past failures to enact climate 
disruption legislation may have for future attempts to enact similar 
legislation or any other environmental legislation that the business 
community is likely to oppose. 
B. Powerful Institutions Are Aligned Against Regulatory Legislation 
Any attempt to enact domestic policy legislation over the objections 
of the business community must contend with the institutions that it has 
erected to protect its interests and to advance a laissez faire minimalist 
agenda.  The idea and influence infrastructures that the business community 
put into place over the past thirty-five years were steadfastly opposed to 
climate disruption legislation, and they played an important role in 
forestalling that legislation.  Three think tanks—the Heritage Foundation, the 
CEI, and the George C. Marshall Institute—have played prominent roles in 
the ideological air wars over climate change.535  Over the years they have 
provided a constant stream of laissez faire minimalist critiques of 
government regulation that has found its way into the public consciousness 
as it resonates through the conservative media echo chamber.536  Industry-
sponsored climate change skeptics in academia—many of whom are 
affiliated with one or more conservative think tanks—have likewise played 
an important role in the debates over climate change legislation by instilling 
doubt about the reality of climate disruption in the public consciousness.537  
Both the think tank scholars and the industry-sponsored scientists have made 
themselves freely available to mainstream press reporters who feel duty 
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bound to present both sides of public controversies.538  The net result is that 
an appreciable segment of the United States population believes that GHG 
emissions do not cause climate disruption and that, even if they did, 
government regulation is not the right way to go about limiting GHG 
emissions. 
The business community’s influence infrastructure has had an even 
more powerful influence on the progress of climate disruption legislation.  
The CoC—the largest and most visible mouthpiece of the business 
community—and the NAM have consistently opposed every bill that would 
have imposed mandatory restrictions on GHG emitters.539  And they have 
invested tens of millions of dollars on advertising campaigns in the districts 
of key members of Congress, maintaining websites on climate change issues, 
and contributing to the campaigns of sympathetic candidates.540 
Over the years, industry trade associations—like the EEI, the API, 
and the AGA—have spent millions of dollars hiring lobbyists, financing 
studies of the impacts of various bills, hosting briefings, generating calls and 
emails from their members to key legislators, participating in meetings with 
members and committee staffs, and working with business-supported 
grassroots organizations to stir up public opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.541  Individual companies have hired their own lobbyists to serve 
as soldiers in the ground wars.542  These troops may aim their fire at one 
another on narrow issues like the proper allocation formula for free 
allowances, but they tend to fall in line with the trade associations and the 
broader business community on issues like whether allowances should be 
auctioned or given away and whether stringent caps should kick in before 
CCS technology becomes easily available to electric utility companies. 
The pro-business media echo chamber has provided a robust 
opportunity for the public to hear the business community’s position on 
controversial issues like climate disruption.  Fox News commentators railed 
against cap and tax legislation, and its coverage of coal-related issues often 
flashed “War on Coal” across the bottom of the screen.543  During the 
debates over climate disruption legislation in the 110th and 111th Congress, 
Fox News commentator Steven Milloy provided a steady stream of criticism 
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of advocates of climate disruption legislation and ready access to a national 
audience for climate disruption skeptics on his Junk Science show and 
blog.544 
Finally, the grassroots organizations that the business community 
created to stir up public opposition to unwanted legislation have proven very 
effective in the battles over climate disruption legislation.  CSE was an early 
generator of grassroots opposition to the BTU tax, and its successor 
organization, Americans for Prosperity, generated targeted opposition to later 
climate disruption bills and played critical roles in the Tea Party movement 
that has moved the Republican Party even farther away from support for 
climate disruption legislation.545  In addition to these relatively longstanding 
organizations, the energy industry created a number of ad hoc organizations 
like the AEA and Energy Citizens to wage extremely effective grassroots 
campaigns against climate change legislation in the districts of likely swing 
voters in Congress.546 
The BTU tax battle provided an early example of how adept the 
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures were at framing 
attempts by the energy industry to avoid its environmental responsibilities as 
worthy crusades to preserve jobs and enhance economic growth.547  They 
argued that a BTU tax was not in the public interest, not because it forced 
energy companies to choose between paying the tax or reducing emissions, 
but because it would raise prices for consumer goods, reduce economic 
activity, and bring about job loss.548  It was much harder on the other side to 
characterize a complex tax on the energy content of fuels as a much-needed 
tool to protect the planet from a host of maladies that might or might not 
flow from global temperatures that might or might not be increasing.549 
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C. America is Deeply and Widely Fractured Over Climate Disruption 
America is a deeply divided nation on many cultural and economic 
issues, but climate disruption is an issue that divides us more than most.  And 
the division is both deep and wide.  Participants on both sides of the climate 
disruption debates have strongly held beliefs about the role of GHG 
emissions in causing climate disruption, the likely cost and availability of 
technologies for reducing or sequestering GHG emissions, whether 
government regulations or voluntary programs are more effective in reducing 
GHG emissions, and whether the United States should unilaterally take steps 
to address climate disruption before other major GHG-emitting nations take 
action.550  In many cases the gulf between the two sides is so wide that 
negotiation and compromise are virtually impossible.  A congressperson who 
believes that climate disruption is a fraud perpetrated by arrogant scientists 
on gullible liberals is unlikely to find common ground with a congressperson 
who believes that climate disruption is a real phenomenon, the effects of 
which we are currently witnessing in unprecedented hurricanes, typhoons, 
and droughts, and the causes of which are corporations that will always put 
the bottom line ahead of the public welfare. 
Science plays a role in these divisions.551  Despite the embarrassing 
East Anglia diversion, the scientific community has come to closure on the 
question of whether anthropogenic GHG emissions cause increased global 
temperatures.552  Nevertheless, a small, but determined group of scientists—
many of whom have derived financial support from energy companies—have 
provided a sufficient degree of doubt to persuade those who want to be 
persuaded that climate disruption is a theory that lacks a scientific basis.553 
Ideology also plays a significant role in the divisions.554  The 
business community’s idea infrastructure and its media echo chamber have 
been exceedingly effective in convincing a large segment of the population 
that government should not interfere in private economic arrangements.555  
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Many Americans are therefore ideologically predisposed to oppose 
government-based solutions to the threat of climate disruption.556  Even those 
who are convinced that climate disruption is real are not convinced that BTU 
taxes or cap-and-trade regimes are the way to go about addressing the 
problem.557  On the other side, environmental activists have historically been 
inclined ideologically to distrust corporations and to look to the government 
to solve environmental problems.558  This has changed somewhat in recent 
years with the acceptance by nearly all environmental groups of market-
based approaches to regulations that give companies flexibility to meet 
predetermined environmental goals in the most efficient way possible.559 
Finally, regional differences play a powerful role in these 
divisions.560  In part, these differences stem from the fact that some areas of 
the country are rich in coal, some are rich in natural gas, and some are poor 
in both resources.561  People from states in which coal plays a large role in 
the economy are not predisposed to favor programs that have the effect of 
discouraging coal use, just as people from natural gas-producing states are 
likely to favor such programs if the result is to induce power plants to switch 
from coal to natural gas.562  The differences may also reflect a subtler 
economic distinction reflecting the differing cost of electricity in different 
states.563  Economists John and Christopher Sautter have demonstrated that 
the distinction between Red States that vote mostly Republican and Blue 
States that vote mainly Democratic very closely tracks the cost of electricity 
in those states.564  The average cost of electricity in Red States is about 2.5¢ 
per kilowatt-hour lower than in Blue States.565  This suggests that people in 
Red States should be more inclined to oppose climate disruption legislation 
not just because it may harm local industries and increase unemployment, 
but also because it may increase the price they pay for electricity in the 
future.566  The business community’s influence infrastructure has proven 
very adept at appealing to these regional differences in advertising initiatives 
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and grassroots campaigns to generate opposition to climate disruption 
legislation.567 
As suggested by the Sautters’ study, these deep and wide divisions 
are now almost perfectly reflected in our two-party system.568  There was 
once a day when Republicans from the Northeast fought with Republicans 
from the Midwest over the content of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act.569  In the 1970s, some of the most vigorous proponents of environmental 
protection were Republicans like Senators Jacob Javits and John Chafee.570  
Although there are still vigorous Democratic supporters of the coal and 
electric utility industries in the South and Midwest, their numbers have 
diminished as the voters replaced them with Republicans.571  Now there are 
very few Republican politicians who are willing to advocate strong 
governmental intervention to solve environmental problems.  And they tend 
to vote with their fellow Republicans when it is their votes that really matter. 
D. The Business Community is Fractured on Climate Disruption, but 
the Fractures Are Neither Deep Nor Wide 
The business community has never been entirely of one mind in the 
debates over climate change.  In the early 1990s, the National Gas 
Association split with the rest of the business community in supporting a 
study concluding that GHG emissions could be reduced by moving rapidly to 
natural gas and other renewables.572  During the debates over the BTU tax, 
two small trade associationsboth of which had an economic interest in 
higher energy taxesbroke ranks and supported the Clinton 
Administration’s bill.573 
Fissures became more apparent in the 110th Congress.  A split 
developed between electric utility companies that were heavily dependent on 
coal and opposed cap-and-trade legislation, companies that were not so 
dependent on coal and supported cap-and-trade legislation with stringent 
caps and short deadlines, and still other companies that supported cap-and-
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trade legislation in principle, but opposed legislation that kicked in before the 
industry had time to develop CCS technology.574  This period also witnessed 
a major split in the business community over the reality of global warming as 
several Fortune 500 companies parted company with the CoC on climate 
disruption legislation.575  These fractures continued and deepened somewhat 
during the debates in the 111th Congress over the Waxman-Markey Bill in 
the House and the Kerry-Boxer and Kerry-Graham-Lieberman Bills in the 
Senate.576 
Upon close examination, however, it appears that these fractures are 
neither deep nor wide.  First, only relatively few companies have parted with 
the CoCthe nominal spokesperson for the business community.577  The 
breakaway companies are either manufacturers, like the Apple Corporation, 
that want to project a clean image, or natural gas distributors and public 
utilities that stand to gain economically from climate change legislation.578  
The most serious fractures within the energy industry have occurred over 
how the free allowances should be allocated among various segments of the 
industry.579  On the broader issue of free distribution of allowances versus 
auctions, the industry has been united in favoring free distribution.580 
Second, the idea and influence infrastructures have lives and minds 
of their own.  Although the think tanks, media outlets, and grassroots 
organizations depend heavily on the business community for financial 
support, they are driven by a strong ideological commitment to free markets 
and noninterventionist governmental policies.581  Because they also receive 
substantial support from conservative foundationsbillionaires like the 
Koch brothersand sympathetic individuals, the rift in the business 
community is not likely to affect them financially.582  It is therefore unlikely 
that they will change their positions on climate change legislation in the 
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foreseeable future, despite the rifts in the business community.583  
Consequently, it is unlikely that many Republican senators and 
representatives will change their tunes. 
Third, to the extent that the support indicated by some companies 
and trade associations for climate disruption legislation is strategic, the 
strong opposition to the same legislation by the CoC, as well as pro-business 
think tanks, grassroots organizations, and media outlets can be very useful.584  
There is an inside-the-beltway adage that “‘if you [are] not at the table, you 
[are] on the menu.’”585  Companies that would rather not see climate change 
legislation enacted may still want to play an influential role in shaping such 
legislation as it moves through Congress.  If they announce that they support 
reasonable legislation so long as it is fair to them, they can actively 
participate in the legislative deal-making, comfortable in the knowledge that 
the idea and influence infrastructures are carrying on the fight to prevent 
Congress from enacting that legislation. 
 A spokesperson for EEIwhich had opposed climate change during 
the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrationsacknowledged in August 
2009 that its position had evolved from opposing anything but a voluntary 
program to support for “‘well-designed legislation that will reduce GHG 
emissions while also containing costs to customers.’”586  Frank O’Donnell, 
the head of Clean Air Watch, suggested that the evolution did not represent a 
change in position so much as an acknowledgement that the politics of 
climate change had changed after the 2008 elections.587  Given the real 
possibility that a Democrat-controlled Congress would pass legislation that a 
Democratic president would sign, EEI may have decided that it should do 
what it could to influence the content of that legislation, even though it 
preferred no legislation at all.  The strong opposition to any legislation by the 
business community’s idea and influence infrastructures gave it an 
opportunity to have it both ways. 
At the end of the day, the divisions in the business community were 
not debilitating.  It presented a united front in opposition to any cap-and-
trade bill that allocated a significant proportion of the initial allowances 
through an auction, the tool preferred by most economists, and that lacked a 
bright-line safety valve that effectively removed the cap once the price of 
                                            
583. Industry Fractures on Climate Policy, supra note 23, at 6; see also 
MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 33–34, 40. 
584. See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 40; Power & Casselman, supra note 459. 
585. Power & Casselman, supra note 459. 
586. Saiyid, supra note 579. 
587. See id. (discussing the opinion of Frank O’Donnell, Clean Air Watch). 
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allowances exceeded a prescribed level.588  Even on issues on which a few 
non-coal-dependent electric utility companies parted company with the EEI, 
the energy industry as a whole was capable of devoting considerable 
resources to stopping legislation they deemed undesirable.589  The ACCCE, 
an umbrella group for the electric utility and coal industry,590 spent almost 
$10 million on lobbyists in its short—but successful—campaign to defeat the 
Lieberman-Warner Bill.591  Fissures certainly developed in the industry most 
affected by climate change legislation, but they disappeared in the face of the 
kind of stringent legislation demanded by environmental groups. 
E. On the Question of Climate Disruption, Republicans Are Dogs, and 
Democrats Are Cats 
Time after time, the Republican leadership in Congress was able to 
persuade all but a tiny few members to vote as a pack against mandatory 
climate disruption legislation at both the committee level and on those rare 
occasions when bills came to the floors of the House and Senate.  The threat 
of a Republican filibuster in the Senate was so credible that the bills’ 
sponsors simply assumed that it would take sixty votes to pass them.592  For 
the Democratic leadership, by contrast, corralling enough votes to get bills 
through committees and past floor votes was like herding cats. 
In part, this reflects the geographical fact that few Republican 
members come from states that stand to benefit from climate change 
legislation beyond the benefits that accrue to all states from reduced climate 
disruption.593  But it also reflects a deep ideological commitment to a laissez 
faire minimalist approach to the role of government in society.  And this in 
turn reflects the influence of three decades worth of books, white papers, 
issue briefs, op-eds, and conferences undertaken by the conservative think 
                                            
588. See Cash, Allowance Game Continues, supra note 372; Cash, Building a 
Climate Change Bill, Congress Hears More from Utlities About Challenges, supra note 187. 
589. See Ari Berman, The Dirt on Clean Coal: The Coal Industry Presents 
Itself as Committed to Environmental Sustainability—But Is It?, NATION, Apr. 13, 2009, at 17, 
17–18. 
590. See About Us, AM. COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY, http://
www.cleancoalusa.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
591. Berman, supra note 589, at 18; Coral Davenport, Coal Industry Digs in 
with Lobbying Campaign, CQ WKLY., Mar. 23, 2009, at 652; Anne C. Mulkern, A 
‘Propaganda War’ over ‘Clean Coal,’ INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/20/20greenwire-propaganda-war-over-coal-escalates-
ahead-of-hi-10594.html?pagewanted=all. 
592. See Kerry & Graham, supra note 423. 
593. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 22,601–02 (2009). 
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tanks and academic centers, and the business-oriented news and political 
commentary of the conservative media echo chamber. 
In every serious attempt to enact climate disruption legislation 
during the past two decades, Democratic members have divided along lines 
that reflected the economic interests of their states.594  In part, this is a 
manifestation of the fact that Democratic members come from more 
economically diverse regions.595  The fact that a large number of Democratic 
members hail from coal-producing states like West Virginia, Virginia, 
Illinois, and Pennsylvania, and manufacturing states like Ohio and Michigan, 
guarantees that critical issues, like the stringency of the caps and the 
allocation of allowances, will be divisive for Democrats.596  And the fact that 
many Democratic members represent rural agricultural states in the farm belt 
means that fractures are likely to occur on issues like the stringency of the 
caps—which arguably cause fuel and fertilizer prices to increase—and the 
entity that oversees trading in offsets.597 
 These divisions had three significant consequences.  First, they 
prevented the Democrats from voting as a block in favor of climate 
disruption legislation.598  Given the thinness of Democratic majorities in both 
houses in years in which they were in control, this made it extremely difficult 
to hit upon a formula that would secure the majority needed to pass 
legislation in the House and the supermajority needed to pass legislation over 
the opposition of a unified Republican Party in the Senate.599  Second, they 
                                            
594. See 155 CONG. REC. 20,556; Robin Bravender, Rockefeller Backs 
Murkowski’s EPA Resolution in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/06/09/09climatewire-rockefeller-backs-murkowskis-epa-resolution-96513.html. 
595. See Alexander E.M. Hess & Michael Sauter, Top States With the Fastest 
Growing Economies, USA TODAY (June 15, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2013/06/15/states-with-the-fastest-growing-economies/2416239/; 
Election Results 2008: President Map, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), http://
elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/map.html. 
596. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2012, 12 tbl.6 
(2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf; Alexander E.M. Hess et al., 
10 States Where Manufacturing Still Matters, USA TODAY (Aug. 10, 2013, 6:19 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/10/10-states-where-manufacturing-
still-matters/2638363/; Election Results 2008: President Map, supra note 595. 
597. See Election Results 2008: President Map, supra note 595; 2007 Census 
Ag Atlas Maps—Farms, U.S. DEPARTMENT AGRICULTURE, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/
Publications/2007/Online_Highlights/Ag_Atlas_Maps/Farms/Agricultural_Chemicals_Used/
07-M104.php (last modified Apr. 19, 2012). 
598. See Bravender, supra note 594. 
599. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives 1935–Present, U.S. 
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/74-Present/ 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
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guaranteed that any bills that the Democrats were able to move through 
Congress would contain many exemptions and giveaways to industries 
favored by holdout members.600  Third, they ensured that the bill that 
Congress finally passed would probably not meet stringent intermediate 
environmental goals.601  Thus, one of the early concessions that 
Representative Waxman and Senators Kerry and Lieberman made to coal-
state members was a reduction in the 2020 cap from 20% below 2005 levels 
to 17%.602 
F. Public Interest Groups Are Outgunned and Outclassed 
The major environmental groups, like the Sierra Club, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
vigorously supported strong climate disruption legislation,603 and they 
benefitted from the fact that climate disruption legislation was high on the 
list of two Democratic presidents and Democratic leaders in both houses of 
Congress during the 107th and 111th Congresses.604  But they were clearly 
outgunned by the large agglomeration of industries that opposed their 
bills.605  Although the environmental organizations devoted unprecedented 
sums to lobbying, advertising, and grassroots campaigns, they were no match 
for the sophisticated efforts of the professional lobbyists and public relations 
operations of the CoC, the NAM, industry trade associations, and individual 
companies.606  Except for the Sierra Club, they had no equivalent of the 
highly organized grassroots campaigns of Citizens for a Sound Economy, 
Americans for Prosperity, and the many ad hoc organizations that industry 
created to fight particular battles.607  Perhaps more importantly, they had no 
                                            
600. See, e.g., Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98. 
601. See Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70. 
602. See Hart, House Energy, Climate Change Bill Cuts Carbon Emissions 
20% by 2020, supra note 274; Lizza, supra note 601. 
603. Ben Geman, Green Groups to Obama:  Choose Climate over Oil, NAT'L J. 
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/green-groups-to-obama-choose-
climate-over-oil-20140117. 
604. See Geman, supra note 603; Clinton Plan: BTU’s Bearing the Brunt, 
supra note 58; Overview of Legislative Proposals in the 107th Congress, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, www.c2es.org/federal/congress/107 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); 111th 
Congress Climate Change Legislation, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
605. See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, 
supra note 397. 
606. See id. (relating lobbying expenses of industry and environmental groups 
for the first half of 2009). 
607. See Americans for Prosperity Calls Victorious Defeat of Bridge to 
Nowhere a Testament to the Power of Grassroots Activism, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sep. 21, 2007; 
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equivalents of Fox News and Rush Limbaugh to spread their message 
throughout the country; although in the later years MSNBC and its 
commentators Rachel Maddow and Keith Olbermann began to fill that 
gap.608 
The campaign to enact climate disruption legislation in the 111th 
Congress was by far the most expensive campaign ever run by environmental 
groups.609  But even with tens of millions of dollars to spend on lobbying, 
advertising, and grassroots organizing, their efforts did not match the 
sophistication of the industry operations.610  The difference in approach is 
well illustrated by the grassroots tours that both the AEA and a coalition of 
environmental groups conducted during the critical August recess after the 
House had passed the Waxman-Markey Bill.611  People attending an AEA 
rally in Athens, Ohio enjoyed free lunches, live concerts, and free T-shirts, 
and heard stirring speeches filled with calls to action.612  People attending an 
environmental group rally in the same city soon thereafter got to hear a 
scholarly panel discuss the issues in a classroom and received free bumper 
stickers.613 
G. It Takes a Crisis 
In Freedom to Harm, I argue that “[r]egulatory legislation usually 
requires a crisis and a resulting groundswell of public opinion.”614  For 
example, the crisis brought on by the financial meltdown of September 2008 
motivated Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
                                                                                                       
Hundreds of Activists to Converge on North Carolina Capitol to Demand ‘Less’ on Second 
Annual ‘Citizens for Sound Economy’ Day, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 4, 2001, at 1; The Sierra 
Club Niagara Group Will Send More Than 100 People to Take Part in the Forward on 
Climate Rally in Washington, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 15, 2013. 
608. See JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 16, at 47; Warming Conspiracy 
Proceeding as Planned, NEWS GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2009, at C3; Joe Romm, Inhofe's Stunning 
Admission to Maddow on Global Warming:  ‘I Thought it Must Be True Until I Found Out 
What It Cost,’ CLIMATEPROGRESS (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:35AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2012/03/16/446008/inhofe-maddow-global-warming/. 
609. See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, 
supra note 397. 
610. See id. 
611. See id.; Paul, Against All Odds, supra note 116; The American Clean 
Energy & Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/111/acesa (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
612. Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, supra 
note 397. 
613. Id. 
614. MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 57. 
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Consumer Protection Act of 2010.615  Climate disruption, by contrast, does 
not create the sort of extreme crises that lead Congress to enact legislation.616  
Thus, Senator James Inhofe scoffed at any suggestion that Congress should 
enact climate disruption legislation based “on speculative computer model 
predictions of [fifty] to [one hundred] years away of a looming climate 
catastrophe.”617  Environmental groups could try to attribute Superstorm 
Sandy, Supertyphoon Haiyan, or the sinking Polar Vortex of the winter of 
2013–14 to climate disruption.  Since few competent scientists are willing to 
support that claim, however, the groups have been hesitant to rely on such 
events to stir up public support for climate disruption legislation.618  Climate 
disruption comes gradually as glaciers melt, sea levels rise, periods of 
drought lengthen, and hurricanes worsen in intensity.619  Even in the absence 
of powerful idea and influence infrastructures aligned against legislation, it 
would have been very difficult for supporters of climate disruption 
legislation to persuade Congress to enact a stringent bill without the impetus 
of a crisis.  And climate disruption is not likely to yield such crises until it is 
far too late to do something about it. 
H. Climate Change Legislation Will Not Be Pretty 
One very clear lesson of the past attempts to enact climate disruption 
legislation is that the end result of any successful attempt in the future is not 
likely to be pretty.  Economists and policy analysts have created elegant 
models of carbon or BTU taxes and cap-and-trade regimes that appear to 
achieve GHG emissions reduction goals fairly and efficiently.620  Putting 
aside the question whether the models would work as fairly and efficiently in 
the real world, supporters of such solutions should understand that if 
Congress ever does enact climate disruption legislation, the regulatory 
regime that it creates will not adhere to the elegant models.  It will reflect 
dozens of compromises, concessions, and giveaways that its sponsors will 
have to make in order to get the legislation enacted.  As Representative 
Waxman observed after the House passed the Waxman-Markey Bill, 
“Congress has to recognize that there are differing opinions, there are 
                                            
615. Id. at 238–40. 
616. See id. at 248. 
617. Kathleen Hart, Boxer Spars with Republicans over Purpose of Cap-and-
Trade Bill, SNL POWER DAILY N.E., Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
618. See Fahrenthold, Environmentalists Slow to Adjust in Climate Debate, 
supra note 397. 
619. See Louise Gray, Stern Warning on Climate Change, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Apr. 21, 2009, at 27. 
620. See MCGARITY, supra note 6, at 247. 
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differing interests.”621  To accommodate all of these interests, the Bill’s 
sponsors will have to make compromises and look for ways to channel 
resources to particular regions of the country or to particular industries.622  
Outside observers of this process may not like it, but until this country comes 
up with a way to finance political campaigns in a way that does not heavily 
depend on contributions from wealthy individuals and corporations, this is 
the political world in which we live. 
I. EPA Should Press Ahead with its GHG Regulations 
The fact that the EPA was busily promulgating technology-based 
regulations for greenhouse gas emissions was an important driver of 
reluctant House Democrats to support the Waxman-Markey Bill in the 111th 
Congress.623  The in terrorem effect of the EPA’s regulatory program was 
not, however, an adequate inducement to Senate Democrats to finish the 
job.624  The EPA has now promulgated a series of regulations that, when 
fully implemented, will reduce emissions from major new facilities and 
modify existing facilities, and it has proposed a very ambitious new source 
performance standard for GHG emissions from power plants.625  We are still 
a very long way from the reductions that scientists tell us are necessary to 
slow down climate disruption.  But if the EPA had waited until Congress 
acted, we would not be as far down the road toward a reduced carbon 
footprint as we are. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Republican Party retains control of the House or gains control 
of the Senate in the 2014 elections, the probability that Congress will enact 
serious climate change legislation is very low.  That party is still heavily 
influenced by its Tea Party constituency and the Tea Party is financed by 
                                            
621. Alexander Duncan, Waxman:  Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted 
Members to Pass Climate Bill, PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, July 13, 2009, at 7 [hereinafter 
Duncan, Waxman:  Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members to Pass Climate Bill], 
available at 2009 WLNR 14404144. 
622. See Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98. 
623. See Duncan, Waxman:  Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members 
to Pass Climate Bill, supra note 621; The American Clean Energy & Security Act (Waxman-
Markey Bill), supra note 611. 
624. See Duncan, Waxman:  Fear over EPA Carbon Regs Prompted Members 
to Pass Climate Bill, supra note 621. 
625. See Broder, Adding Something for Everyone, supra note 98; Amy 
Royden-Bloom, American Clean Energy and Securities Act of 2009:  Analysis and 
Discussion, EPA (June 17, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/
pdf/royden-bloom_presentation_fed_leg_6-17-2009.pdf. 
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funders who are strongly opposed to any governmental solution to global 
warming.  After two election cycles in which moderate Republicans have 
lost primary elections to Tea Party candidates626 and general elections to 
Democratic opponents,627 there are precious few Republican members of 
Congress who would support even very modest federal legislation on climate 
disruption.628  And there is no reason to suppose that this will change in the 
foreseeable future.  As long as it takes two houses of Congress to enact 
legislation, the adamant opposition of the Republican Party to climate 
disruption legislation will ensure that none will be forthcoming from a 
Congress in which at least one House is controlled by that party. 
Even if the Democratic Party retains control of the White House and 
the Senate and gains control of the House in 2014 or 2016, the prospects for 
enacting serious climate change legislation remain dim.  The myriad of 
interest groups that will be affected by serious climate change legislation will 
do whatever they can to influence legislators to oppose legislation that might 
damage their economic interests.  The legislators will, in turn, negotiate for 
their votes with those interests in mind.  If Congress does enact legislation, it 
is likely to be a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions that may or may not 
attain the larger GHG emission reduction goals of its sponsors.  The result 
will not be pretty, but it may be the best that we can expect in an 
economically diverse nation that, after a remarkable laissez faire revival, 
remains deeply divided on the fundamental question of the propriety of 
governmental intervention into private economic arrangements. 
                                            
626. See Nate Silver, In House of Representatives, an Arithmetic Problem, 
INT’L N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/
21/in-house-of-representatives-an-arithmetic-problem/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; 
Congress by the Numbers:  The 112th’s New Composition, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/05/congress-numbers-ths-new-composition/. 
627. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 599. 
628. See Chemnick, Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their Stringent 
Climate-Change Bill, supra note 284; Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, supra note 
599. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To hear electric utilities tell the story, the end is nigh.1  Their chief 
worry is symbolized by the simple rooftop solar panel.  Of course, a 
homeowner’s installation of rooftop solar, in and of itself, is little or no cause 
for concern.  After all, property owners have every legal right to generate 
their own power.  Rooftop solar, however, is significant for what it 
                                                 
* Joseph P. Tomain Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of 
Law University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
1. See Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the 
Electric Business Model, 25 ELECTRICITY J. Aug.–Sept. 2012, at 65, 66 [hereinafter Sioshansi, 
Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business Model]; John Slocum, Threat from 
Behind the Meter, The Case for Utilities to Compete Directly with Distributed Resources, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2013, at 46, 50. 
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represents more broadly—distributed generation (“DG”).2  This broader 
concept of DG means that central power stations can lose market share of 
their electricity sales by a range of technologies including solar, wind, fuel 
cells, micro-grids, and the like.3  Fortunately for electric utilities, at this 
point, distributed solar electricity constitutes only one to two percent of the 
total electricity load and, therefore, DG is not an immediately significant 
contributor to load loss.4  However, the signs on the horizon are not 
necessarily rosy for investor owned electric utilities (“IOUs”) that provide 
seventy-five percent of the nation’s electricity.5 
The reality is that the electricity market is changing.6  The market is 
more competitive today than it has been historically and, consequently, 
traditionally structured IOUs face real financial challenges as new 
technologies with decreasing costs “directly threaten the centralized utility 
model.”7  This article argues that the twenty-first century challenge to the 
                                                 
2. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 69.  DG is also sometimes referred to as distributed energy 
resources—or DER.  ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE INTEGRATED GRID:  REALIZING THE 
FULL VALUE OF CENTRAL AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=3002002733. 
3. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 2, at 10. 
4. Id.; see also CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES 22, 26 
(2013) [hereinafter CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES], available at https://
ir.citi.com/HUpLUJZhzhXsP%2b6OiTTARHAGreyfPZR1UG279bla4pIcwvwwMBlSn6clve
Fs%2bcVQPTaKmIi568s%3d; PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES, 
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A 
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/
finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf (report prepared for the Edison Electric Institute). 
5. Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory:  Electric Utility Industry 
Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/electricutility_
overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
The [United States] electric industry includes over 3,100 electric utilities.  Investor 
owned electric utilities are privately owned, represent [eight] percent of the total, 
approximately [seventy-five] percent of utility generating capability, generation, 
sales, and revenue.  Historically, most investor owned electric utilities were 
operating companies that provide basic services for the generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity. 
Id. 
6. See, e.g., Charles K. Ebinger & John P. Banks, The Electricity Revolution, 
BROOKINGS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/11/06-
electricity-revolution-ebinger-banks. 
7. KIND, supra note 4, at 3; see also JOHN STERLING ET AL., NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TREATMENT OF SOLAR GENERATION IN ELECTRIC UTILITY 
RESOURCE PLANNING 1, 4 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy1405ti/60047.pdf.  
But see Julie Cart, Solar Power’s Outlook Not as Sunny; Projects Stall Amid Uncertainty 
About the Future of Big Tax Breaks and Utilities’ Willingness to Buy the Pricier Electricity, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at A1.  Cart refers to utility scale solar in the article, which does 
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electric industry is different in kind from previous challenges.  Further, past 
responses to past challenges are inadequate to meet the convergence of 
demands posed on IOUs by new technologies, new markets, and new 
regulations.8  Instead, the twenty-first century challenge requires a dramatic 
new response as electric utilities face a new economic order and as they seek 
revenue protection and assurances of financial stability from their regulators. 
Now, what to do?  Two responses are readily available.  Electric 
utilities can either fight or switch.9  The first response is the one given by 
incumbents:  Stay the course, tweak the regulatory system, and continue 
doing business as usual (“BAU”).10  The BAU strategy relies on maintaining 
cost-of-service ratemaking as central to the regulatory compact between 
utilities and regulators.11  The second—and smarter—is that IOUs must 
change their business models in significant—if not dramatic—ways.12  The 
country is making a revolutionary transition to a clean energy economy13 and 
                                                                                                                   
not threaten traditional utilities as does distributed generation but does affect traditional 
transmission.  See id. 
Of the 365 federal solar applications since 2009, just [twenty] plants are 
on track to be built.  Only three large-scale solar facilities have gone online, two in 
California and one in Nevada.  The first auction of public land for solar developers, 
an event once highly anticipated by federal planners, failed to draw a single bid last 
fall. 
Id. 
8. Joseph P. Tomain, Building the iUtility, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2008, at 
28, 29 [hereinafter Tomain, Building the iUtility]. 
9. Michael T. Burr, Turning Energy Inside Out: Amory Lovins on Negawatts, 
Renewables, and Neoclassical Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 28, 31.  Amory 
Lovins expands on these two basic choices: 
There are at least a half-dozen ways an incumbent can respond to such insurgents.  
It can ignore them; fight them; try to tax or block them; finance them; buy them; 
incorporate their products as its own brand[] offering; become an open-source 
integrator for all qualified offerings; or several other possibilities.  But among all 
responses, playing ostrich [is not] a good one. 
Id.  Not surprisingly, incumbents tend to fight.  See, e.g., Perry Sioshansi, Utility of the Future 
or Future of the Utility?, BREAKING ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://breakingenergy.com/2013/11/13/utility-of-the-future-or-future-of-the-utility/?print=1 
(regarding California’s largest gas and electric utilities, “they were rather attached to the status 
quo with all the protections, security, and restrictions that comes with operating as a regulated 
monopoly”). 
10. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 66. 
11. See id. 
12. See, e.g., Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29–30 (arguing 
that electric utilities must change their business model from selling as much electricity as they 
can to selling energy products and services including electricity generated from renewable 
resources and selling energy efficiency). 
13. See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, 2014 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA: FACTBOOK 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.bcse.org/factbook/pdfs/2014%20sustainable%20energy%20in%20America%20fa
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there are several drivers to that transition, including:  (1) a developing policy 
consensus;14 (2) positive economic indicators;15 (3) the need to diversify fuel 
resources; (4) new financing techniques; and, (5) regulatory proposals at the 
state and federal levels.16  Quite simply, electric utilities should behave as 
key actors in that transition.  Today, however, utility efforts have been 
lacking as they seek solace in old ways of doing business. 
This article will first explore current industry characteristics and 
challenges in Part II.  Part III will then discuss the current situation of the 
electricity market and IOU participation in that market.  Part IV will analyze 
the fundamental legal claim available to utilities that the regulatory 
environment is devaluing their property and may constitute a constitutional 
taking.  In Part V, a test case involving solar distributed generation and net 
metering will be presented to examine the types of challenges facing IOUs as 
well as available responses to those challenges. 
Starting with Part VI, the article more broadly discusses the need to 
change the current regulatory compact between utilities and their regulators.  
Then, Part VII examines new forms of ratemaking that can be employed to 
implement the regulatory compact.  The article concludes in Part VIII with a 
discussion of the shape that the utility of the future ought to take. 
II. INDUSTRY CHALLENGES 
The electricity industry has been roiling for over three decades.  For 
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the industry continued to realize 
growth and, with it, increasing sales and profits.17  Utility executives were 
aided in their expansion by a cost-of-service rate formula that rewarded them 
for their capital investments.18  During that period, as the industry expanded, 
economies of scale were realized and consumers enjoyed relatively low and 
stable prices while producers reaped their rewards.19 
                                                                                                                   
ctbook.pdf (“A revolution is transforming how the [United States] produces, delivers, and 
consumes energy.  The mix of supply is changing rapidly, with low-carbon sources gaining 
share, while consumption is declining, despite overall economic growth.”). 
14. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 92 (2011) [hereinafter TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY]. 
15. See, e.g., Joel Makower, The State of Green Business 2014, 
GREENBIZ.COM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/01/21/state-green-
business-2014 (discussing growth in clean energy investments). 
16. CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 6. 
17. KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN 
THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 17 (2012), 
available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/COSR_history_
final.pdf. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
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By the mid-to-late 1960s, however, things began to change:  A 
national electricity infrastructure was completed; electric generation plants 
reached a technological plateau; and, the cost of electricity from traditionally 
structured electric plants began to rise.20  These events, among others, shook 
the industry from its complacency and presented real challenges both to 
industry actors and to their regulators. 
This once staid industry began encountering a series of challenges 
beginning in the late 1970s as electricity prices began to rise and as the 
financial stability of the industry was threatened by two major events.21  The 
first financial shockwave came with the collapse of commercial nuclear 
power.22  From the mid-1970s through the 1980s, utilities that had invested 
in nuclear power found themselves with excess capacity, canceled plants, or 
the costly conversions of nuclear plants to coal-fired plants.23  These nuclear 
investments ran into the billions of dollars and those costs had to be 
apportioned in some way.24  The question “Who pays?” was a real one for 
utilities, for regulators, and for consumers.  The response to the question was 
generally some form of cost allocation between ratepayers and 
shareholders.25  In some instances, regulators simply amortized the 
investment and allowed the utilities to recover their principal but did not 
allow them to either earn a return on their investment or to recover their costs 
of capital.26  In brief, the regulatory response to the nuclear crisis was to 
                                                 
20. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 11 (1987) 
[hereinafter TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION]. 
21. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in 
Retrospect:  Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 503 (1984). 
22. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–04. 
23. MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at 24; Pierce, supra note 21, at 503–05. 
24. Pierce, supra note 21, at 504. 
25. See TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 3; 
Pierce, supra note 21, at 505–06. 
26. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
810 F.2d 1168, 1171–72 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  In this case, an en banc panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) ruling that allowed Jersey Central to recover a $397 million 
investment in a failed nuclear power plant over a fifteen-year period.  Id. at 1170–71, 1187–
88.  Jersey Central wanted to place the unamortized portion that remained each year into the 
rate base.  FERC allowed the fifteen-year amortization—i.e., allowed the utility to recover 
$26.4 million as an expense for fifteen years—but disallowed including the unamortized 
portion in the rate base, and that ruling was upheld by the Circuit Court.  Id. at 1171, 1187–88. 
Regulators applied other rules as well.  Some regulators, for example, applied the 
prudent investment test, which held that investments that were prudent when made should be 
recovered from ratepayers.  See United Illuminating Co., 55 P.U.R. 4th 252, 267 (Conn. Dept.  
Pub. Util. Control Aug. 22, 1983); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 45 P.U.R. 4th 386, 400 (N.Y. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n 1982).  And others applied a used and useful test that held that ratepayers 
were not to be saddled with the cost of an investment that produced no electricity.  See 
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protect some of a utility’s investment, and to maintain their financial stability 
while not overburdening consumers.27 
The second financial shockwave came in the 1990s with efforts to 
deregulate the electric industry, and when that failed, then to restructure it.28  
Complete deregulation failed due to its complexity and the inability to 
develop either a policy or political consensus to fully deregulate.29  At the 
wholesale level, deregulation looked promising and has occurred to a 
significant degree.30  At the retail level, however, the continued natural 
monopoly characteristics of the transmission and distribution (“T&D”) 
segments prevented across-the-board deregulation from occurring.31  Many 
states, however, did attempt retail competition,32 but California’s notable 
failure threw two major utilities into financial distress with Pacific Gas and 
Electric declaring bankruptcy.33  With that failed experiment, restructuring 
effectively ended.34  Still, restructuring efforts threatened the financial 
integrity of IOUs.35  The regulatory response to this problem, however, was 
to provide some mechanism for utilities to recover any stranded costs that 
resulted from (1) prudent investment and (2) reliance on regulatory 
requirements.36 
The nuclear power collapse and the failure of restructuring were one-
off events.  In other words, once an investment in a nuclear plant was 
unproductive for any of the reasons cited above, then the financially 
threatening event was over and it needed to be resolved in some way.  
Similarly, once an investment in a restructured environment was also seen to 
                                                                                                                   
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989).  In this case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States upheld a Pennsylvania state statute that mandated that only capital 
investments that were used and useful could be recovered through rates.  Id. 
27. See Pierce, supra note 21, at 518. 
28. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 31. 
29. See id. at 36. 
30. See id. at 28, 31. 
31. See id. at 33; Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly 
System, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY:  DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE 
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 89, 104 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Joseph 
P. Tomain, Whither Natural Monopoly?  The Case of Electricity, in 7 THE END OF A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY:  DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 111, 111 
(Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
32. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 413 (2d ed. 2011). 
33. Laura M. Holson, California’s Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A1. 
34. Tomain & Cudahy, supra note 32, at 408. 
35. See Electric Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility 
Industry Overview, MIDWEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, http://www.midwestpub.com/
electricutility_overview.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
36. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6, 31. 
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be unproductive, then it too needed resolution.  The regulatory responses to 
both events were essentially cost-based.37  Regulators looked to the prudence 
of a utility’s capital investment and they looked to the overall effect of those 
investments on the utility’s financial integrity.38  Regulators then did what 
they could to ensure the continued financial existence of the utilities.39  The 
current challenge, however, is not one-off.  Instead, it is long-term and 
developing slowly, and also requires a more creative response than shoring 
up past investments.40  Instead, a forward-looking response is needed to 
maintain a healthy electric market for IOUs.41 
In order to better understand the nature of the twenty-first century 
challenge, let’s briefly first look at changes in the market and then examine 
some of the reasons for those changes.  The electricity market in the twenty-
first century is dramatically different from what it was during the twentieth 
century.  For most of last century, electric utilities enjoyed a growing market 
and, therefore, regularly enjoyed increasing sales.  Today, however, things 
are different. 
Demand for electricity has slowed each decade from the post-World 
War II golden age until now.42  In the decade of 1949 to 1959, electric 
utilities enjoyed an annual growth of 9.8%.43  That growth has declined to an 
annual rate of 0.7% in the first decade of the twenty-first century.44  In fact, 
electricity demand has declined every year except two since 1996.45  Further, 
for the last two years demand has fallen, and in 2012, demand was down 
1.7% compared with 2011.46  According to recent Energy Information 
                                                 
37. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at viii–ix tbl.1, x, 
17–40.  In addition to nuclear power and restructuring, McDermott notes other periods of 
stress including the rise of inflation during the 1970s, excess capacity in the 1980s, and a 
current challenge to restore customer and investor confidence in the industry.  Id. 
38. Id. at viii, 25–26. 
39. See id. at 33. 
40. See Ebinger & Banks, supra note 6. 
41. See id. 
42. See LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES:  PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 151 (8th ed. 2005).  From 1945 through 1965, electric utilities enjoyed 
an annual growth rate of approximately seven percent.  Id.  “No doubt what helped most was 
the dramatic and continuing drop in the real price of electricity, compared to the price of other 
fuels.”  Id. 
43. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040 71 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2013], available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf. 
44. Id. 
45. Amory B. Lovins, Amory’s Angle:  Three Major Energy Trends to Watch, 
SOLUTIONS J. ONLINE (Summer 2013), http://www.rmi.org/summer_2013_esj_amorys_
angle_three_major_energy_trends_main. 
46. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 2012 STATE OF THE MARKETS 
REPORT 43 (2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/reports-analyses/st-
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Administration estimates, demand is scheduled to decline for the third year 
in a row and hit the lowest level since 2001.47  Nevertheless, the Department 
of Energy projects that for the next three decades, from 2011 to 2040, overall 
demand will increase by twenty-eight percent.48  Even with such modest 
growth in overall demand, individual consumers are, in fact, consuming less 
electricity.49  More problematic for traditional IOUs, however, is that 
projected demand for central power station electricity is predicted to fall 
“dramatically due to a combination of energy efficiency and competition 
from new technologies, which collectively could impact their addressable 
markets by 50% over the next two decades.”50  To add to these troubles, 
significant investment is needed in the electricity infrastructure, both to 
upgrade the current grid and to promote interconnections with renewable 
resources, as well as to make investments in new technologies.51 
According to the Energy Information Administration, electricity 
demand declined due to reduced retail sales and a lack of demand growth in 
the commercial and industrial sectors as a result a soft economy.52  A slow 
economy, though, is only one reason among many.  Technological and 
market reasons include increased energy efficiency in appliances and 
buildings; smarter meters and temperature controls; smarter consumer 
choices about using cheaper off-peak energy; growth of DG so that 
consumers can obtain power on-site; and an increase of inexpensive shale 
gas for home heating.53  These technological and market changes, however, 
did not come about on their own.  They were aided by state and federal 
regulations that were intentionally designed to increase competition and 
change the fuel mix in the electricity sector largely because cleaner, cheaper 
                                                                                                                   
mkt-ovr/2012-som-final.pdf; Jonathan Fahey, Home Electricity Use in US Falling to 2001 
Levels, AP (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/home-electricity-use-us-
falling-2001-levels. 
47. Fahey, supra note 46. 
48. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 43, at 
71. 
49. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 12 fig.1.5 
(2012) [hereinafter U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011], available at 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.  Energy consumption per capita has 
been relatively flat or declining since roughly 1990.  Id. 
50. JASON CHANNELL ET AL., CITI, ENERGY DARWINISM: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 73–75 (2013), available at https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/
ReportSeries.action?recordId=21. 
51. See New Regulatory Frameworks for Electric Infrastructure Investment, 
EDISON ELECTRIC INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/documents/altreg_
brochure_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
52. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra 
note 43, at 71. 
53. See KIND, supra note 4, at 3, 5, 11. 
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power was available than that generated by IOUs.54  Further, these regulatory 
demands clearly point to a clean energy future rather than to a continued 
expansion of coal-fired—or even nuclear generated—electricity.55 
III. THE NEW NORMAL 
The constrained electricity market now represents the new normal 
for privately-owned electric utilities.56  This new normal must be recognized 
as different in kind from the threats posed by the nuclear collapse and the 
restructuring failure.  Today’s challenge is structural, long-term, and driven 
by multiple events.  Consequently, to meet the challenge, structural changes 
are necessary on the regulatory side to renegotiate the regulatory compact 
and redesign traditional cost-of-service ratemaking.57  Additionally, there 
must be structural changes in the business model of utilities as well.  The 
needed regulatory and business model responses presented by the new 
                                                 
54. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 17, at ix–x, 33. 
55. Id. at 35.  Recently, four nuclear reactors—two each in Georgia and South 
Carolina—have been granted combined construction and operating licenses.  See Building 
New Nuclear Facilities, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/New-
Nuclear-Energy-Facilities/Building-New-Nuclear-Facilities (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).  
Nevertheless, the economics of high cost nuclear power remain problematic.  See John 
Mecklin, Introduction:  U.S. Nuclear Exit?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 9, 9; The Cost of Nuclear Power:  Numbers That Don’t Add Up, UNION 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear-power-and-our-
energy-choices/nuclear-power-costs/ (last revised Oct. 1, 2013). 
56. See Ahmad Faruqui & Eric Shultz, Demand Growth and the New Normal, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 22, 23.  Demand side management (“DSM”) is comprised of 
“programs and technologies [that] enable consumers to reduce peak demand and electric 
energy consumption by providing customers with incentives to buy more energy efficient 
technologies and to shift demand from peak hours—where the power grid is stressed due to 
high demand—to off-peak hours.”  Id. at 24; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 1–2.  Among the 
factors contributing to the challenge, Kind lists:  (1) falling cost of distributed generation; (2) 
new technologies; (3) consumer and regulator interest in demand side management; (4) 
declining natural gas prices; (5) slow economic growth; (6) rising electricity prices in some 
sections of the country; and (7) investment need for system improvements.  KIND, supra note 
4, at 1–3. 
57. See, e.g., Jim Pierobon, Don’t Hold Your Breath for Any Progress 
Stemming from the Joint Statement by NRDC and EEI, THEENEGERYCOLLECTIVE (Feb. 17, 
2014), http://www.theenergycollective.com/jimpierobon/341816/don-t-hold-your-breath-any-
progress-stemming-joint-statement-nrdc-and-eei. 
[W]e all have to realize that real progress can only be made by state utility 
commissions, many of which seemed unwilling to seriously consider moving 
beyond regulatory compacts in states that for decades have rewarded utilities only, 
or mostly, for selling more kilowatt hours.  Now that electricity demand nationally 
is flattening and may be declining, the time has come for tradition-bound states to 
reengineer the traditional regulatory compact. 
Id. 
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normal electricity market can be uncovered by first examining the economic 
and policy assumptions behind the traditional regulatory model, and then by 
examining the regulatory climate that has significantly contributed to the 
current market. 
A. Traditional Economic Assumptions 
In the early years of utility regulation, the relationship between 
utility and regulator was based upon what—in 1898—the infamous Samuel 
Insull proposed as “a grand bargain in which local electric companies would 
receive exclusive franchise service territories, ‘…coupled with the conditions 
of public control, requiring all charges for services fixed by public bodies to 
be based on cost plus a reasonable profit.’”58  Nearly one hundred years later, 
then Judge Kenneth Starr defined that grand bargain as a regulatory compact 
that has been prevailing since electricity regulation began.59  In short, the 
regulatory compact was indeed a grand bargain for the utility.  As it turns 
out, the regulatory compact also served as something of a bargain to 
consumers and to regulators for most of last century. 
Utilities greatly benefited from the regulatory compact essentially 
because by having been granted an exclusive service territory, utilities could 
block out competition from new entrants simply because they were now 
operating under a government protected monopoly.60  Further, utilities also 
benefitted from a ratemaking formula that operated like a cost-plus contract.  
Utilities would receive all of their reasonably incurred expenses on a dollar-
for-dollar basis and they would be able to earn a return on invested capital.61  
                                                 
58. DAVID MALKIN & PAUL A. CENTOLELLA, RESULTS-BASED REGULATION:  A 
MODERN APPROACH TO MODERNIZE THE GRID 7 (2013), available at http://
www.gedigitalenergy.com/regulation/. 
59. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. 
INST., supra note 17, at 56. 
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a 
particular geographical areacoupled with state-conferred rights of eminent domain 
or condemnationis granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive 
regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market.  Each party to 
the compact gets something in the bargain.  As a general rule, utility investors are 
provided a level of stability in earnings and value less likely to be attained in the 
unregulated or moderately regulated sector; in turn, ratepayers are afforded universal, 
non-discriminatory service and protection from monopolistic profits through political 
control over an economic enterprise.  Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless 
to say, not before us. 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 810 F.2d at 1189 (citation omitted). 
60. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii; Electric 
Utility Industry Worldwide Directory: Electric Utility Industry Overview, supra note 5. 
61. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at vii, 2. 
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While it is inaccurate to say that utilities were guaranteed a profit, in effect 
though, as long as they operated prudently, profit was assured.62  Consumers 
also benefitted to the extent that rates were set at more or less competitive 
levels rather than at monopoly levels.63  Regulators benefited as well because 
as the industry was expanding and as utilities were realizing economies of 
scale, rates stayed relatively flat and in some instances, declined.  In other 
words, rate hearings followed well-established and well understood rules and 
methodologies and the life of a regulator was fairly easy.64 
The regulatory compact was implemented through the application of 
a traditional cost-of-service ratemaking formula that required regulators to 
balance the interests of the utility and its shareholders in earning a reasonable 
return on their investments against the interests of ratepayers in not being 
charged confiscatory or discriminatory rates.65  The balance was intended to 
satisfy the Fifth Amendment constitutional prohibition against takings of 
private property without just compensation.66 
Cost-of-service ratemaking, quite simply, works well in an 
expanding economy.  As long as electric demand continues to grow and as 
long as utilities continue to make technological improvements and achieve 
scale economies, utilities can be rewarded for their prudent capital 
investments and customers do not suffer rate increases due to a “virtuous 
growth cycle in which increasing electricity consumption was viewed as 
synonymous with the public good.”67 
The danger in such a formula, however, should be apparent.  As long 
as utilities received a return on capital expenditures, they had an incentive to 
build.68  Again, during a period of economic expansion and growth in 
electricity demand, building is a necessary and economically valuable 
strategy.  Today, however, the industry is experiencing a “‘paradigm shift’ 
caused by the need for large new capital additions at a time of declining sales 
growth and reduced credit worthiness.”69  If the economy slows or demand 
falls, capital investments may not be economically valuable because the 
                                                 
62. See id. at 6. 
63. See id. at 6, 12. 
64. See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
REGULATIONS 6 (1983); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 25. 
65. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; J. GREGORY 
SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: 
THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 223 
(1997). 
66. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 6; SIDAK & 
SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222. 
67. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at ix. 
68. See id. 
69. Id. at 41. 
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market is saturated and electricity sales flatten, meaning revenues decline for 
IOUs.  Today, IOUs in fact face just such a slow economy, weak demand, 
and nervous regulators.70 
B. Traditional Policy Assumptions 
Generally, energy policy—more specifically electricity policy—was 
grounded on the central and important idea that the more energy that a 
country produces and consumes, then the more vibrant its economy would 
be.71  Indeed, the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented economic 
growth for the United States as well as any developing country with a robust 
energy infrastructure. 
There are other policy ideas associated with this belief in the direct 
positive relationship between energy and the economy.  First, it is more 
efficient to use cheaper inputs to produce a product such as electricity than 
more expensive ones.72  In this way, then, the electric industry has relied 
predominantly on cheap, but dirty, fossil fuels—particularly coal.73  Second, 
scale economies could be realized through larger plants and greater 
centralization.74  Therefore, the utility industry should capitalize on those 
improvements—to a point.  Parenthetically, this principle was exactly the 
reason that utilities invested in nuclear power—to realize scale economies.  
Unfortunately, that strategy often proved to be quite costly.  Third, as utilities 
moved from local to regional, and, ultimately, to interstate T&D, industry 
regulation similarly moved from municipal to state and then to federal 
authorities.75  In short, the development and the structure of the industry and 
its regulation moved in tandem as industry actors and regulators mimicked 
how each conducted its business, thus reinforcing the traditional energy 
paradigm.76 
As a result of these assumptions, the industry and its regulation 
developed a pattern that exists today and is a pattern that has witnessed the 
investment of trillions of dollars over the century.  Unfortunately, the 
traditionally structured industry and its regulation do not fit with current 
                                                 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at ix, 17. 
72. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 119. 
73. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 358 (1990) [hereinafter Tomain, The Dominant Model of United 
States Energy Policy]. 
74. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION, supra note 20, at 11. 
75. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, supra note 
73, at 356–57. 
76. See id. at 374. 
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economic policy nor are they aligned with contemporary energy policy 
assumptions. 
Most notably, today we have significant reasons to question the 
underlying assumption about the direct relationship between energy and the 
economy.  Most particularly, even though electricity demand is projected to 
increase overall, albeit slowly, individual consumption is declining.77  In 
other words, the traditional belief in the direct linkage between energy and 
the economy is now experiencing a reversal.  Individual consumers can 
continue to enjoy the lifestyles they have while consuming less electricity.  
Further, industrial and commercial, as well as residential, consumers are less 
dependent on the local utility for their electricity.  Additionally, energy 
policy—more specifically electricity policy—is concerned not only with the 
relationship between energy and the economy; it is also concerned about 
environmental consequences and about the energy reliability and national 
security issues in the realm of geopolitics.78 
Consequently, given the dramatic nature of changes in the electricity 
market and in energy policy, it is time to reconsider, reevaluate and redesign 
both the regulatory compact and the traditional approach to ratemaking—
particularly given the changes that have been made in energy regulation—to 
which we now turn. 
C. Regulatory Changes 
The regulatory landscape for the electricity industry and its markets 
has been undergoing dramatic change for over forty years at both the federal 
and state levels.79  It is this regulatory twist that has given IOUs cause for 
concern and it is something that they must now confront. 
Although, as noted above, the electric market began changing in the 
mid-1960s, no major regulatory changes occurred until the passage of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).80  In brief, large 
IOUs seemed to reach a technological plateau in the mid-1960s, yet they had 
committed capital to expansion projects.  In doing so, IOUs overbuilt and, as 
a consequence of the traditional ratemaking formula, they were charging 
customers for that capital expansion.  To inside observers, it was clear that 
cheaper electricity was available but could not get to market because T&D 
                                                 
77. Sioshansi, Why the Time Has Arrived to Rethink the Electric Business 
Model, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
78. See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29. 
79. Compare e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012), with Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 
2621). 
80. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. 
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was privately owned by IOUs.  As it turned out, PURPA proved the very 
point that cheaper electricity was available.81 
As economic dislocations occurred in world energy markets and in 
the domestic economy, President Carter proposed, and Congress enacted, the 
National Energy Act82 with the intent of stabilizing domestic energy policy 
and markets.83  PURPA was intended to encourage states to move away from 
electricity rate designs that encouraged consumption and move toward 
marginal cost pricing because it would promote more accurate price signals 
and achieve greater efficiencies.84  In addition, PURPA promoted 
independent power production, co-generation and small power generation.85    
Known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”), these non-utility generators were 
able to produce electricity that was less expensive than electricity generated 
from traditional IOUs and they were more successful than policymakers 
imagined.86  QFs demonstrated that non-utility generation could be delivered 
safely and reliably and, as it turned out, there were more generating facilities, 
sometimes referred to as PURPA-machines, than anticipated.87  
Consequently, it was revealed that cheaper power was available for electric 
markets.88 
QFs had a very attractive economic incentive to generate electricity 
up to the maximum amount allowed under law.89  Not only could QFs 
generate cheaper power for a firm’s own use, any excess power could be sold 
back to the local utility at the “utility’s full avoided costs.”90  The local utility 
                                                 
81. See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2602). 
82. National Energy Act of 1978 was comprised of five major pieces of 
energy legislation:  Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; Natural Gas Policy Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3301); Energy 
Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 
3206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Power Plant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 92). 
83. National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 
Stat. 3206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8201). 
84. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3); Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2622). 
85. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210. 
86. See What is a Qualifying Facility?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012). 
87. Id.; see Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA:  The Intersection of Competition and 
Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L. J. 419, 423 (1995). 
88. See What is a Qualifying Facility?, supra note 86. 
89. Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 
417–18 (1983). 
90. Id. at 404. 
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had to allow access to QFs, and it was obligated to purchase their excess 
electricity at the local utility’s marginal cost of electricity.91  The local utility 
had to pay the cost that it would incur to generate one more kilowatt-hour of 
electricity.92  In other words, the utility had to pay the generator not at the 
prevailing market value, but at the utility’s own higher cost of producing 
electricity.93  Thus, PURPA discovered a new generation market. 
In effect, PURPA set the stage for competition.  Traditionally 
regulated IOUs, following the traditional regulatory structure and rate 
formula, earned favorable rates, but they had overbuilt.94  The excess 
capacity raised utilities’ fixed costs, which had to be recovered from 
ratepayers.95  Consumers were aware of these market developments.96  They 
did not want to pay for higher cost electricity and sought lower-cost 
options.97  While the existence of lower cost electricity did not surprise large 
customers, the market was surprised by how much new non-utility generated 
electricity was available, and how eager new generators were to enter the 
market.  These new unregulated producers were willing to supply the market 
with electricity at prices lower than those charged by incumbent IOUs, and 
they now provide over one-third of the country’s electricity.98 
PURPA opened electricity markets and other state and federal 
legislation entered that arena and expanded competition.99  Under the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, Congress created a category of exempt wholesale 
generators.100  These entities generated electricity to be sold at wholesale, 
and they were exempt from some of the regulatory provisions contained in 
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which was later repealed 
                                                 
91. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617, § 
210(a), (d), 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3). 
92. See id. § 210(d). 
93. See id. 
94. Joseph P. Tomain, The iUtility, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY 
PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 223, 231–33 (Alyson C. Flournoy & 
David M. Driesen eds., 2010) [hereinafter Tomain, The iUtility]. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 231. 
97. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at X; Tomain, The 
iUtility, supra note 94, at 226–27. 
98. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA 
FOR DECEMBER 2013 tbl.ES1.B (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/
current-year/february2014.pdf. 
99. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 421, 423–24; see also Energy Efficiency & 
Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Net Metering, GREEN POWER NETWORK http://
apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/netmetering.shtml (last updated May 25, 2011). 
100. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 79). 
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by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.101  That repeal was deemed to be a 
significant boost to independent power production because it opened the 
electricity market to a wider variety of business activities.102  Also under the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress required electric utilities, under certain 
restrictions, to offer net metering services to electricity consumers.103  To 
date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form 
of net metering.104  Additionally, for over three decades federal tax incentives 
in the form of production tax credits and investment tax credits, among 
others, have spurred production of electricity from renewable resources.105  
Finally, federal regulators, pursuant to enacted legislation, are pursuing 
methods of pollution control.106  Proposed EPA rules will strengthen Clean 
Air Act protections and they will have a negative impact on coal-fired power 
plants.107 
Federal regulation was a boon to independent power production.  
State regulation, however, was more varied and went quite a bit further.  
State regulatory actions that contribute to declining electricity demand 
include demand side management planning requirements; integrated resource 
planning requirements; renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”); and energy 
efficiency standards as well as net metering laws.108  Additionally, in an 
effort to stimulate non-fossil fuel generation, thirty-seven states and the 
                                                 
101. See Michael J. Zimmer, Regulation Under the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 2005, in 3 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 70.14 (2013). 
102. See id. 
103. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594 
(codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)).  “Each electric utility shall make available 
upon request net metering service to any electric consumer that the electric utility serves.”  Id.  
The section contains qualifications that allow Public Utility Commissions (“PUCs”) to fashion 
net metering rules:  (1) consumer must be an “eligible on-site generating facility” and (2) that 
electricity “may be used to offset electric energy provided by the electric utility to the electric 
consumer during the applicable billing period.”  Id. 
104. Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra 
note 99. 
105. See Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States:  A 
“Bit” of History, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 172 (2013); Mona L. Hymel, The United 
States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives:  The Evidence Supporting Tax 
Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 43, 50 (2006). 
106. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007) (holding that the 
EPA does have the authority and the responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
107. See, e.g., Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
New Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (forthcoming Federal Register Publication), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposal.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014). 
108. See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–28. 
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District of Columbia have adopted RPS that impose requirements of varying 
strictness on local utilities to sell electricity generated by renewable 
resources.109  These standards vary throughout the country but are comprised 
of essentially two elements.110  First, a resource such as solar, wind, 
hydropower, or geothermal must qualify for inclusion under the terms of the 
RPS.111  Second, a percentage goal and timetable is established for each 
utility to satisfy the requirement.112  RPS programs have a significant impact 
on developing renewable resources over the last decade or so.113 
States have also been involved in an array of other regulations that 
are aimed at having electricity produced by non-utility generators using 
renewable resources.114  Feed-in tariffs, for example, are long-term contracts 
                                                 
109. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, EIA (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have 
Renewable Portfolio Standards], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850; 
Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DSIREUSA.ORG (Mar. 2013), http://
www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
110. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New 
Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107. 
111. See id.; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, supra note 109. 
112. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New 
Stationary Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units, supra note 107; Lincoln L. Davies, 
Commentary, Power Forward:  The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 
1342 (2010). 
113. See Davies, supra note 112, at 1383; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most 
States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 109.  One of the open issues 
regarding RPS requirements is whether or not they should be left to the states or that national 
standard should be adopted.  Compare Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1441–43 (2010) [hereinafter Rossi, The Limits of 
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard], and Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy 
Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 361–
64 [hereinafter Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable 
Electricity Requirement], with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.  Because each state has a 
different energy mix and because regions have different energy resources available to them, 
the argument is made that they should be left to the states.  Compare Rossi, The Limits of a 
National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky 
Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, supra note 
113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66.  However, national standards may 
provide more uniformity and may make trading in renewable energy credits more fluid.  
Compare Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 113, at 
1441–43, and Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable 
Electricity Requirement, supra note 113, at 361–64, with Davies, supra note 112, at 1364–66. 
114. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, ZERO NET ENERGY AND 
THE DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE FUTURE: ADAPTING ELECTRIC UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7, 9, 11, (2012) [hereinafter ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY 
METERING], available at http:/ /www.rmi.org/Content/Files/RMI_PGE_NEM_ZNE_DER_
Adapting_Utility_Business_Models_for_the_21st__Century.pdf.pdf; U.S. Energy Info. 
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
490 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
that utilities enter into with renewable resource providers, which enable the 
providers to have an assured income stream enabling them to provide 
renewable energy.115  Energy efficiency standards and zero net building 
standards are intended to reduce consumption by capturing energy 
efficiencies.116  States also have tax credits available that have made the 
installation of photo-voltaic (“PV”) solar and other alternatives more 
affordable for more consumers.117 
Consequently, an array of federal and state legislation has had two 
dramatic consequences for the industry.118  First, competition in the 
electricity market has been encouraged.119  Second, regulations have 
promoted renewable resources and energy efficiency that have had the effect 
of reducing demand for IOU electricity.120  This new regulatory scheme has 
caused a reevaluation of regulation at both ends of the fuel cycle.121  At the 
generation end, we have seen that the market is more competitive than once 
assumed.122  At the consumption end, buyers wanted cheaper electricity.123 
Since the late 1970s we have been trying to restructure the electric 
industry with only partial success.  We continue to struggle with the 
problems of:  (1) getting cheaper electricity to consumers; (2) continuing to 
diversify generation sources; (3) dealing with intermittent sources such as 
wind and solar power; (4) redesigning electricity markets; and (5) 
encouraging traditional IOUs to rethink their business models.  This last 
issue—encouraging traditional IOUs to reformulate their business models—
raises a legal question of constitutional dimension.  To the extent that a 
privately owned firm has invested capital in reliance on government 
regulations, is the firm entitled to compensation when those regulations 
change?  That question will be addressed in the next section and will then be 
followed by the test case for the matter of DG that has been promoted 
                                                                                                                   
Admin., Feed-in Tariff:  A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity 
Technologies, EIA (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
115. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff, supra note 114. 
116. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
11. 
117. See id. at 7, 9. 
118. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 423. 
119. Id. 
120. See CHANNELL ET. AL, supra note 50, at 74–75; Cudahy, supra note 87, at 
423. 
121. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21; Cudahy, supra 
note 87, at 425. 
122. Cudahy, supra note 87, at 425. 
123. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 21. 
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through government regulation and that now competes with the IOU market 
share. 
The electricity market is indeed changing.  As the Edison Electric 
Institute—the trade association for IOUs—puts the issue:  “While every 
market-driven business is subject to competitive forces, public policy 
programs that provide for subsidized growth of competing technologies 
and/or participant economic incentives do not provide a level playing field 
upon which generators can compete fairly against new entrants.”124  It is 
important to distinguish between technologically driven changes that result 
in increased competition and competition that results from regulatory 
requirements on incumbent utilities and on regulatory incentives that 
promote new entrants.  It is equally, if not more, important to realize that the 
dividing line between markets and their regulation is fuzzy at best.125 
Edison, thus, is partially correct to distinguish between market-
driven technological change and public policies that promote competition.  
This distinction, though, fails to recognize that the electric industry has been 
a regulated industry and has enjoyed the fruits of that regulation for over a 
century.  In other words, the divide between market changes and government 
regulation is not a particularly neat one.  The fact that the electric industry 
has been the beneficiary of regulation and is now in a posture of contesting 
competition that has come about through regulation reveals that a solution or 
response to the industry’s concerns involves political as well as economic 
considerations. 
IV. TAKINGS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
As noted in Part II, the issue of costs from failed nuclear power 
investments or from failed restructuring investments can also arise as 
regulators adopt rules that increase competition for IOUs.  Each of these 
issues raises the same constitutional question.  Is an IOU entitled to recover 
such costs because of regulations that devalue its property?  In other words, 
has a regulation effectuated a taking of utility property? 
Any legal transition generates economic winners and losers.126  In 
the energy sector, subsidies and financial supports to wind and solar 
providers, for example, reduce their cost of doing business and may open up 
clean energy markets.  Similarly, the under payment of royalties or tax 
incentives and subsidies for fossil fuel companies reduce their cost of doing 
                                                 
124. KIND, supra note 4, at 4. 
125. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY: 
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 137 (2014). 
126. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 509, 513–14 (1986). 
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business, thus giving them a competitive advantage over clean energy 
providers.127  In short, any regulation has economic consequences including 
reducing the value of an owner’s property.  It is generally true, though, that 
regulations occur on a regular basis without giving rise to a takings claim.  
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law.”128 
However, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has also said, “[t]he 
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a [constitutional] 
taking.”129  Holmes’ Delphic pronouncement would seem to settle the matter 
that a regulation can constitute a taking necessitating just compensation.130  
However, the definition of a taking, let alone a regulatory or a deregulatory 
taking,131 remains unsettled and takings jurisprudence has been seen by the 
Supreme Court of the United States as essentially ad hoc.132  More 
problematically, takings jurisprudence, as a whole, has been said to be in vast 
disarray.133 
Consequently, takings law is best understood on a case-by-case basis 
with three or four general principles.134  First, a court is most likely to find a 
taking when a property owner has suffered a permanent physical invasion of 
                                                 
127. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf 
(while most energy resources receive some financial incentives “tax preferences for fossil 
fuels continued to make up the bulk of all energy-related tax incentives through 2007, 
typically accounting for more than two-thirds of the total cost”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE 
EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 24 (2013), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659801.pdf (undervaluing royalty payments on 
public lands); David Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, It Reaps Subsidies, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2010, at A1 (“[A]n examination of the American tax code indicates that oil 
production is among the most heavily subsidized businesses, with tax breaks available at 
virtually every stage of the exploration and extraction process.”). 
128. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
129. Id. at 415. 
130. Id. 
131. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222–26, 427.  Regulatory 
takings are discussed at 222–26.  Deregulatory takings are discussed at chapter 13. 
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
133. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings:  One 
Distinction Too Many, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012). 
134. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
426 (1982). 
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his or her property.135  Second, a property owner who can demonstrate that a 
regulation deprives him or her of all economically beneficial use of his or her 
property may successfully assert a takings claim.136  Third, a regulatory 
taking may be found when a regulation has frustrated the property owner’s 
investment-backed expectations.137  These three reasons are the standard tests 
developed by the Court for identifying takings.138  There appears, though, 
that a fourth requirement is most often applied.139  Specifically, all of the 
cases just cited deal with real property rather than with the value of a 
corporate enterprise.140  Thus, “major regulatory initiatives rarely require a 
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”141 
Nevertheless, the takings argument is far from fanciful for utilities.  
Indeed, the constitutional requirement that regulators cannot take property 
without just compensation is at the heart of the regulatory compact.  As 
noted by the Supreme Court: 
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a 
return on the value of the property which it employs for the 
convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the 
same time and in the same general part of the country on 
investments [and] other business undertakings which are attended 
by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no 
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in 
highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.  The return 
should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under 
efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its 
                                                 
135. Id. at 441.  The laying of cable TV lines across an owner’s property is a 
physical occupation of real property and is, therefore, a taking.  Id. at 421–26.  “We affirm the 
traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking.”  Id. at 441. 
136. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently 
expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to 
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, 
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. 
Id. 
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (“The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”). 
138. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
139. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
140. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
141. Epstein, supra note 133, at 101. 
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credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper 
discharge of its public duties.142 
Over ninety years ago, then, the Supreme Court established the principle that 
a public utility is entitled to earn a return on its prudently incurred capital 
investments at a level sufficient for the utility to be financially sound and to 
attract investors.143  The problem for a regulated entity, such as an electric 
utility, is that regulations can affect the value of those investments.144  
Indeed, electric utilities have raised the takings issue in a number of settings:  
Environmental regulations,145 restructuring orders,146 low rates of return,147 
and the like,148 have all generated takings claims.  None, however, have 
resulted in direct monetary damages paid in compensation to a utility 
although financial relief from burdensome regulations has been made 
available as discussed below.149 
Substantive takings jurisprudence appears to provide electric utilities 
grounds for claiming that when a regulation goes too far it then becomes a 
taking.150  Yet, electric utilities’ regulatory takings claims have not been 
                                                 
142. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. 
Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1923). 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 689–90, 693. 
145. See, e.g., Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, Rulemaking Proceeding No. 06-04-009, 2007 WL 2579525 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Sept. 6, 2007).  The regulatory takings claim that GHG regulations may 
devalue property or cause a sale of the property is denied.  Id.  Indeed, the PUC noted that 
claimant failed to cite “any cases holding that there is a regulatory taking if a pollution control 
requirement causes an owner of a plant to shut it down entirely.”  Id. 
146. See, e.g., Provision of Elec. Servs., 175 P.U.R. 4th 1, Docket No. U-0000-
94-165, 1966 WL 787623 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 26, 1996) (utility’s regulatory takings 
claim that Arizona’s restructuring orders may result in uncompensated stranded costs denied, 
because the rules provided a mechanism for at least some stranded cost recovery). 
147. See PacifiCorp, Case No. PAC-E-10-07, 2011 WL 1525191 (Idaho Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Apr. 18, 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 P.U.R. 4th 401, Case No. 
10-E-0050, 2011 WL 286478 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 24, 2011) (9.3% return on equity 
not a taking even though it was below the rate set by other PUCs for similarly structured 
utilities).  PUC’s decision that the 27% of a transmission line that is not used and useful can 
be excluded from the rate base is not a taking.  PacifiCorp, supra note 147.  The PUC also 
noted that when the line is fully integrated into the system, it will put it into the rate base.  Id. 
148. See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d 19, 23 (Vt. 2000) (takings 
claim denied when the Public Services Board reduced the rate of return from 10.5% to 5.25% 
because of the poor management of the utility). 
149. See id. at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of Elec. Servs., supra note 146; 
Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into Procurement Policies, supra note 
145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra note 147. 
150. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
119
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] UTILITIES IN A DISTRIBUTED GENERATION WORLD 495 
successful.151  In part, the lack of success can be attributed to a narrow 
application of takings doctrine as revealed by the four substantive law 
principles listed above.152 
In addition to a narrow reading of substantive takings law, utilities 
must also confront procedural challenges to the successful assertion of a 
takings claim.153  According to the letter of the law, if property is taken for 
public use then compensation is required.154  However, compensation in the 
form of damages for regulatory takings is rare if not impossible.155  First, if a 
utility asserts that a regulatory taking has occurred as a result of an onerous 
regulation, then the most likely remedy will be an invalidation of the 
regulation, not damages.156  Second, courts are reluctant to award damages if 
a utility asserts a facial claim of an unconstitutional regulation because, most 
often, courts require a showing that actual damage has occurred.157 
There is another subtlety to takings jurisprudence that electric 
utilities must face.  Regulation, for example, may very well reduce, even 
destroy, a valuable portion of electric utility’s property.158  However, before 
a takings claim can be successful, the property as a whole must be evaluated 
and not just portion of it.159  A utility, for example, that argues that a portion 
of its property was denied a return on investment, cannot successfully claim 
that a portion of its property has been taken if, looking at the utility’s total 
financial situation, the utility’s property still has value.160  Another way of 
characterizing this issue of partial or full evaluation of a utility’s property is 
to ask the question:  How much damage has the utility suffered? 
Utilities, for example, that have claimed that a portion of their 
property has been excluded from rate base treatment and, therefore, denied a 
return on investment, have not succeeded with their takings claim when the 
                                                 
151. See, e.g., In re Citizens Utils. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of 
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., supra note 147. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 134–41. 
153. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005). 
154. Id. at 536–37. 
155. See, e.g., In re Citizens Util. Co., 769 A.2d at 22–23, 32–33; Provision of 
Elec. Servs., supra note 146; Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards into 
Procurement Policies, supra note 145; PacifiCorp, supra note 147; Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corp., supra note 147. 
156. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 695 (1923). 
157. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544; Customer Billing Arrangements, Case No. 
99-M-0631, 2000 WL 33938296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 19, 2000). 
158. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1989). 
159. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
160. See, e.g., Barasch, 488 U.S. at 301–02. 
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remaining property is treated as a capital investment for which a return is 
due.161  States that have passed legislation requiring that only property that is 
used and useful can earn a return on investment have seen that legislation 
upheld as constitutional.162  Finally, to the extent that the regulated entity can 
take steps to mitigate any damages that might occur as a result of a 
regulation, they must do so, and failure to do so will negate the takings 
claim. 
As the electricity market undergoes its current transformation and as 
IOUs confront their current challenges, the issue of costs imposed on IOUs 
due to government regulation is ever present as revealed by the test case next 
discussed.163 
V. A DG TEST CASE 
IOUs have become concerned about the growth of solar power,164 
other renewables, and energy efficiency because of the consequent loss of 
load attributed to those activities.165  The use of solar power is expanding for 
three predominant reasons.166  First, the cost of solar panels is declining 
noticeably.167  Second, third party financing options make the installation of 
solar panels attractive to individual homeowners.168  And, third, existing state 
                                                 
161. See, e.g., id. 
162 See, e.g., id. 
163. See infra Part V. 
164. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3, 31. 
165. See id. 
166. See id.; Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://
www.solarcity.com/residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
167. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 3. 
168. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114.  Third-
party financing essentially leases solar installations to individual homeowners or businesses 
under long term-contracts but retains ownership.  Id. at 23–24.  The third parties also operate 
the solar system.  See, e.g., Solar Power for Your Home, supra note 166.  These third-party 
owners can do so because in exchange for selling solar installation, they receive tax credits 
and other financial incentives as the nominal owner.  See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET 
ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 23–24. 
The use of third-party financing and third-party ownership has not gone 
unchallenged.  See, e.g., Ruling on Petition for Judicial Review at 3–4, SZ Enter., LLC v. 
Iowa Util. Bd., No. CVCV009166 (Iowa 5th Dist. Mar. 29, 2013).  From the perspective of 
the regulated utility, to the extent that third parties are financing a number of residential and 
commercial installations, those actors are invading the service territories of the incumbent 
utilities.  See, e.g., id. at 18.  The utility’s argument then, is that these third parties should be 
regulated as public utilities.  See, e.g., id. at 5.  This matter is currently under consideration by 
the Iowa Supreme Court.  Appellate Court Case Details for SZ Enterprises v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, Docket No. 13-0642, IOWA CT. ONLINE SEARCH, https://
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and federal regulations provide financial incentives for solar installations.169  
To an incumbent IOU, reduced electricity sales are a financial threat. 
On December 3, 2013, the Arizona Corporation Commission issued 
a ruling that brings together the several issues in this article.170  The Arizona 
Public Service Company (“APS”), the local IOU, sought relief from 
regulatory obligations and petitioned the Commission to reduce the burdens 
imposed upon it by net metering regulations that required the utility to pay 
rooftop solar users for their excess electricity.171 
Arizona’s net metering law “allows electric utility customers to be 
compensated for generating their own electric[ity] . . . from [identified] 
renewable [behind-the-meter] resources,” such as solar power.172  “If [a] 
customer’s energy production exceeds the energy supplied by the electric 
utility during a billing period, [then] the customer’s bill for subsequent 
periods is credited for the excess generation.”173  The credit is based upon the 
IOU’s avoided cost or the customer’s retail rate.174  The avoided cost rate—
sometimes referred to as a bundled rate—means the marginal cost to the 
utility of producing its next unit of electricity.175 
To better understand the impact of avoided cost as defined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and in the Arizona Code, it is necessary 
                                                                                                                   
www.iowacourts.state.ia.us.ESAWebApp/AppelSimpFrame (search “Appellate Docket 
Number” for “13-0642”; then follow “13-0642” hyperlink under the “Docket No.” column; 
then follow “Docket” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
169. BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. & BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY, supra note 13, at 31. 
170. See generally Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 121, Docket No. E-
01345A-13-0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id.  The law does provide a safety valve and limits the size of the 
customers distributed generation system to a maximum of 125% of that customer’s total load.  
Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.  This limitation is not unproblematic.  From a utility 
standpoint, this 125% maximum helps limit the amount of revenue loss.  Regulators, mindful 
of the need to protect the utility’s revenue requirement together with their service obligation, 
have adopted such limitations.  See generally SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, RATEMAKING, 
SOLAR VALUE AND SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING—A PRIMER (2013), available at 
http://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51299/sepa-nem-report-0713-print.pdf.  The 
problem, however, is that, to the extent that solar rooftop in particular or DG in general is 
either a desirable or inevitable direction for the future of the electric industry, the transition is 
being delayed.  Id. 
175. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 10.  Arizona more 
specifically defines avoided costs as “the incremental costs to an [e]lectric [u]tility for electric 
energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the Net Metering Facility, such 
utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.”  ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 14-2-
2302 (2013). 
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to understand how a utility bill is designed.  By way of simplification, a 
utility serves basically three types, or classes, of customers—residential, 
commercial, and industrial.176  Each class, in turn, has different energy needs 
and is charged accordingly.177  By way of example, residential customers 
consume less electricity than industrial customers; however, residential 
customers, as a class, consume more customer service for their homes in 
contrast with a large manufacturing company that requires less customer 
service for its plant relative to the amount of electricity consumed.178 
In the attempt to even out charges to each class of customers, a 
utility bill is generally comprised of three components—a demand charge, an 
energy or volumetric charge, and a customer service charge.179  The service 
charge represents the costs, such as billing, metering and some investments, 
to provide electricity service to each consumer.180  These charges remain flat 
relative to the amount of electricity that a user consumes, but the total cost 
varies with the number of customers.181  The energy charge represents the 
amount of electricity consumed by each user.182  And, finally, the demand 
charge represents the utility’s capital investment in plant and equipment that 
is allocated to each consumer based on the consumer’s maximum rate of 
usage.183  A rough way of differentiating these costs is to say that the energy 
charge and the service charge represent a utility’s variable costs while the 
demand charge represents the utility’s fixed costs.  Usually, residential 
consumers do not pay a separate demand charge.184  Instead, the fixed costs 
are embedded in the volumetric portion of the bill.185  This embeddedness, or 
bundling, gives rise to the problem litigated in this test case.186 
In its regulatory filing, APS argues that as participation in DG 
grows, it becomes increasingly concerned about the cross-subsidization 
between customer classes.187  DG customers, APS argues, are partially 
subsidized by non-DG customers because, it asserts, DG customers do not 
                                                 
176. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 13. 
179. Id. at 15–17.  PUCs often add other charges such as a surcharge for a 
specific investment.  Nonetheless, these three charges illustrate the distinction between fixed 
and variable costs.  See, e.g., id. 
180. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3, 15. 
181. Id. at 15. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 17. 
184. Id. at 15. 
185. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 15. 
186. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
28–29. 
187. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
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bear their fair share of fixed costs.188  Instead, they offload those costs to 
non-DG customers.189  Parenthetically, in addition to an unfair allocation of 
fixed costs, DG shows some income bias.190  Quite simply, higher income 
consumers have more options available to them, including installing rooftop 
solar, than lower income consumers.191  Consequently, rate designs that may 
apportion costs across all residential consumers will be regressive and 
unfairly burden low-income users.192 
The issue of cross-subsidization is problematic.193  The real concerns 
of APS, however, are that:  (1) Arizona’s net metering obligations became 
increasingly costly; (2) it was losing market share even though in its filing it 
asserted that revenue loss was not part of its case; (3) that non-DG users are 
paying a disproportionate share of the fixed costs; and, (4) most 
disconcerting for the utility, the cost increase to non-DG customers will 
effectively drive more people to DG thus resulting in greater revenue 
losses.194  This phenomenon of losing customers to DG because of increased 
costs is sometimes referred to as a death spiral, which is a  
situation that prompts/forces more ratepayers to install solar on 
their rooftop to avoid rising utility rates as a result of the spreading 
out of those fixed costs to a lower base.  In the end, the utility 
could be left with fewer revenues to support already installed (and 
future) infrastructure investments with long useful lives (i.e. 
transformers, low and high-voltage transmission lines, distribution 
assets).195 
To gather information and formulate a proposal to the Commission, 
APS held a series of conferences.196  APS then proposed solutions that fell 
into two broad classes.197  To simplify, the first option for new DG 
                                                 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. (Burns, Comm’r, dissenting). 
192. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET ENERGY METERING 
(NEM): DRAFT COST-EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION 110–11 (2013); Sam Sciacca, Smart Grid 
Dilemma: Concerned Stakeholders Seek an Equitable Cost-Benefit Ratio for All Ratepayers, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2013, at 32, 33–34. 
193. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
30–31. 
194. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
195. CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 11–
12; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model has been 
stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”). 
196. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
197. Id. 
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customers198 was that net metering could continue to be used; however, new 
DG customers would have to pay under a rate schedule that better accounted 
for the demand (or fixed) costs of the utility’s service through the imposition 
of a “basic service charge, a demand charge, or a standby charge.”199  The 
second option entailed a recalibration of the net metering rate.200  New DG 
customers would be credited for the market value of the power that they sold 
to the utility rather than at the avoided cost.201  Further, the rate at which DG 
customers would be reimbursed would be recalibrated.202 
APS recognized that by effectively lowering the current net metering 
charge, rooftop solar installations may be slowed.203  To address that 
problem, APS suggested that the Commission should authorize cash 
payments to encourage greater DG penetration.204 
Commission staff responded to APS proposals by noting that 
Arizona’s net metering policy has been successful, that DG was expanding 
as intended, and that it was following the net metering practices of the 
majority of states.205  Staff acknowledged that DG customers effectively paid 
less of the utility’s fixed costs, and therefore non-DG customers were 
saddled with a portion of fixed costs higher than those actually used by 
them.206  APS introduced testimony that this cross-subsidization amounted to 
between $800 and $1,000 per year per DG customer.207  Consequently, those 
costs had to be picked up either through higher rates or other charges such as 
APS’s Lost Fixed Cost Recovery mechanism (“LFCR”).208 
Staff argued that the APS analysis neglected to address the benefits 
to the APS electric system derived from DG customers.209  The staff argued 
that there were quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits attributable to 
DG.210  The first quantifiable benefit is that APS will avoid paying certain 
                                                 
198. Existing customers would be grandfathered into the rate schemes in 
existence, for twenty years.  Id.  After that time, however, APS posed that the new rates would 
be imposed.  Id.  The problem with this proposal, however, is that the rates should attach to 
the property rather than to the customer.  Id. 
199. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
205. Id. 
206. Id.; see also KIND, supra note 4, at 17. 
207. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
208. Id.  The LFCR is a surcharge allowed by regulators that is intended to 
offset the revenue that results from customers who reduce their bills through conservation and 
other renewable energy programs.  Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
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fuel costs and avoid making certain capital investments in plant transmission 
or distribution.211  Non-quantifiable benefits include “increased grid security 
and air quality improvements,”212 improved system reliability,213 load 
balancing,214 improved forecasting and planning,215 environmental 
improvement, and meeting regulatory requirements such as renewable 
portfolio mandates.216  To be sure, accurately valuing the benefits of DG is 
difficult and—according to one study—most analyses had failed to 
comprehensively evaluate the benefits and costs of DG.217  Still, such 
benefits may well be accounted for through a smart rate design.218  Not 
surprisingly, intervenors representing solar interests, argued that APS should 
award a system benefit credit to DG users for the contributions that they 
make to the grid.219 
Staff concluded that both options offered by APS should be rejected 
and that the Commission should open a separate docket to more fully study 
the issue, taking into account the benefits, as well as the costs, of DG.220  The 
Commission, then, should develop a new rate design to account for DG 
penetration.221 
The Commission concluded that the proliferation of DG installations 
did result in a cost shift from DG customers to non-DG residential 
customers; therefore, rate design changes were warranted.222  As an interim 
measure, the Commission imposed a seventy-cent per kilowatt monthly 
                                                 
211. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170.  Because distributed generation is 
closer to its end users—sometimes located on exactly the same property—the need for 
extensive transmission and distribution lines is mitigated.  Id. 
212. Id. 
213. LENA HANSEN & VIRGINIA LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., A REVIEW OF 
SOLAR PV BENEFIT & COST STUDIES 37 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/
Knowledge-Center%2FLibrary%2F2013-13_eLabDERCostValue.  System reliability can be 
improved by distributed generation as it reduces congestion, reduces large-scale outages, and 
can provide backup power during outages.  Id. 
214. Id. at 15; see also ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra 
note 114, at 32–33. 
215. See, e.g., Margaret Jolly et al., Capturing Distributed Benefits:  Factoring 
Customer-Owned Generation into Forecasting, Planning, and Operations, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Aug. 2012, at 32, 34–35. 
216. STERLING ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 7, at ix, 
27–28; see also SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 25, 28. 
217. HANSEN & LACY, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 213, at 4. 
218. Richard Perez et al., Why a Smart Fit Policy Is a Smart Policy, SOLAR 
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2013, at 18, 18, available at http://www.omagdigital.com/publication/
?i=145842&p=19. 
219. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 170. 
220. Id. 
221. See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 11, 18. 
222. See id. at 20. 
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charge for all residential DG customers until the Commission more fully 
addressed the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.223  The goal of the 
interim measure, then, is to not raise the amount of fixed costs APS collects 
from residential non-DG customers due to reduced payments by DG 
customers.224 
The advantage of the seventy-cent fixed cost charge—also 
sometimes referred to as an access fee, solar rider, or standby charge—is its 
simplicity.225  New DG customers will know what the charge is and why it is 
imposed.226  Further, such charges are intended “to recover a portion of the 
utility fixed costs that have typically been embedded in volumetric 
[electricity] rates.”227  In principle, this approach allows those fixed costs to 
be fairly allocated among all customers, and specifically, DG customers.228 
The test case raises exactly the correct issues and suggests a 
direction for a correct solution as long as all benefits and costs are taken into 
account.229  While the Arizona case is an important one to watch, a series of 
studies and other actions are occurring throughout the industry and in many 
states including California, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Texas, 
                                                 
223. See MARK NEWTON LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., 
ALTERNATIVE REGULATION FOR EVOLVING UTILITY CHALLENGES:  AN UPDATED SURVEY 21–
23 (2013), available at http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/
innovative_regulation_survey.pdf; CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
224. See SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 2–3, 20. 
225. See id. at 3. 
226. See id. 
227. Id.; see KYLE MACLAURY, CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, ASSESSING 
MINNESOTA’S SOLAR RESOURCE: REVENUE IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEM ORIENTATION 
AND RATE STRUCTURE 4 (2011), available at http://www.mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/
SolarValueReport.pdf (noting that Minnesota has several rate designs to accommodate PV 
generation). 
228. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 3. 
229. See CITI, RISING SUN:  IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, supra note 4, at 
11–12. 
There is a middle ground solution on the compensation issue for DG, in 
our view.  Either:  (1) a set fixed charge for T&D or (2) a credit that only reflects 
the utilities replacement power cost of generation.  Eventually, for DG to work at a 
larger scale with the support of the utilities, we expect changes to the compensation 
structure for the off grid solar providers in the near future.  These changes more 
specifically could include:  (1) a bill credit that is lowered from the current 
avoidance of full retail rates to one that resembles the utilities replace cost of power 
(i.e. gas peaker) and/or (2) a demand charge (fixed charge for T&D) to be tacked on 
to the off grid solar homeowners electric bills.  These items provide a middle 
ground solution, in our viewpoint, with net metering battles clearly evident in 
several states like CA and AZ. 
Id. at 12.  See also KIND, supra note 4, at 12 (“When investors realize that a business model 
has been stung by systemic disruptive forces, they likely will retreat.”). 
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Vermont,230 Idaho,231 and others.232  In California, for example, legislation 
was passed directing the California PUC to study the costs and benefits of 
net metering and calculate the ratepayer impacts and cost of service to solar 
customers.233 
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, IOUs have been 
experiencing increased competition from technological innovations as well 
as from innovative regulatory strategies.234  On the positive side, the 
electricity market is becoming more competitive; consumers are enjoying a 
wider array of choices; and, energy policy is moving towards a clean energy 
economy.235  Incumbents, however, must deal with the negative side of a 
changing electric industry.236  More precisely, the challenge is to address the 
matter of past investments made by incumbents.237  Now that consumers are 
leaving the grid in whole or in part, which, if any, of the capital investments 
should be recouped by IOUs? 
Fortunately, DG penetration into electricity markets at this time in 
history is relatively low and warnings about a death spiral for IOUs is 
premature and alarmist.238  The amount of penetration by DG, at this time, is 
minimal and manageable.239  A smart electric utility, like the smart 
telecommunications firm, can get ahead of the technology and it can 
certainly manage it to their advantage even if that necessitates changing the 
                                                 
230. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4; see also Herman K. 
Trabish, Rooftop Solar and Net Metering Win a Big Decision in Colorado: Regulators Want a 
Better Way to Value Solar, GREENTECHMEDIA (Jan. 30, 2014), http://greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/rooftop-solar-and-net-metering-win-a-big-decision-in-colorado. 
231. ID PUC Rules Against Idaho Power in “Net Metering” Case, SNAKE 
RIVER ALLIANCE (July 3, 2013), http://snakeriveralliance.org/id-puc-rules-against-idaho-
power-in-net-metering-case/; see also Case Summary, PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://
www.puc.idaho.gov/fileroom/cases/summary/IPCE1227.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2014). 
232. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 4. 
233. Assemb. 327, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
234. See Andrew Kosnaski & Ramesh Shankar, Embracing Disruption: 
Developing a Leadership Role for Utilities in Alternative Technologies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 
2014, at 16, 16. 
235. See id. at 20. 
236. Id. at 16. 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the 
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher 
rates for those customers remaining—first creating a cross subsidy from wealthier 
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further 
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives. 
Kosnaki & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16. 
239. See BART KRISHANMOORTHY ET AL., SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, 2012 
SEPA UTILITY SOLAR RANKINGS 6 fig.4 (2013), available at http://
www.solarelectricpower.org/media/51302/final-2012-top-10-report-v2.pdf. 
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firm’s business model.  But then, that is what smart businesses do.  DG 
penetration, however, is expanding and therefore caution is warranted.240  
Regulators must provide a mechanism that compensates IOUs for their 
investments and they must design a new regulatory regime for a clean energy 
future.  Additionally, regulators must insure that customers are treated fairly, 
that cross-subsidization is minimized or justified on sound policy bases, and 
that the proper balance between shareholder and ratepayers is realized.241  In 
short, rates must respond to the legitimate concerns of the utility and to the 
value provided by DG customers.242  Those responses will come from a 
renegotiated regulatory compact, new rate designs, and new business models 
for IOUs.243  Each of those issues is addressed in the following Parts. 
VI. THE NEW REGULATORY COMPACT 
The core of the regulatory compact is that the government sets the 
utility’s rates—and consequently, its profits—in exchange for protecting the 
IOU’s service territory.244  As long as the IOU operates prudently, it is 
virtually guaranteed a return on its capital investment.  When the compact 
was made, the exclusive business of the IOU was to sell as much electricity 
as it could.245  As we have seen, the electric market is changing in significant 
ways, such that a new regulatory compact must be considered.246 
We can start with certain concrete assumptions.  First, large-scale 
central power stations will continue to be important generators in the 
electricity market, although on a diminishing scale.  Second, the T&D 
segments of the industry will continue to be regulated as long as they exhibit 
natural monopoly characteristics.  Third, IOUs can no longer be devoted 
                                                 
240. See, e.g., id. at 23. 
241. See Sciacca, supra note 192, at 33–34.  The rate design issues that plague 
rooftop solar and other DG strategies also complicate a utility’s smart grid investments.  Id.  
More specifically, 
[d]o individual end users save enough money on their bills with AMI, for instance, 
to offset the increase in rates necessary to pay for that infrastructure?  If so, how 
long does it take to achieve payback, or ROI?  If the benefits [are not] direct and 
quantifiable, then what reasoning in metrics justify such a project? 
Id. at 33; see Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Patrick Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council, 
EEI/NRDG Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp. 
242. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 32. 
243. Id. at 36. 
244. Tomain, The iUtility, supra note 94, at 223, 231. 
245. See id. 
246. See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 5; Tomain, 
The iUtility, supra note 94, at 234; Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”:  Greening the 
Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 931, 933 (2009) [hereinafter Tomain, “Steel in the 
Ground”]. 
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exclusively to electricity sales.  Instead, IOUs must be seen as actors in a 
broader energy business that provides a wider array of energy services and 
products as discussed in Part III.247  Finally, because IOUs will continue to 
be regulated, the regulatory compact will continue.  However, given these 
assumptions a new set of regulatory principles will be necessary and we can 
identify five. 
A. Stranded Costs 
First, utilities should not be put in a position of incurring excess 
costs that, due to regulatory or policy changes, may become stranded and 
may then give rise to a regulatory takings claim.  This principle is actually a 
two-edged sword.  On the one hand, investors should not be deprived of a 
return on their investments due to regulatory or policy changes.248  On the 
other hand, regulators must be careful when imposing requirements on 
IOUs.249  As discussed in Part I, regulators and legislators in the past have 
provided relief to utilities from previous financial challenges.250  Thus, to the 
extent that IOUs invest in reliance on regulatory requirements, then some 
protection must be provided.251  Nevertheless, as contemporary energy policy 
changes, the problem of stranded costs should be anticipated and, if possible, 
avoided.252 
The stranded cost problem in the context of an energy transition is 
distinct from the problem of nuclear power cancellations and the like, and 
from government ordered divestment.  First, in the nuclear power and 
divestment situations, the stranded costs were more or less identifiable and 
occurred at a very time-specific point. 253  A clean energy transition is 
distinguishable in that it will not occur at a point in time, but will most likely 
occur over decades.  This fact alone should allow utilities to plan for changes 
in the industry and changes in their own business models.  Next, as a utility’s 
                                                 
247. See supra Part III. 
248. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29; see David B. Raskin, The 
Regulatory Challenge of Distributed Generation, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 38, 47 (2013), 
http://www.hblr.org/?p=3673.  “[The] inability of utility shareholders to secure the return of, 
and a competitive rate of return on, their investment gives rise to the condition known as 
stranded investment or stranded costs.”  SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 29. 
249. See id.; Raskin, supra note 248, at 47. 
250. Raskin, supra note 248, at 47; see supra Part I. 
251. See Raskin, supra note 248, at 47.  Raskin also writes:  “The differential 
was known as ‘stranded costs.’”  Id. 
252. KIND, supra note 4, at 17–18.  One suggestion for addressing the stranded 
cost problem is to impose a stranded cost charge on all DER customers to recoup that portion 
of the investment that might otherwise become stranded due to departures from the grid.  Id. at 
18. 
253. See id. at 8. 
130
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
506 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
customer base declines, the downward spiral in lost sales will mean that there 
will be a smaller group of ratepayers to pick up increasing costs.254  That is a 
scenario that is obviously not sustainable. 
Nevertheless, although the law regarding regulatory or deregulatory 
takings remains opaque, the risks are real.255  Investors will be reluctant to 
invest without reasonable assurances of a return on their investment that will 
not be negated by prudence hearings, regulatory changes, or legislation that 
diminishes the value of their property to the point at which their investment-
backed expectations go uncompensated.  Indeed, such financial risk is 
reflected in the downward movement of credit ratings for the electric 
industry.256  Thus, the issue of distributed generation, particularly coupled 
with net metering, can pose a real risk to capital unless the utility recalibrates 
the way it does business and regulators rethink their rules.257 
B. Legacy Financing 
Second, regulators should avoid legacy financing.  Quite simply, 
traditionally structured utilities should not continue to be rewarded as they 
have in the past.  Any argument that utilities should continue to earn revenue 
because demand is down must be scrutinized quite closely.  Decreased 
demand alone is no cause for continuing to allow a regulated firm to earn a 
return on investment.258  The problem, of course, is complicated because the 
current challenge to IOUs is the consequence of both market and 
technological changes, as well as regulatory requirements.  Nevertheless, no 
utility has any legal claim to continue to maintain its revenue requirement 
just because it loses sales.259  The idea that the revenue requirement must be 
                                                 
254. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16; Raskin, supra note 248, at 
48. 
An alarmist interpretation suggests that revolutionary technology could throw the 
sector into a death spiral where customer migration off the grid results in higher 
rates for those customers remainingfirst creating a cross subsidy from wealthier 
to poor[] customers, and eventually fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of further 
erosion as rising costs drive more customers to seek off-grid alternatives. 
Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 16. 
255. Compare SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 65, at 222, with Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436–38 
(2000). 
256. See KIND, supra note 4, at 10 fig.2. 
257. See Robert E. Curry, Jr., The Law of Unintended Consequences: The 
Transition to Distributed Generation Calls for a New Regulatory Model, PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Mar. 2013, at 44, 47.  “As [distributed generation] grows, such under-recovery has the 
potential to materially weaken the utility’s financial integrity and its ability to attract investor 
capital, which in turn can lead to higher rates.”  Id. 
258. See Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945). 
259. See id. 
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maintained as embedded in a cost-of-service mentality to cover a utility’s 
costs, regardless of the amount of service, is no longer tenable. 
Cost-of-service ratemaking may have had its place; nevertheless, it 
should not be used to allow utilities to continue to build dirty coal-fired 
plants, nor should it be used to reward utilities for embarking on financially 
risky nuclear projects precisely because “investment in conventional 
generation [is] hard to justify” in the new market.260  Indeed, financial 
analyses indicate that solar, wind, and natural gas generated electricity are 
showing increasingly positive cost signals, particularly against nuclear 
power.261  As a result, continued investments in coal and nuclear power will 
be viewed skeptically by the market while investments in new fuels and 
technologies are becoming increasingly attractive.262  Those investments 
must also be viewed skeptically by regulators.  Thus, instead of maintaining 
the status quo, regulators must manage the changing role of IOUs and 
encourage alterations in their business models.263 
C. Innovation & Competition 
Third, the new regulatory compact should encourage—rather than 
inhibit—competition and the development of innovative energy technologies 
including sales reducing technologies such as DG.  Indeed, the alternative 
energy market is attracting significant investments and will only expand.264 
DG is becoming an increasingly important actor in electricity 
markets.  In the test case, APS argued that it needed to revise net metering 
rates in order to avoid unfair cross-subsidization.265  Behind that argument, 
                                                 
260. CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73 (a report for Citi GPS). 
261. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY 
RELEASE OVERVIEW 7, 11 fig.8, 12 fig.11 (2013), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf. 
262. See, e.g., id. 
263. See ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NEW BUSINESS 
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE 
CONSTELLATION 8 (2013), available at http://www.rmi.org/New_Business_Models. 
264. See JOEL MAKOWER, GREENBIZ GRP. & TRUCOST, STATE OF GREEN 
BUSINESS 2014 58, 60 (2014), available at http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2014/01/
19/state-green-business-report-2014; CITI, CITI CLIMATE CHANGE UNIVERSE 3 (2013), 
available at http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/17389986/1546283763/name/CITI+Climate+
Change+Universe.pdf (projecting the need for $37 trillion in energy transformation over the 
next twenty-two years, with $24 trillion of that amount devoted to clean energy including gas, 
and $6 trillion in renewable power generation). 
265. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 310 P.U.R. 4th 12i, Docket No. E-01345A-13-
0248, 2013 WL 6384419 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Dec. 3, 2013); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., 
NET METERING BILL IMPACTS AND DISTRIBUTED ENERGY SUBSIDIES: REPORT PREPARED FOR 
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.navigant.com/~/media/www/
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however, APS was concerned about loss of sales volume.266  To the extent 
that net metering rates do generate an unfair cross-subsidization, then they 
should be changed.  However, net metering benefits must also be accounted 
for,267 and to the extent that net metering rates may slow DG penetration and 
therefore, act as a drag on innovation and competition, then that argument 
should be rejected.  The smart utility will become actively involved with DG 
as well as with the development of utility-scale solar, wind, and other 
renewable projects.268 
D. Universal Service & Reliability 
Next, regulators must be attentive to maintaining universal electric 
service.  With the expansion of distributed generation and energy-efficient 
improvements, some customers will be placed at a disadvantage such that 
distributed generation and energy-efficient customers will be using less 
electricity which puts pressure on utilities to raise rates to the customers that 
remain in that territory.  Similarly, regulators must assure energy/electricity 
reliability.  Electricity must remain available at the flip of a switch for most 
consumers.  To be sure, those consumers that have access to other sources of 
electricity, such as distributed generation and the like, may be able to 
negotiate for interruptible rates.  Most consumers, however, will need firm 
service contracts. 
The provision of universal reliable service presents challenges all of 
its own.269  However, an increase in electricity providers does have the 
potential for bringing significant benefits to a utility’s T&D segments.270  
Reduced load can, at times, reduce congestion and improve balancing, and a 
larger number of providers should lower cyber security risks.  To be sure, the 
issue of reliability will be an argument to be made against DG and that 
                                                                                                                   
site/insights/Energy/Navigant%20Final%20Net%20Metering%20Impact%20Report_Revised
%20Dec%2011.ashx. 
266. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 265; NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., 
supra note 265, at 7. 
267. See, e.g., R. THOMAS BEACH & PATRICK G. MCGUIRE, CROSSBORDER 
ENERGY, EVALUATING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NET ENERGY METERING IN CALIFORNIA 
19–20 (2013), available at http://www.votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Crossborder-Energy-CA-Net-Metering-Cost-Benefit-Jan-2013-final.pdf. 
268. See, e.g., Brad Copithorne, 4 Utilities Thinking Beyond ‘Wires and Poles,’ 
GREENBIZ.COM (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/10/09/4-utilities-think-
beyond-wires-poles. 
269. See Amory Lovins, Amory Lovins:  Don’t Cry for the Electric Utilities, 
GREENBIZ.COM (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/02/12/dont-lament-
renewables-disruption-electric-utilities. 
270. See id. 
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argument should be recognized for what it is—a political argument not 
necessarily a technical nor economic one.271 
E. Mitigation 
The Arizona test case, and others like it, as well as the reports of the 
dire threats to electric utilities, clearly demonstrate that IOUs are well aware 
of changing electricity market conditions as well as aware of a change in the 
policy landscape towards clean energy.  As a consequence, utilities cannot 
rely on past practices for future revenue.  Instead, since IOUs are well aware 
of the political economy of a changing energy market, they cannot continue 
to do business as usual; to the extent that they can avoid incurring 
expenditures based upon past assumptions, they must do so in an effort to 
mitigate damages as is required by any contract. 
During the period of electric industry restructuring, for example, 
New Hampshire passed legislation intended to introduce competition into 
retail electric markets.272  As part of those efforts, independent system 
operators controlled the transmission grid by accepting bilateral contracts 
and operating a power exchange with spot markets.273  The New Hampshire 
restructuring plan would treat generation and retail marketing as functionally 
separate from T&D services.274  The legislation expressed a preference for 
the divestiture of a utility’s generation and transportation assets.275  Utilities 
operating under the previous statutory scheme were concerned about 
stranded assets.276  More specifically, regulators recognized the fact that if 
retail customers could purchase lower-priced electricity from sources other 
than the IOU, then a portion of the IOU’s investments may be 
unrecoverable.277 
The New Hampshire PUC recognized this possibility and made 
provisions that would allow the utility to recover its stranded costs if those 
costs were found to have resulted from a government regulation.278  The 
utility, however, would not be able to recover stranded costs if they were 
imprudently incurred.279  Concomitantly, the legislation required utilities to 
                                                 
271. See id. 
272. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374-F:1 (2013); Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. 
Indus., 171 P.U.R. 4th 564, DR 96-150, 1996 WL 591937 (N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 10, 
1996). 
273. See Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Restructuring N.H.’s Elec. Util. Indus., supra note 272. 
279. Id. 
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mitigate their stranded costs.280  Moreover, the commission took a fairly 
aggressive approach regarding mitigation efforts that the utility should 
undertake.281  Those steps included, among other efforts, “the sale of . . . 
excess generating capacity” and the renegotiation of service contracts.282 
By adopting these principles, then, the regulatory compact will 
continue to balance utility/shareholder interests with customer/ratepayer 
interests while maintaining reasonable and fair rates.  At the same time, the 
new regulatory compact will encourage utilities to adopt new business 
models; promote technological innovation and competition; expand market 
opportunities; and, increase consumer choice.  The regulatory compact, 
however, is not self-executing.  Instead, PUCs must adopt a forward-looking 
approach to ratemaking. 
VII. RATEMAKING 
Ratemaking is the mechanism that drives the regulatory compact.  
Historically, cost-of-service ratemaking has had remarkable persistence even 
though regulators have been experimenting with performance-based rates 
and with market-based rates for decades.283  As noted earlier, when the 
electric industry was challenged by nuclear and restructuring failures, 
regulators relied on cost-based ratemaking.284  In times of financial stress, 
when utilities confronted volatile costs for fuel or wrestled with inflation, 
they sought refuge behind automatic fuel adjustment clauses that allowed 
rates to escalate in tandem with those rising costs.285  Similarly, regulators 
have relied on this formula and, in some instances, have expanded its use.286  
Such devices as forward test years,287 multi-year rate structures,288 cost 
trackers, and the like, are all cost-based.289 
                                                 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. See, e.g., SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: 
THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND JURISDICTION 216 (2013). 
284. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 18–19. 
285. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5 (a 
report for the Edison Electric Institute on cost trackers); MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., 
supra note 17, at 18–19 (fuel adjustment mechanisms).  Another mechanism for recovering 
costs during construction periods is to include construction costs while they are ongoing.  
LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C, supra note 186, at 5.  This mechanism is 
known as construction work in progress.  Id. 
286. See MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 23. 
287. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 27. 
288. Id. at 31. 
289. See id. at 5, 27, 31. 
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In brief, cost-based ratemaking functions well when the market is 
expanding and demand continues to grow.  Once the market slows or stalls, 
then cost-based ratemaking may contribute to excess capacity and other 
economic dislocations.290  Further, “cost of service regulation can slow the 
pace of innovation and may offer little incentive for utilities to improve 
operational efficiency or service quality beyond the minimum levels set by 
regulators.”291 
Nevertheless, cost-of-service ratemaking has a strong hold on the 
regulatory structure.  “The regulatory framework has been resilient in the 
face of the flux brought about by economic, technical, and financial shocks 
that often nullified one or more of the assumptions underlying the original 
framework, precisely because of the willingness to adopt incremental 
changes to the process.”292  However, another way of analyzing cost-of 
service ratemaking is to argue that it has not been resistant to change and that 
the ratemaking formula must adapt to today’s changing market conditions. 
The most immediate problem, then, is that cost-of-service 
ratemaking was dedicated to covering a utility’s prudently incurred costs.  
Now the problem is that utilities cannot continue to make the same types of 
investments that they have in the past particularly in light of falling sales that 
can threaten a utility’s of financial stability.293  In brief, the traditionally 
structured electric utility, as well as its regulators, must figure out how to 
earn money by selling less electricity while promoting other energy services 
and products. 
Fortunately, there is no shortage of new rate designs294 including:  
(1) performance-based ratemaking;295 (2) incentive rates;296 (3) alternative 
regulation;297 (4) market-based rates; (5) decoupling;298 (6) feed-in-tariffs;299 
                                                 
290. See MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3.  This tendency to invest 
and expand is also known as the A-J effect or the Averch-Johnson effect, based upon the 
seminal paper by Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson.  Harvey Averch & Leland L. 
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 
(1962). 
291. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 3. 
292. MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 17, at 1. 
293. Burr, supra note 9, at 30. 
294. See TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 174–79. 
295. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SCHMIDT, PERFORMANCE-BASED RATEMAKING: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (2000). 
296. See, e.g., Scott H. Strauss & Jeffrey A. Schwarz, Transmission Incentive 
Overhaul: FERC’s ROE Incentive Adder Policy Sends the Wrong Signals, 147 PUB. UTIL. 
FORT. Feb. 2009, at 32, 33. 
297. LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 1 (a 
report for the Edison Electric Institute). 
298. THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, REVENUE REGULATION AND 
DECOUPLING:  A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 1–2 (2011), available at http://
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and, (7) results-based regulation as examples.300  In choosing among new 
rate designs, regulators must “address the fact that in an efficient, modern 
utility, conventional revenue recovery may no longer keep pace with utility 
system costs, investment needs, and the changing dynamics of customers 
which have a growing range of energy related choices ranging from DG to 
demand response.”301  Further, rates should be seen as “a means by which 
energy companies communicate their value proposition to their customers—
[and] not merely the process by which they collect revenues.”302  Thus, while 
a wide variety of approaches can be adapted for a new electricity market, any 
choice should be based upon a set of principles. 
A. Costs 
While costs will most likely play some role in any new rate 
design,303 the move away from using historically embedded costs—or even 
future tests year costs—as the central element of utilities revenue 
requirement must be changed.  A key move away from cost-based 
ratemaking is decoupling.  At its simplest form, decoupling means that rates 
will not be based on the volume of electricity sales; instead, rates will be 
based on other indicators such as the number of customers served.304   
Another basic element of decoupling is that it allows for periodic rate 
adjustments.305  Still, there are a variety of decoupling mechanisms.306  
“Some mechanisms use the revenue authorized in the utility’s last general 
rate case; others adjust that for specific cost changes or according to a 
                                                                                                                   
www.raponline.org/document/download/id/861; see also LOWRY ET AL., PAC. ECON. GRP. 
RESEARCH L.L.C., supra note 223, at 15–16. 
299. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff:  A Policy Tool Encouraging 
Deployment of Renewable Electricity Technologies (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., Feed-in Tariff], http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471. 
300. MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 3. 
301. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 14. 
302. Philip Q. Hanser, Rate Design by Objective: A Purposeful Approach to 
Setting Energy Prices, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 2012, at 48, 50. 
303. MALKIN & CENTOLELLO, supra note 58, at 14. 
304. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 298, at 2. 
305. PAMELA MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., A DECADE OF DECOUPLING FOR 
US ENERGY UTILITIES:  RATE IMPACTS, DESIGNS, AND OBSERVATIONS 6 (rev. ed. 2013), 
available at http://www.switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rcavanagh/decouplingreportMorganfinal
.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Elizabeth Heyd & Pat Remick, Natural Res. Def. Council, 
EEI/NRDC Agreement Supports Policies to Benefit Electricity Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140212.asp. 
306. MORGAN, GRACEFUL SYS. L.L.C., supra note 305, at 5. 
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formula, and still others calculate revenue on a per-customer account basis 
rather than as a single dollar amount.”307 
B. Innovation and Transition 
Rate designs can promote innovation and assist in the clean energy 
transition by allowing utilities to recover investments in innovation, energy 
efficiency, or renewable resources.308  Smart grid investments should be 
recouped, for example.309  Similarly, investments in smart meters, energy 
savings appliances, energy audits, and the like should be encouraged and 
included in any utilities revenue requirement.  Regulators, of course, will 
have a great degree of discretion.  Some investments can be included in rate 
base, and therefore can earn a return for shareholders.  Other investments can 
be treated as costs and recouped dollar-for-dollar. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the utility regulator has 
adopted a Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, Innovation, and Outputs 
(“RIIO”) rate design.310  The intent is to have “utilities . . . focus on 
delivering long-term value to customers.”311  “Revenues [will be] set based 
[up]on a review of the utility’s business plan,” including planned operating 
expenses as well as an assessment of future capital investment.312  The rates 
are then set on a multi-year basis and are intended to “provide[] an incentive 
for the utility to pursue efficiency improvements by [allowing a] utility . . . to 
retain [some] of [the] cost savings.”313  Indeed, cost sharing is a principal that 
should incentivize utilities to earn savings that can then be shared with 
customers.314  Again, regulators will have discretion on the proportion of cost 
sharing between the parties, but the idea is to create incentives for innovation 
and efficiency.315 
In the same way that revenue decoupling and shared savings 
policies together can provide strong incentives for utilities to 
invest in energy efficiency, a similar approach could strengthen 
incentives for utilities to invest in distributed generation, storage, 
microgrids, smart electric vehicle charging, smart inverters, or 
other distributed technologies to reduce operating costs and/or [to] 
                                                 
307. Id. at 6. 
308. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 13. 
309. Id. at 5. 
310. Id. at 16. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 16. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 14–16. 
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defer or avoid the need for investments to expand capacity of 
distribution feeders or invest[ed] in . . . other electricity supply, 
transmission, or distribution assets.316 
A smart rate design, then, may require hybrid pricing models that 
apply to different investments and to different expenses.  Electricity rates can 
be unbundled for different purposes such as “unbundled pricing for 
reliability, standby, and power quality services; temporally or locationally 
differentiated prices for energy or distribution services; price structures that 
reflect how costs are incurred—e.g. fixed, demand-based, energy-based, 
etc.—and incentive payments for dispatchable demand response or ancillary 
services to the grid.”317 
Smart rate designs, then, “may ultimately create a nimble system that 
pays for required services, maximizes value, and allows for effective 
implementation.”318  The core idea behind moving away from cost-based 
ratemaking to rate designs that are more sensitive to the market and 
technological developments is to encourage competition and enable utilities 
to capitalize on new opportunities.319 
C. Balance of Interests 
Shareholders, of course, will only invest if they earn a reasonable 
return on their investment.  That return must be comparable with investments 
of similar risk.  Nevertheless, shareholders do take on some investment risk 
and they should not be guaranteed a return at the expense of customers who 
may receive little or no benefit.320  The trick, of course, is in clearly 
identifying the risks to shareholders, as well as the costs and benefits to 
consumers.  Rates should send clear price signals that account for both fixed 
and variable costs,321 avoid cross-subsidization as much as possible,322 and 
represent the value of services provided to the customer by the utility.323  
“Building a shared understanding among stakeholders and regulators in the 
electricity sector about the full range of costs and benefits of distributed 
energy resources and the implications of net energy metering is an essential 
                                                 
316. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 46. 
317. ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 14. 
318. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 43. 
319. ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–
14. 
320. MALKIN & CENTOLELLA, supra note 58, at 11. 
321. ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 10. 
322. See id. 
323. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 41. 
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first step toward devising rates and incentives that will create the greatest 
benefit for all.”324 
D. Prudence and Needs Reviews 
Prudence reviews became a matter of concern to utilities with the 
collapse of the nuclear power industry.  The possibility of a prudence review 
constitutes a risk to investors; however, all risk cannot and should not be 
eliminated.325  The fact that utility’s capital investment will be reviewed for 
prudence should be considered simply a matter of bringing business 
discipline into the electricity market.  A prudence review should work hand-
in-hand with the obligation of a utility to mitigate the costs of unwise 
investments. 
Generally, a prudence review occurs at the time a utility wants to 
include specific investments in the rate base as part of a rate hearing.326  The 
problem with ex post reviews of investment decisions should be apparent.  
At Time One—for example—a utility assesses the need for a capital 
investment.327  Construction projects—particularly nuclear plants—take 
years and up to a decade or more to complete.  Consequently, the decision to 
include that investment in the rate base will occur at a time when future 
market and financial conditions, as well as the need for energy, can change 
significantly.  One way of reducing the risk of a disallowance at Time Two 
when the prudence review takes place is for regulators to aggressively assess 
the need for power before the investment is made.328  These two sets of 
principles, both for the regulatory compact and for new rate designs, are 
intended to encourage IOUs to reshape the way they do business.329 
VIII. NEW UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 
One need only look at the technological advances in telephony and 
computers to realize that the world is changed in ways that will not return.  
Landlines and desktop computers have largely become things of the past.  
Electricity providers are proliferating, energy efficient appliances and 
                                                 
324. Id. at 36. 
325. See Rilck Noel, Managing Risk:  Prudence Reviews and Nuclear Projects, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2006, at 21, 23. 
326. See id. at 21. 
327. See id. at 22–23. 
328. See Util. Reform Network v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 
762–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); N. States Power Co., MPUC Docket No. E-002/CN-12-1240 
(Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 31, 2013) (PUC reviewed need and setting conditions 
regarding how that need can be satisfied); see also Noel, supra note 325, at 22–23. 
329. Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 29. 
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buildings are reducing per capita use, and competition and consumer choices 
for power providers are increasing.  IOUs, whether they like it or not, are in a 
new market.  Indeed, electric utilities should take a lesson from the 
telecommunications playbook and invest in change rather than continue to 
resist it.330 
The renegotiated regulatory compact, together with innovative rate 
designs, can encourage utilities to change the way they do business.  More 
specifically, IOUs whose primary or exclusive business is to increase 
electricity sales cannot stay complacent in today’s changing market.  Instead, 
utilities must offer a wider array of energy products and services, running 
from renewable energy and energy efficiency, to performing energy audits 
for its customers and broadening the array of power providers.331  In 
particular, utilities must act “more aggressively [by] looking at programs to 
use distributed assets to their benefit so that they can have a wider 
distribution of generation assets throughout their service areas.”332  By way 
of example, NRG Energy333 and NextEra Energy334 are developing utility-
scale solar and other renewable projects; firms like Direct Energy335 and 
Veridian336 have partnered with Solar City to offer solar installations to their 
customers; and Duke Energy and PSE&G have been “invest[ing] in 
residential solar, microgrids, energy storage and smart grid technologies.”337  
Indeed, opportunities abound for forward thinking utilities such as San Diego 
Gas & Electric, which has proposed a strategy to engage in three energy 
services functions:  (1) generate and sell electricity to serve customers’ real-
time needs; (2) provide distribution services; and (3) help customers manage 
                                                 
330. See KIND, supra note 4, at 14–17. 
331. See Tomain, Building the iUtility, supra note 8, at 28; Tomain, “Steel in 
the Ground,” supra note 246, at 931–933; see also Joint Statement from Edison Elec. Inst. & 
Natural Res. Def. Counsel, supra note 305. 
332. Grid:  Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility 
Business Model (E&ETV Special Report television broadcast Jan. 28, 2014), available at 
www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1771/transcript. 
333. Press Release, NRG Energy, Inc., World’s Largest Solar Thermal Power 
Project at Ivanpah Achieves Commercial Operation (Feb. 13, 2014), phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=121544&p=irol-newsArticleNRG&ID=1899656. 
334. See Our Company, NEXTERA ENERGY, http://www.nexteraenergy.com/
company/our_company.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
335. Eric Wesoff, SolarCity and Direct Energy Form $124M Fund for 
Commercial and Industrial Solar, GREENTECHSOLAR (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/SolarCity-And-Direct-Energy-Form-124M-
Fund-For-Commercial-and-Industrial-S. 
336. Press Release, Solar City, SolarCity and Viridian Team to Provide Clean 
Energy Day and Night (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.solarcity.com/pressreleases/204/-
solarcity-and-viridian-team-to-provide-clean-energy-day-and-night.aspx. 
337. Martin LaMonica, Inside the Utility-Renewables Power Play, 
GREENBIZ.COM (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.greenbiz.com/print/55347. 
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electricity use through programs that promote efficiency, smart appliances 
and meters, electric vehicle charging, and the like.338 
Traditionally structured, vertically integrated electric utilities served 
the country well for most of the twentieth century as demand continued to 
grow.  Now with flattening demand, together with the need for investments 
in grid improvement, smart grid technologies, access to the grid by variable 
resources, reliability, cyber security, and pushes for greater use of renewable 
resources and energy efficiency, the utility of the future must acknowledge 
that the integrated utility model will not function effectively in a DG 
world.339  In short, as former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) Chair Jon Wellinghoff has stated, “utilities are going to have to 
have the ability to morph into those roles of entrepreneurs and marketers and 
deliverers of these energy services to be able to effectively compete with all 
the other people in the space.”340  Further, today’s electric utilities must also 
recognize that the new market “does present new avenues for investment and 
growth in terms of grid expansion, smart grid, storage, and downstream 
services; the question is whether utilities grasp that opportunity and evolve 
themselves.”341 
One way of conceptualizing the new utility model is to focus on 
distribution and customer service rather than on generation where the 
utility’s primary business is to serve as a grid operator in an environment of 
wholesale and retail competition.342  Innovative utilities are sensitive to 
customer demand.343  Studies show, for example, that consumers are 
responding to price information and that they are reducing consumption at 
peak times.344  Some of this consumer price responsiveness is due to pilot 
programs such as those in California, which are being operated by San Diego 
Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison that provide rebates to 
customers for electricity saved in particular peak event days.345  In addition, 
                                                 
338. SOLAR ELEC. POWER ASS’N, supra note 174, at 23. 
339. See CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73; ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 13–14. 
340. Grid:  Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility 
Business Model, supra note 332. 
341. CHANNELL ET AL., supra note 50, at 73. 
342. See generally Bain & Co., California Public Utilities Commission: The 
Business Model for the Electric Utility of the Future, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N (Oct. 8, 
2013), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/932AC939-CAC7-43E3-BF06-61D5E90FCC25
/0/1ScaliseCPUCenbanc1082013.pdf. 
343. Paul Woods, The Social Utility: Mastering Multi-Channel 
Communications for Customer Service Success, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 2012, at 40, 41–42; 
see also Bain & Co., supra note 342. 
344. See, e.g., Faruqui & Shultz, supra note 56, at 24–25. 
345. Id. at 24. 
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behind-the-meter technologies such as home displays, programmable 
thermostats and other appliances, along with simple social networking, all 
provide information about how consumers can increase their energy 
efficiency to help IOUs develop their business plans.346 
Thus, the utility of the future must start with the recognition that 
their primary business is not selling a commodity; it is providing and 
managing an infrastructure service.347 
The entrepreneurs who put that competitive solar power on your 
roof with no money down can provide a portfolio of other equally 
unregulated products, like efficiency, demand response, storage, 
and so on, that could ultimately add up to a virtual utility providing 
the same services that utilities now provide—quite possibly with 
lower cost and greater reliability and resilience.348 
Another, similar, way of conceptualizing the utility of the future is to 
see it as a network entity. 
Under a network utility approach, the utility would 
provide highly differentiated price signals to direct investments by 
other service providers.  In this case, the utility’s role would 
increasingly be focused on maintaining and operating the grid and 
on creating markets, managing transactions, replacing aging 
distribution equipment, and/or making smart grid investments and 
interconnecting buyers and sellers with the network.  This network 
utility would shepherd and coordinate the network of increasingly 
complex transactions among [a] growing number of actors.349 
Such a utility would:  (1) pick a distribution area where a utility plans to 
expand, upgrade or modernize; (2) assess peak load demand; (3) use demand 
side management to target reducing loads; and (4) expand DG rather than 
add transportation and distribution. 
Such new business approaches should be responsive to any number 
of issues.  If large capital investments are too financially risky, then they can 
be scaled down.  If investments in efficiency and in DG are less costly and 
less risky than building a new plant or making significant additions to T&D, 
then those investments should be made.  Similarly, if the concern with 
upgrading and modernizing the grid is cyber security, then reducing the scale 
                                                 
346. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 343, at 41–42 (arguing that utilities are 
underutilizing social networks to inform their customers about energy consumption). 
347. Burr, supra note 9, at 31 (referencing a comment by Walt Patterson). 
348. Id. (quoting Amory Lovins). 
349. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., NET ENERGY METERING, supra note 114, at 
47. 
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of generation and multiplying power sites rather than concentrating them will 
reduce those risks.  Also, if natural disasters threaten the grid,350 then DG, 
microgrids,351 and the like may well prove to be smart alternatives. 
The utility of the future, then, will adopt a new vision of the 
electricity business.  The new utility will see itself not as a isolated actor in 
the market, but as part of a network “that provides a platform for the 
economic and operational integration of distributed resources.”352  The new 
utility will use more transparent costs and benefits of service, including 
technical standards, such as those needed for interconnection, as well as 
economic standards, such as those used in making value determinations and 
pricing goods and services generally.353  The new utility will be a value 
creator by serving as:  (1) a distributed system operator;354 (2) an integrated 
resource planner for both large-scale distributed energy resources, and 
storage; (3) a provider of reliability and standby power to customers; and (4) 
an energy services provider and financier, through rates, of such things as 
energy efficiency retrofits, energy control systems, DG, storage, and the 
like.355 
As new technologies and new strategies develop, the utility of the 
future must integrate them into its portfolio and into its rate designs.  
Strategic investments as well as strategic partnerships will be necessary 
components of utilities’ new business model.  Investments in distributed 
generation such as fuel cells356 or rooftop solar—as examples—can in some 
                                                 
350. See, e.g., Robert Uluski, Modernization Foundation:  Near-Term Vision 
for Advanced Distribution Management, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2014, at 44, 45 (“Recent so-
called ‘storm of the century’ events in the Northeast [United States] and the lengthy power 
outages and customer hardships that followed have greatly elevated the need to make power 
delivery systems more resilient to major storm events and to provide a more effective electric 
utility response during such regional power grid emergencies.”). 
351. See Sara C. Bronin & Paul R. McCary, Peaceful Coexistence: 
Independent Microgrids Are Coming.  Will Franchised Utilities Fight Them or Foster Them?, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2013, at 38, 39.  “Generally speaking, a microgrid is a small-scale, 
low-voltage system for sharing distributed generation among several facilities or end users.”  
Id.  Microgrids can be powered by conventional fuels, fuel cells, solar panels or wind turbines.  
Id.  They may also incorporate combined heat and power.  Id. 
352. ELEC. INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 263, at 9. 
353. Id. 
354. See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 19. 
355. See id. at 16–20. 
356. Anthony Leo, FuelCell Energy, Stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems with 
Direct FuelCell Technology Tackle Growing Distributed Baseload Power Challenge, 
DOMINION, https://www.dom.com/about/stations/fossil/pdf/fuelcell-whitepaper.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014).  As defined by the vendor, FuelCell Energy, 
fuel cells are electrochemical devices that combine fuel with oxygen from the 
ambient air to produce electricity and heat, as well as water.  The non-combustion, 
electrochemical process is a direct form of fuel-to-energy conversion, and is much 
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instances produce greater efficiency, and in both instances reduce carbon 
emissions.357  Companies such as Bloomenergy358 and FuelCell Energy359 are 
actively in the market constructing fuel cells on-site as well as developing 
them for traditional IOUs and these are partnership opportunities.360  Fuel 
cells can achieve greater efficiencies and, as their costs decline, they become 
cost competitive in the current electricity market.361  Similarly, rooftop solar 
offers a low carbon alternative to baseload power and it is being offered by 
such companies such as Solar City that finance, install, and maintain the 
systems at a lower cost to the owner than traditional utility service under 
long-term power purchase agreements.362  This type of financial 
intermediation could also be adopted by the traditional IOU.363 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Thus, to succeed in the new electricity market, IOUs should adopt 
leadership roles by:  (1) developing a plan for technological deployment and 
including DG;364 (2) engaging in strategic investments in fuel cells and in 
rooftop solar; (3) providing financial assistance to customers who wish to 
invest in alternative technologies and in energy efficiency; (4) assisting 
regulators in designing new rate structures; and (5) partnering with other 
vendors, utilities, and a variety of investors to engage all of these, and other, 
innovative and creative activities.365 
As such, the new utility will be proactively responding to a new 
business environment.  Utilities, however, cannot and will not act on their 
                                                                                                                   
more efficient than conventional heat engine approaches.  CO2 is reduced, due to 
the high efficiency of the fuel cell, and the absence of combustion avoids the 
production of NOx and particulate pollutants. 
Id. 
357. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17. 
358. BLOOMENERGY, http://www.bloomenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
359. FUELCELL ENERGY, http://www.fuelcellenergy.com (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014). 
360. See Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 18, 20; Scott Hempling, 
Protecting Innovation During Consolidation:  The Advantages of Alertness, 
SCOTTHEMPLINGLAW.COM (Feb. 2014), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/essays/protecting-
innovation. 
361. See, e.g., Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17–18. 
362. Solar Power for Your Home, SOLARCITY, http://www.solarcity.com/
residential/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see also SUNGEVITY, http://www.sungevity.com (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
363. Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 17. 
364. See, e.g., Jolly et al., supra note 215, at 35. 
365. Kosnaski & Shankar, supra note 234, at 20; see also CHANNELL ET AL., 
supra note 50, at 77. 
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own.  They must be aided and abetted by regulators who adopt new rules for 
their relationship with utilities that they regulate.  Those new rules will be 
sensitive to the new market, sensitive to the demands of customers, and 
sensitive to the needs of utilities.  The sensitivities are not only responsive to 
changing market conditions, they are responsive to a fundamental change in 
energy and electricity policy.  The traditional fossil fuel policy is no longer 
viable.  The future demands a clean energy economy and smart IOUs can 
play a transformative role.  The clean energy future will increase their 
reliance on renewable resources and energy efficiency, thus increasing the 
diversity of inputs into electricity generation.  In addition, the clean energy 
future should encourage competition, consumer choice, and technological 
innovation, as well as economic growth.  Although the challenges are real, 
the direction of the future should be clear.  IOUs can, then, play a leading 
role in building out the DG world. 
146
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss3/1
PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUELS 
DAVID M. DRIESEN* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 523 
II.  ON THE NEED TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS ................................. 524 
III.  HOW TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS ............................................... 528 
IV.  SOME TECHNOCRATIC QUESTIONS ................................................ 530 
A.  The Speed of a Phase-Out ................................................. 531 
B.  Policy Mechanisms ........................................................... 533 
V.  SOME POLITICAL QUESTIONS ........................................................ 538 
VI.  CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 540 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of global climate disruption requires a rather specific 
solution, the phase-out of fossil fuels. 1   Most policy experts and 
policymakers are understandably reluctant to face up to the need for such an 
ambitious change.2  So, we tend to talk about climate policy in the traditional 
language of environmental law, discussing the need for emission reductions.  
                                                 
* University Professor, Syracuse University.  J.D. Yale Law School.  The author 
would like to thank Nicholas Cortese and Joseph Frateschi for research assistance. 
1. See Myles Allen et al., Commentary, The Exit Strategy, NATURE REP. 
CLIMATE CHANGE, May 2009, at 56, 58, http://www.nature.com/climate/2009/0905/pdf/
climate.2009.38.pdf (calling for phasing out net carbon dioxide emissions altogether and 
leaving substantial fossil fuel resources in the ground); James Hansen et al., Target 
Atmospheric CO2:  Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 228 
(2008), http://www.benthamscience.com/open/toascj/articles/V002/217TOASCJ.pdf 
(concluding that “remaining fossil fuel reserves should not be exploited without a plan for 
retrieval and disposal of resulting atmospheric CO2”); Veerabhadran Ramanathan & 
Yangyang Xu, The Copenhagen Accord for Limiting Global Warming:  Criteria, Constraints, 
and Available Avenues, 107 PNAS 8055, 8057 (2010) (including the replacement of fossil 
fuels with renewables as things we must do in order to halve emissions by 2050 while calling 
for eighty percent reductions by 2100); Henry Shue, Climate Hope:  Implementing the Exit 
Strategy, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 388–89 (2013) (pointing out that many of the studies cited 
above may understate the need for aggressive action because they focus only on carbon 
dioxide, ignoring other greenhouse gases); Michael Le Page, IPCC Digested:  Just Leave the 
Fossil Fuels Underground, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/
article/dn24299-ipcc-digested-just-leave-the-fossil-fuels-underground.html (interpreting the 
latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change draft as a call to leave recoverable fossil 
fuels in the ground); Alex Morales, Fossil Fuels Need to Stay Unburned to Meet Climate 
Target, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-
27/fossil-fuels-need-to-stay-unburned-to-meet-climate-target.html. 
2. See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8055–56; Le Page, supra note 1. 
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But ultimately, routine emission reductions will not suffice; we need the 
virtual elimination of emissions and that requires the phase-out of fossil 
fuels.3 
This may seem like a radical claim, but we certainly will phase out 
fossil fuels.  Because they are finite resources, they will run out eventually.4  
The question for policymakers then is not whether to phase out fossil fuels; it 
is whether to do so in time to avoid many of global climate disruption’s 
impacts in a planned way, or whether to wait until after carbon dioxide 
emissions throw the climate radically off kilter and our limited fossil fuel 
resources become fiendishly expensive, perhaps suddenly, and then run out 
altogether.  A planned and reasonably rapid fossil fuel phase-out minimizes 
economic and environmental disruption.5 
Facing up to this need would hardly answer all the questions we 
might ask about appropriate climate disruption policy.  But it might change 
the questions we consider worth asking in productive ways. 
This paper will begin by making the case for a goal of phasing out of 
fossil fuels.  It will then discuss the questions that adopting a phase-out goal 
raise about both politics and policy. 
II. ON THE NEED TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS 
We need to phase out fossil fuels for four major reasons.  First, the 
predicted and possible consequences of climate disruption are too serious for 
us to risk continued emissions of fossil fuels until they run out.6  Second, 
carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels account for some eighty 
percent of greenhouse gas emissions both in the United States and globally.7  
Third, carbon dioxide—once emitted—remains in the atmosphere for 
                                                 
3. WORKING GRP. I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 26 (2013) (noting that “a large fraction 
of . . . climate [disruption] . . . is irreversible,” and that even with cessation of emissions 
“temperature[] will remain . . . constant at elevated levels”). 
4. See Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57–58; Hansen et al., supra note 1, at 
228. 
5. Allen et al., supra note 1, at 57. 
6. See WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 11–13 (2007) 
[hereinafter WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007] (discussing impacts in detail); 
WORKING GRP. II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2001:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 5, 77 (2001) [hereinafter WORKING GRP. II, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001]. 
7. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS:  1990–2011 ES-9 (2013). 
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centuries, so that emissions have a cumulative effect.8  This means that every 
year in which we burn any fossil fuels we will add to climate disruption, 
even if we have reduced emissions by a large amount.9  Fourth, fossil fuels 
cause an enormous amount of destruction wholly apart from climate 
disruption.10 
Serious scientists do not doubt that greenhouse gas emissions have 
disrupted the climate and will wreak greater havoc still in the future absent 
drastic changes. 11   The average mean surface temperature has risen in 
response to rising greenhouse gas emissions. 12   We have a rather good 
understanding of the sorts of disruption rising temperatures create.13  This 
conference devoted a lot of attention to one of the most basic consequences 
of all—sea level rise—which has dire implications for Florida. 14   Other 
consequences we can expect include more violent weather events, increasing 
drought, the spread of infectious diseases, the loss of many endangered 
species, and the destruction of ecosystems.15  As with sea level rise, our 
understanding of the magnitude and timing of these consequences is quite 
limited.16  We have generally underestimated the extent of global warming in 
the past and some ice masses have melted much more quickly than 
                                                 
8. See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (pointing out that carbon dioxide 
emissions generate climate change that is mostly “irreversible on a multi-century to millennial 
time scale”). 
9. See id.; Allen et al., supra note 1, at 58. 
10. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality:  The 
Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 35–
37 (2002) [hereinafter Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality] (describing harms 
associated with fossil fuel burning). 
11. See WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 2–17 (discussing warming trends, 
their attribution to greenhouse gas emissions, and likelihood of further warming). 
12. See id. at 2, 11–13, 15. 
13. See id. at 17–27. 
14. See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5 
(discussing flooding from sea level rise). 
15. WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 12, 792 
(discussing “increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves [sic], floods, storms, fires, 
and droughts” and expressing high confidence about loss of endangered species and 
ecosystem destruction); WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 6, at 5, 42–43 
(discussing increased incidence of diseases such as malaria, cholera, dengue, and heat stroke 
mortality). 
16. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, CLIMATE 
ECONOMICS: THE STATE OF THE ART 11–15 (2013) (discussing uncertainties about sea level 
rise and other key variables). 
149
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
526 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
expected.17  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports generally 
admonish readers to expect surprises, some of which may prove unpleasant.18  
The climate system includes feedback loops that have the potential to greatly 
accelerate climate disruption.19  For example, a lot of methane lies trapped 
below permafrost in Siberia and elsewhere.20  As the earth warms, it has 
melted some of this permafrost, allowing some of the methane trapped 
beneath to escape.21  Methane itself is a very potent greenhouse gas, so the 
released methane increases warming, which can melt yet more permafrost 
and lead to the release of more methane.22  In other words, runaway global 
warming is a possibility, where consequences of our previous actions set up a 
cycle of warming that we cannot prevent through emission reductions.23  The 
possibility of calamitous warming exceeding the amount predicted by most 
models cannot be ruled out, partially because of these sorts of feedback 
loops.24  We do not know where a tipping point lies, which once crossed, 
could have very dire consequences.25  Because of the serious consequences 
predicted and the scary nature of what could happen but cannot be predicted, 
we need to do everything we can to avoid future temperature increases. 
                                                 
17. See id. at 12 (explaining that temperature increases have followed the 
most pessimistic projections and that sea level rise has outstripped the main projections 
altogether). 
18. WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 497 (stating 
that “surprises should be anticipated” and are of great concern); WORKING GRP. II, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE:  SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES 5 
(1996) (characterizing surprises as likely). 
19. ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 15–18 
(describing various feedbacks). 
20. See id. at 17–18 (describing methane in the boreal region and elsewhere). 
21. Arctic Melt “Bubbling Out” Ancient Methane, ASIAN NEWS INT’L, May 
21, 2012 (stating, “[s]cientists have [discovered] thousands of sites in the Arctic where 
[trapped] methane . . . is seeping out” from melting permafrost); Steve Connor, Vast Methane 
‘Plumes’ Seen in Arctic Ocean as Sea Ice Retreats, INDEP. (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://independent.co.uk/news/science/vast-methane-plumes-seen-in-arctic-ocean-as-sea-ice-
retreats-6276278.html (describing scientists’ shock after witnessing plumes of methane being 
released from permafrost and the Arctic seabed). 
22. See ACKERMAN & STANTON, CLIMATE ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 17–
18 (discussing the warming from released methane). 
23. See WORKING GRP. II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 6, at 249 
(characterizing feedbacks from permafrost melting as key uncertainties in need of further 
research). 
24. See Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping 
Points in the Climate System, 106 PNAS 5041, 5041 (2009). 
25. See id. (discussing tipping points and our inability to accurately gauge the 
probability of triggering them). 
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Because roughly eighty percent of the United States greenhouse gas 
emissions come from burning fossil fuels, any serious effort to address 
climate disruption must have the project of addressing fossil fuel burning as 
its centerpiece. 26   This does not mean that addressing fossil fuel use 
constitutes the only thing we need to do to address global climate disruption, 
but it does mean that successfully addressing fossil fuel use must take center 
stage.  That is why this symposium, like other serious efforts to address 
climate disruption, focuses so heavily on energy policy questions.27 
Even if we reduce emissions, we will make climate disruption worse 
every year in which we continue to burn any fossil fuel at all.28  Carbon 
dioxide, once emitted, remains in the atmosphere for many centuries. 29  
Given the nature of the consequences and the possibility of triggering 
runaway warming, we just cannot continue to increase the global store of 
atmospheric carbon year after year until fossil fuels run out.  Continued 
emissions commit us to future disruption of unknown magnitude.30  If we 
find out later that we have crossed some sort of threshold or triggered routine 
consequences that we cannot easily live with, such as a level of sea level rise 
that inundates Miami, we cannot reverse these consequences by subsequently 
reducing emissions.31  This means, as Howard A. Latin has emphasized, that 
reducing emissions by ten percent—for example—increases warming above 
current levels.32  For a ten percent reduction implies that we continue to add 
                                                 
26. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS:  1990–2011 ES-9 (2013) (showing that carbon dioxide made up 
seventy-nine percent of United States greenhouse gas emissions in 2011); cf. 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 36 fig.2.1 (2008) (indicating that fossil fuels account for 56.6% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions). 
27. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy:  What Do the 
Models Tell Us?, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 860, 860 (2013). 
28. See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at 
35. 
29. See Ramanathan & Xu, supra note 1, at 8056 (pointing out that the 
residence time for carbon dioxide is up to one thousand years). 
30. See Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at 
35–36. 
31. WORKING GRP. I, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that even after complete 
cessation of emissions, elevated temperatures will remain constant for centuries). 
32. HOWARD A. LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES: WHY 
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED 20–21 (2012) (pointing out that a 
ten percent cut in emissions implies continued additions to greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere). 
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ninety percent of current emissions to the global store of carbon every year, 
thus adding to the current imbalance in the global carbon cycle.33 
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions to zero or near zero levels 
requires a fossil fuel phase-out.34  Because of the cumulative nature of the 
emissions, the importance of carbon dioxide to the overall problem, and the 
seriousness of the potential consequences of increasing climate disruption, 
we must phase out fossil fuels long before they run out.  The sooner the 
fossil fuels are phased out, the smaller the likelihood of triggering runaway 
warming or suffering some of the more serious consequences associated with 
warming generally.35 
Although I have discussed a phase-out as the right response to global 
climate disruption, a goal of phasing out fossil fuels has broader merit.  
Burning fossil fuels contributes greatly to severe local and regional air 
pollution problems that kill tens of thousands of people annually in the 
United States and even more in developing countries.36  Phasing out fossil 
fuels promises relief from serious conventional air pollution, coal mining’s 
destruction of land and maiming or killing of miners, an end to oil spills, and 
much more.37  The harms avoided when we phase out fossil fuels go far 
beyond limiting climate disruption. 
III. HOW TO PHASE OUT FOSSIL FUELS 
Phasing out fossil fuels would require a number of changes.38  The 
most obvious reform needed involves greatly increased energy efficiency.39  
                                                 
33. Id. at 21 (equating a ten percent cut in emissions with the addition of 
ninety percent of baseline emissions to the atmosphere). 
34. Shue, supra note 1, at 386, 394. 
35. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING 
STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-
warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719 (explaining that avoiding an increase in mean 
surface temperature of two degrees Celsius, which scientists consider dangerous, would 
require leaving eighty percent of current proven industry owned fossil fuel reserves in the 
ground). 
36. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 10, at 28, 
35 (pointing out that health studies link particulate pollution to tens of thousands of annual 
deaths); e.g., Edward Wong, Early Deaths Linked to China’s Air Pollution Totaled 1.2 Million 
in 2010, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at A9. 
37. See, e.g., Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality, supra note 
10, at 51–52. 
38. Id. at 25. 
39. See John C. Dernbach et al., Energy Efficiency and Conservation:  New 
Legal Tools and Opportunities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring 2011, at 7, 7 
(characterizing energy efficiency as low-hanging fruit). 
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Increases in energy efficiency reduce the scope of the project of replacing 
fossil fuel as the basis for our economy.40  Happily, many energy efficiency 
improvements pay for themselves through savings in electricity costs. 41  
They also produce jobs for contractors and engineers.42  So, they produce 
win-win situations that prove attractive to rational policymakers. 
Fuel switching to achieve zero emissions, even for a greatly reduced 
energy requirement, however, poses significant challenges. 43   In 2012, 
renewable energy and nuclear power accounted for less than twenty percent 
of United States energy consumption.44  About eighty percent came from 
fossil fuels.45  At current levels of total energy consumption, we must replace 
almost eighty quads of fossil fuel energy in order to reach zero emissions.46  
Even a fifty percent energy efficiency improvement—an ambitious level—
would leave us with the need to replace almost forty quads of energy, a 
significant amount. 47   If a phase-out is possible, it would likely require 
ambitious policy measures, and might produce significant costs. 
Thoroughly analyzing the question of whether a complete phase-out 
is possible would require an article of its own.  I will note that a recently 
published analysis suggests that my home state, New York, could replace all 
of its fossil fuel with renewable energy.48  It does not necessarily follow that 
all areas in the country could rely solely on renewables, as renewables’ 
potential varies geographically. 49   The optimistic picture for New York 
depends heavily on offshore wind possibilities that take advantage of New 
York’s proximity to Long Island Sound and some of the Great Lakes.50  But 
if a nationwide shift to one hundred percent renewables is not possible, then 
phasing out fossil fuels might require some use of nuclear power. 
                                                 
40. See id. 
41. Id. (discussing studies finding substantial opportunities to save money 
through energy efficiency improvements are available). 
42. See id. (finding that energy efficiency improvements generate jobs). 
43. See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Examining the Feasibility of Converting New 
York State’s All-Purpose Energy Infrastructure to One Using Wind, Water, and Sunlight, 57 
ENERGY POL’Y 585, 586–87 (2013). 
44. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 3 tbl.1.1 
(2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/archive/00351401.pdf. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. (showing 77.994 quads of fossil fuel related energy consumption in 
2012). 
47. See id. 
48. Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 598. 
49. See id. at 598–99. 
50. See id. at 589 tbl.2 (showing that the study relies on off-shore wind for 
forty percent of its power in 2030). 
153
: Nova Law Review 38, #3
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
530 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
The history of serious efforts to make major changes should make us 
somewhat optimistic about a phase-out’s prospects.  When we moved toward 
phasing out ozone depleting substances, we discovered that more substitutes 
existed at lower costs than academic researchers or experts at individual 
companies had believed.51  Although a fossil fuel phase-out appears to pose 
much greater challenges than the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals, 
aggressive policies have already produced surprising results and probably 
will produce more of them.52  The ozone depletion experience teaches us that 
we should be wary of claims that we know how rapidly we can phase out 
fossil fuels and how much it will cost.  For many years prior to the initiation 
of the phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals, it appeared that substitutes 
would either be impossible or costly.53  This proved not to be the case.54  I 
am not saying that we can confidently predict that phasing out fossil fuels 
will prove cheap.  But we must recognize that academic studies lack 
information individual companies may possess on technological possibilities, 
that individual companies may have incentives not to share information they 
have, and that new research can uncover possibilities that nobody knew 
about. 55   Strong policies have generally done well at encouraging 
innovation.56 
IV. SOME TECHNOCRATIC QUESTIONS 
Even if we agree that we should phase out fossil fuels, important 
questions remain about how quickly we should do so and what policy 
                                                 
51. See EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND 
STRATEGY 9 (2003) (stating that “it was widely believed that significant cuts in ozone-
depleting chemicals would be extremely difficult and costly,” but that agreement to a fifty 
percent cut created collaborations that led to subsequent identification and development of 
alternatives). 
52. See, e.g., Daniel T. Kaffine et al., Emissions Savings from Wind Power 
Generation in Texas, ENERGY J., 2013, at 155, 156 (discussing technological advances and 
falling prices of wind energy). 
53. PARSON, supra note 51, at 8–9 (pointing out that ten years of deadlock 
preceded the Montreal Protocol and that during that period many believed that cuts would be 
costly and difficult). 
54. See id. at 9. 
55. See, e.g., id. (arguing that prior to regime formation, knowledge about 
substitutes for ozone depleters was controlled by firms, not academics, and not shared). 
56. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 
33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10094, 10103–04, 10106 (2003) [hereinafter Driesen, Does Emissions 
Trading Encourage Innovation?] (reviewing empirical evidence of innovation and finding it 
correlated with stringent standards). 
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mechanisms we should use to accomplish this.  I address both of these issues 
in turn. 
A. The Speed of a Phase-Out 
The argument above suggests that we should phase out fossil fuels as 
quickly as feasible.57  But what does that mean for policy?  How should a 
policymaker determine how quickly we should phase out fossil fuels? 
One might think of this rapidity question as a question about the 
technical feasibility of replacing fossil fuels.  Although engineers studying 
these sorts of questions no doubt make a contribution to resolving fossil fuel 
policy questions, there are reasons to doubt that these questions are the most 
central ones for policymakers.58  No society in the world has done all that is 
technically feasible to phase out fossil fuels.59  Furthermore, what I already 
said about the limits of any one actor’s information gathering capacity and 
our ability to predict advances implies that experts can easily underestimate 
our society’s technical capabilities. 
One might think that a decision to phase out fossil fuels does away 
with the need to consider costs.  My justification for the phase-out 
commitment suggests a rejection of the reigning economic orthodoxy on how 
to consider costs—the theory that we should do so by setting emission 
reduction targets or prices designed to equalize costs and benefits at the 
margin.  We should not do so for at least two reasons.  First, we cannot 
quantify the costs and benefits of any given mitigation measure with a 
reasonable degree of precision, so cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) does not 
provide a useful guide to policy.60  Second, a cost-benefit criterion in the 
                                                 
57. See Brigitte Knopf et al., Managing the Low-Carbon Transition—From 
Model Results to Policies, ENERGY J., 2010, at 223, 225 (arguing that the needed steep 
decreases in carbon intensity require rapid energy system changes). 
58. See id. at 226; McKibben, supra note 35. 
59. See Knopf et al., supra note 57, at 226; McKibben, supra note 35. 
60. See Donald A. Brown, Climate Change, in STUMBLING TOWARD 
SUSTAINABILITY 273, 306–07 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (discussing problems in 
monetizing climate disruption impacts); Frank Ackerman & Elizabeth A. Stanton, Climate 
Risks and Carbon Prices:  Revising the Social Cost of Carbon, ECON. E.-J., Apr. 4, 2012, at 1, 
2, http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10 (explaining that plausible 
assumptions about climate sensitivity can generate estimates of carbon’s social costs at nine 
hundred dollars a ton, but that many estimates have come up with much lower numbers); 
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1577, 1596–97 (2011); Pindyck, supra note 27, at 861 
(finding integrated assessment models at the base of climate disruption CBA close to useless 
as policy analysis tools); Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental 
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climate context proves even more morally obtuse for United States climate 
policy than in other contexts because decisions we make about climate 
disruption influence the amount of death, injury, and destruction faced not 
only in Florida, but also in Bangladesh, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in Island 
States.61  It is not morally acceptable to say that we will not prevent deaths in 
developing countries that we—together with other developed countries—
have caused, because the prevention would cost too much.62  Nevertheless, 
cost constraints remain relevant to the question of how rapidly we can 
feasibly phase out fossil fuels. 
A commitment to phasing out fossil fuels, however, changes the 
questions we should ask about costs.  We should focus primarily on cost 
distribution, rather than magnitude.  We should ask, for example, whether 
phasing out fossil fuels at a given rate would cause unacceptable hardships 
for energy consumers.  For example, we must go slowly enough so that we 
do not leave people with bills so high that they cannot afford electricity, heat, 
and transportation.  This leaves the question of how rapidly to phase out 
fossil fuels somewhat dependent on other policies.  We can, for example, 
proceed more rapidly if we have good mass transit and robust programs to 
pay electricity bills for poor people in place.63  Of course, that means that we 
also have to answer questions about how much we want to spend to enhance 
these sorts of programs.  Furthermore, an emphasis on distribution suggests 
that even for relatively cheap changes we must consider the plight of workers 
losing their jobs as fossil fuel facilities shut down.  It may be true that 
phasing out fossil fuels will create more jobs than it takes away. 64  In a 
reasonably robust economy, it may be appropriate to expect flexible labor 
markets to handle the necessary transitions reasonably well.  If we need to 
accelerate fossil fuel phase-outs during periods of high unemployment, 
however, it may be important to have job training and other kinds of 
transition assistance in place to help those losing jobs in the fossil fuel 
industry. 65   Congress did this with respect to the acid rain program by 
                                                                                                                   
and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 318–19 (2010) (explaining that 
models illuminate dynamics and uncertainties rather than generate answers). 
61. See Masur & Posner, supra note 60, at 1563. 
62. See Brown, supra note 60, at 304–06 (arguing that CBA is dubious 
because even high costs do not free us of our responsibilities to prevent harms to others). 
63. See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7; Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 
595–96; Shue, supra note 1, at 384–86. 
64. Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95; see also Dernbach et al., supra 
note 39, at 7. 
65. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 1101, 
104 Stat. 2399, 2710–11 (1990), repealed by Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105–220, § 199, 122 Stat. 936 (1998); cf. Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 594–95. 
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granting the industry flexibility in how to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions; 
Congress allowed the use of low sulfur coal, which would displace coal-
mining jobs in high sulfur coal regions.66  Accordingly, it did provide some 
transitional assistance. 67   Even though we should provide transitional 
assistance if we transform the economy during tough times, we should not 
accept using unfounded allegations of hardship to justify slowing progress. 
B. Policy Mechanisms 
Policymakers must also ask themselves about what policies can most 
readily phase out fossil fuels.  There seems to be a political consensus around 
the globe that we should “put a price on carbon” through environmental 
benefit trading or carbon taxes.68  Yet, if one looks around the world at 
advanced countries that have gone far down the road toward phasing out 
fossil fuels, these two policies do not always figure as causal factors. 69  
Germany now produces twenty-five percent of its energy from renewable 
resources.70  Its policies have produced big declines in the price of solar and 
other renewable energy sources.71   As Michael Mehling has made clear, 
Germany has achieved this progress primarily through an aggressive feed-in 
tariff, which offers renewable energy producers a high price for renewable 
energy.72  This policy does not directly put a price on carbon; it aims instead 
                                                 
66. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPACTS OF THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM ON 
COAL INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT i–ii, app. at A2A3 (2001). 
67. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 1101 (allocating up to 
$250,000,000 for retraining and assisting miners adversely affected by employers’ Clean Air 
Act compliance). 
68. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN DESIGNING A GLOBAL 
AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL WARMING 3 (2009), available at http:/ /www.econ.yale.edu/
~nordhaus/homepage/documents/Copenhagen_052909.pdf (describing the lesson that all 
people must “face a market price for the use of carbon” as the economists’ “bottom line for 
policy”). 
69. See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the 
European Union:  The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE 
ENERGY 1, 8–9 (2006). 
70. Chris Cottrell, German Renewables Output Hits Record High in H1, 
REUTERS (July 26, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/germany-
renewables-idUSL6E8IQIA720120726. 
71. Craig A. Hart & Dominic Marcellino, Subsidies or Free Markets to 
Promote Renewables?, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 196, 203 (2012). 
72. Ralph Buehler et al., How Germany Became Europe’s Green Leader:  A 
Look at Four Decades of Sustainable Policymaking, SOLUTIONS, Oct. 2011, at 51, 57–58; see 
Samantha Booth, Community Solar:  Reviving California’s Commitment to a Bright Energy 
Future, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10585, 10590–91 (2013) (noting that Germany has become the first 
country to exceed thirty gigawatts of solar capacity because of its feed-in tariff); Ringel, supra 
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to provide an incentive to substitute renewable energy for fossil fuels.73  
France currently relies on fossil fuels for less than ten percent of its energy.74  
This extraordinary achievement stems from a government decision to build 
nuclear power plants with rigid state control of both design and worker 
training in order to ensure safety.75  France did not put a price on carbon; 
instead, it mandated construction of zero emission facilities.76  This record 
should invite some fairly simple questions:  Can putting a price on carbon be 
an effective strategy for phasing out fossil fuels?  If so, what sorts of design 
features are needed to make this approach more effective than in the past?  
Are there better tools than taxes and trading for phasing out fossil fuels?  
What are the advantages and limits of pricing carbon as a strategy? 
I do not propose to answer all of these questions here, but I will say 
something about possible answers.  First of all, pricing policies must be 
much more ambitious than the pricing policies countries have employed so 
far if they are to have any chance in succeeding in rapidly phasing out fossil 
fuels.77  Countries have generally set caps for trading programs and carbon 
taxes without any clear intention to phase out fossil fuels. 78   Indeed, in 
Europe, which has the most experience with these programs, the primary 
goal of many of these policies is to reduce emissions rather modestly in the 
near term.79  Howard Latin has questioned this sort of back-loaded strategy 
that saves ambitious reductions for much later.80  He has raised concerns that 
such strategies encourage investments in technologies, such as natural gas, 
that we must ultimately abandon to get to zero emissions and that those who 
make these investments will resist scuttling the infrastructure they have 
                                                                                                                   
note 69, at 6 (explaining that a feed-in tariff pays renewable energy providers an above market 
price for the power they produce). 
73. Ringel, supra note 69, at 6. 
74. NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION, NUCLEAR 
ENERGY DATA 43 (2013) (showing that France gets only 9.8% from fossil fuels). 
75. See id. (showing that France gets seventy-five percent of its power 
production from nuclear energy); Dieter Helm, Nuclear Power, Climate Change, and Energy 
Policy, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 247, 249 (Dieter Helm & 
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (discussing France’s ownership of the entire technology chain 
for nuclear energy and state training of the nuclear workforce). 
76. See Helm, supra note 75, at 249. 
77. See, e.g., Ringel, supra note 69, at 6. 
78. See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151. 
79. Hart & Marcellino, supra note 71, at 197. 
80. See id. at 152–53, 158 (noting that “conversion from coal to natural gas” 
is an interim investment that might make eventual achievement of zero emissions more 
difficult). 
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invested in when the time comes.81  He would rather see us move more 
directly to zero emissions.82  Adopting a goal of phasing out fossil fuels, not 
simply reducing emissions, does suggest that the goals for these programs 
have not been commensurate with the climate disruption problem.83 
Amy Sinden and I have suggested elsewhere that a goal of phasing 
out fossil fuels suggests a redesign of environmental benefit trading 
programs. 84   Current approaches focus on the end-of-the-pipe and are 
designed to reduce emissions.85  We argued for explicitly using trading to 
phase out fossil fuels.86  This implies that allowances would limit the amount 
of fossil fuels being used in the economy.87  We refer to trading—and non-
trading—programs that limit dirty inputs rather than pollution outputs as 
Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”).88  We have used DILs in both tradable and non-
tradable forms before when we phased out ozone-depleting chemicals and 
lead. 89   This may seem like a radical idea, but proposed federal 
comprehensive climate disruption legislation included DILs for 
transportation fuels.90  We simply suggested extending this approach.91 
But a bigger question we must ask is whether pricing policies—
which are conceived of as encouraging the most cost effective adjustments in 
the status quo—are really the best way of transforming an economy, even if 
they were ambitious.  The French and German experiences suggest that some 
sort of more active state role might be necessary to encourage investments 
that are effective, and perhaps even cost effective in the long run, but not 
                                                 
81. See id. at 158 (arguing that investments in interim technologies like 
natural gas will build constituencies for those technologies that will make their abandonment 
difficult); see also Jacobson et al., supra note 43, at 587 (doubting that natural gas may 
produce more global warming than coal because of methane emissions associated with gas 
extraction and lower sulfur dioxide emissions, which mask warming). 
82. See LATIN, supra note 32, at 151. 
83. See id. 
84. See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument:  Dirty 
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 66–67, 104–09 (2009) (discussing a trading 
program limiting consumption of fossil fuel through tradable permits limiting fossil fuel 
production). 
85. See id. at 67–68 (stating that we have traditionally focused vehicle 
regulation on the exhaust output). 
86. See id. at 104–09. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 67 (defining Dirty Input Limits (“DILs”)). 
89. See Driesen & Sinden, supra note 84, at 83–88 (discussing the lead and 
ozone-depleting chemical examples). 
90. See id. at 81–83 (discussing the use of DILs in global warming bills 
considered in Congress). 
91. See id. at 67. 
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cost effective in the short run.92  We need more thinking about what lessons 
the most successful approaches have to teach the rest of us, instead of blithe 
assumptions that since pricing carbon has good efficiency properties, it must 
be the right solution to the climate disruption problem.  Indeed, it seems 
fairly clear that price alone will not accomplish all that is needed.93  Mass 
transit improvements, for example, require public expenditures—although 
one can imagine using a carbon tax or auctioned permits to fund this.94 
We also must recognize that an enormous project like phasing out 
fossil fuels may require a level of innovation that challenges conventional 
approaches, like traditional regulation, environmental taxation, and 
emissions trading.95  All of these programs require governments to make 
difficult decisions about goals, in the form of choosing a cap for a trading 
program or a tax rate for a carbon tax. 96   Political difficulties and the 
government’s inability to predict innovation rates will tend to constrain the 
ambition of these goal-setting decisions. 97   This raises the question of 
whether we can invent new approaches that will do better. 
I have suggested the possibility of an environmental competition 
statute.98  Such a statute would allow any polluter who is reducing carbon 
emissions to collect the cost of making its reductions from any competitor 
with higher emissions, plus a statutory profit margin.99  In all likelihood this 
would spur a race to phase out fossil fuels, since getting to zero emissions 
generally secures payments, whereas continuing to pollute risks having to 
pay cleaner competitors.100  This approach seeks to emulate the innovation 
stimulating properties of a very competitive market, where making a superior 
product allows an innovator to steal market share from its competitors, 
                                                 
92. See, e.g., MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES: 
MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY 117 (1994), and Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 57. 
93. See Buehler et al., supra note 72, at 52, 57. 
94. See Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7. 
95. See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, 2 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 199, 201–05 (2010) [hereinafter Driesen, An Environmental 
Competition Statute]. 
96. Id. at 203–04. 
97. Id. at 203. 
98. Id. at 200–01 (describing and advocating this mechanism). 
99. Id. at 206–07 (describing the basic mechanism of an environmental 
competition statute). 
100. See Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, supra note 95, at 
200–01 (characterizing an environmental competition statute as “encourag[ing] contests to 
improve environmental quality”). 
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thereby potentially making the innovator wealthier at the expense of less 
nimble competition.101 
Howard Latin has proposed using carbon taxes to fund an expert 
commission to fund research into zero emissions technologies and to 
subsidize their deployment.102  His approach mirrors my own in following 
the principle that using negative economic incentives to fund positive 
economic incentives provides a powerful driver for innovation.103 
These comments focus on the most challenging aspect of the phase-
out problem—the problem of fuel switching.  The question of how best to 
minimize the use of fuel altogether—the energy efficiency problem—also 
raises questions about effective policies.  Policymakers around the world 
have adopted a lot of successful approaches, from improved mass transit to 
least cost planning for electric utilities, to regulations mandating increased 
energy efficiency in appliances.104  They have done so because of strong 
evidence that people often do not adopt energy efficiency measures on their 
own, even when doing so would save them money.105  The data suggest that 
pricing policies without redistribution of the revenue may have limits in 
encouraging the cheapest options for limiting the use of fossil fuels.  On the 
other hand, pricing policies that help fund energy efficiency improvements 
can pair economic benefits with fuel switching, thus lessening—and perhaps 
eliminating—the pain associated with rapid change.106 
                                                 
101. Id. at 207 (developing the analogy between this statutory mechanism and 
the “economic dynamics of [a] competitive market[]”). 
102. LATIN, supra note 32, at 162–63 (describing this scheme along with other 
less central remedies). 
103. ANDERSEN, supra note 92, at 18–19, 26–27 (promoting taxes like the 
French effluent tax which raise funding for environmental programs). 
104. See Veronika Czakó, Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Action at 
the City Level:  The Hungarian Experience, in OPPORTUNITIES AND DRIVERS ON THE WAY TO A 
LOW CARBON SOCIETY:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMER ACADEMY ‘ENERGY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT’ 95, 99–101 (2013) (discussing subsidies funding energy efficiency 
improvements in Hungarian apartment buildings); Dernbach et al., supra note 39, at 7 
(describing various approaches used in the United States). 
105. See Cameron Hepburn & Nicholas Stern, The Global Deal on Climate 
Change, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 36, 49 (Dieter Helm & 
Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating that because of energy efficiency investment’s 
insensitivity to price, carbon pricing will do little to increase deployment of energy 
efficiency); cf. Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive US Cap-
and-Trade System, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 197, 198 (Dieter 
Helm & Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009) (stating flatly that polluters will undertake all 
reductions that are less costly than the allowance price in “[a] well-designed cap-and-trade 
system”). 
106. See id. 
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V. SOME POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
The major reason that the United States has not become a leader in 
moving toward a phase-out of fossil fuels has been political.107  The United 
States has been unwilling to even take the relatively modest step of 
implementing a nationwide so-called cap-and-trade program to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.108  Nor has the United States eliminated massive 
subsidies for fossil fuels, in spite of repeated proposals from the Obama 
Administration to do so.109 
So, a major question that the need to phase out fossil fuels raises is a 
political one:  What sorts of strategies would help change the political 
climate over time to one that might accept measures that would phase out 
fossil fuels?  My own view is that we are unlikely to gain acceptance of a 
program phasing out fossil fuels without environmental leaders making such 
a phase-out an explicit political goal.  The evidence suggests that the Obama 
Administration and many environmental groups disagree with me on that.  
They either do not see the need for a phase-out, or assume that it can best be 
accomplished by selling steps in that direction indirectly, justifying 
individual regulations as cost effective and helping with the problem of 
climate disruption. 110   Thus, the Obama Administration has passed very 
strong standards improving vehicle emissions and promises significant 
regulation of power plants, but supports an “all-of-the-above” energy 
strategy.111 
I have my doubts about whether the American public can be brought 
around to support a phase-out of fossil fuels without a rhetorical strategy that 
prepares them to accept much more significant changes than are currently 
politically feasible.  If nobody tells the American public that fossil fuels are 
finite resources, that an increase in their price is inevitable as they become 
scarce, that renewable energy has fallen in price in countries with good 
policies and will likely fall further if supported appropriately, that new 
                                                 
107. See Neela Banerjee, Warning on Greenhouse Gases; A Study Says 
Emissions Are on Track to Raise Global Temperatures by up to 9.54 Degrees by Century’s 
End, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A11. 
108. See Stavins, supra note 105, at 198; Banerjee, supra note 108. 
109. See Banerjee, supra note 107 (stating “Congress has shown no interest in 
ending fossil fuel subsidies”); Gary Gentile et al., Obama Seeks to Slash Oil Industry Tax 
Breaks, PLATTS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 15, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 5108712 
(stating that, as of 2011, President Obama proposed eliminating fossil fuel subsidies three 
times). 
110. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Limits Set on Pollution from Autos, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2010, at B1. 
111. See McKibben, supra note 35. 
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industries can generate new jobs, that climate disruption will wreak havoc 
unless we take ambitious measures, and that phasing out fossil fuels would 
save thousands of lives and spare us all from many types of environmental 
destructions wholly apart from climate disruption, I do not see how we can 
ever phase out fossil fuels. 
The political challenge, however, goes beyond how we debate 
environmental policy.  We live in an era in which many politicians oppose 
any governmental role in solving most societal problems.  Although we 
surely need limits on governmental power, climate disruption poses 
problems of coordination that make it insolvable without a significant 
governmental role.112  Countries that have made significant progress on the 
climate issue take a more pragmatic and less ideological view of the 
appropriate role of government than we do.  So, progress on the climate issue 
is linked to making progress on broader issues of the appropriate role of 
government. 
This requires environmental advocates and their political allies in 
Congress to figure out how to advance a broader project of sensible 
governance.  They should, for example, repeatedly remind the American 
people of the role deregulation played in creating the financial crisis. 113  
Reasonable standards of conduct are as important to well-functioning 
markets as they are to our efforts to solve environmental problems.  
Furthermore, politicians who do not want to see the government dismantled 
need to simply say, repeatedly, that they support an adequate government.  
This would start a healthy debate about what constitutes an adequate 
government and marginalize those who oppose an adequate government.  At 
any rate, progress in phasing out fossil fuels will require political changes 
and strategic actions to make them come about.114 
I do not think it is possible for anybody to prove a view about what 
political strategy is best.  I provide my views merely to clarify the questions 
that a phase-out goal raises.  These questions include whether we can sell a 
phase-out without arguing against continued fossil fuel use directly, and how 
we can move the political process to accept a legitimate role for government 
more generally.  An effort to change the political climate to make a phase-
out politically plausible requires answers to these questions. 
                                                 
112. See id. 
113. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 36–49 (2012). 
114. Hepburn & Stern, supra note 105, at 36–37, 43–46; see also Banerjee, 
supra note 107. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Addressing climate disruption requires a phase-out of fossil fuels.  
Accepting this proposition reframes the questions we should ask ourselves 
about how to design effective environmental policy and how to create a 
political climate where we can adopt sensible policies. 
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